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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
May 14, 1981 Conference
List 3, Sheet 2
No. 80-1429

Cert to CA 3 (en bane)
(Adams for 5-judge majority;
Se1tz for 4-judge concurrence)

Youngberg (superintendent,
Pennhurs~tate ~c ~ol), et. al ~ /

'

v.
Romeo
1. SUMMARY:

Federal/civil

Timely

Petrs contend that the CA 3 erred in holding

that institutionalized, mentally retarded persons have substantive
due process rights (1) to receive treatment which is the "least
intrusive" treatment under the circumstances,

(2) to be free of

2•

restraints absent "compelling necessity," and (3) to be protected
from harm absent "substantial necessity."

Petrs also contend that

the CA 3 erred in refusing to dismiss this §1983 claim on the ground
of qualified immunity.
2. FACTS and DECISION BELOW:

This case arises from the

same Pennhurst State School and Hospital at issue in the Court's
recently decided Pennhurst v. Halderman, et al., Nos. 79-1404, etc
(April 20, 1981).
Pennhurst.

Petrs are the superintendent and two directors of

Resp, who was a member of the class in Pennhurst, is a

profoundly mentally retarded resident of Pennhurst.

(Although 30

years old, a chemical imbalance of the brain retarded resp's mental
capacity at the level of an 18 month old).

His mother requested

that he be committed in 1974, when his father's death left his
mother financially unable to care for him.
Resp has been injured at Pennhurst over 70 [sic] times,
both from self-infliction and from the attacks of other residents.
Some of these attacks were in retaliation for resp's aggressive
behavior.

Some of resp's injuries became inflected, either from

inadequate medical attention or from contact with human excrement
that had not been cleaned up from the Pennhurst wards.

Resp's

mother brought this §1983 suit in 1976 on resp's behalf, alleging
that these injuries violated resp's constitutional rights.

An

amended complaint also alleged that resp had been shackled to a bed
or chair for long periods each day, and that this too violated
constitutional rights.

According to the CA 3, resp's complaint did

not specify the exact constitutional rights asserted, but the CA 3
read the complaint to allege violations of substantive due process

3•

under the 14th Amendment and of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment under the 8th Amendment.

The complaint sought

compensatory and punitive damages.
At trial, the dist ct refused to permit testimony by two
experts on resp's behalf.

They would have testified that the lack

of "programming and activities" on resp's ward accounted for the
numerous injuries.

One of the experts also would have testified

that the shackling served no medical purpose and was used solely for
the staff's convenience.

The dist ct excluded this testimony on the

ground that its admission would have turned this §1983 claim into a
malpractice suit.

The dist ct also refused resp's proffered jury

instructions, which maintained that resp had a "right to treatment
in the least restrictive environment."

Rather, the ct followed an

8th Amendment standard and instructed the jury that it should find
~

petrs liable if they exhibited "deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs."

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429

u.s.

97 (1976).

The

jury returned a verdict for petrs.
The en bane CA 3 reversed.

All nine judges agreed that

the 14th Amendment's Due Process Clause rather than the 8th
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause governs this case,
and all nine agreed that the dist ct's judgment should be vacated
and a new trial be had.

But the CA split 5-4 over the standard of

liability mandated by the Due Process Clause.
The majority viewed resp's complaint as asserting three
rights:

(1) a right to be free from undue bodily restraint; (2) a

right to personal security and protection; and (3) a right to
adequate treatment.

The following statement by the majority sums up

4.

its decision as to the standards of liability for violating these
rights:

"The first two [rights] are undiluted legal concerns,

relating to protected liberty interests; as such, they are entitled
to heightened judicial scrutiny.

The t ~d entails mixed questions

of law and medical judgment, and thus requires a more flexible
standard of judicial review and suitable deference to informed
medical opinion."

'

More specifically, theCA decided as follows as

to each right:
(1)

Right to freedom from bodily restraint.

According to

the majority, resp's claim that he had been shackled to a bed or
chair stated a claim of deprivation of a substantive liberty
interest--i.e. the right to be free from bodily restraint.

This is

so because shackling is a type of punishment and because the liberty
interest in the Due Process Clause protects those not committed of
crimes from punishment.
The majority held:

See Bell v. Wolfish, 441

u.s.

520 (1979).

"The trial judge, therefore, should instruct the

jury [upon retrial] that such shackling may be justified only by a
compelling necessity, i.e., that the shackling was essential to
protect the patient or to treat him."

In the alternative, the

majority held that the trial court could charge the jury that petrs
are not liable if shackling was the "least restrictive method of
dealing with the patient in the light of his problems and
surrounding."

In the majority's view, "[a]

'least restrictive'

charge will not only insure that compelling treatment explanations,
as opposed to fiscal concerns or staff convenience, were the basis
for shackling, but also that the institution considered and rejected

5.

alternative methods of restraining the resident, if some restraint
indeed was required."
(2)

Right to personal security.

The majority also held

that the "concept of liberty .•• embrace[s] the 'right to be free from
and to obtain judicial relief for unjustified intrusions on personal
security.'

Ingraham v. Wright, 430

u.s. 651, 673 (1977) ."

Resp

stated a claim under this right by alleging that he had been
attacked many times and that petrs knew or should have known of some
of these attacks.

A violation of this right, according to the

majority, is justified by a "substantial necessity."

The majority

explained:
"Substantial necessity is more appropriate than
the compelling necessity standard employed in
connection with the shackling claim, for it
enables a court and jury to distinguish between
isolated incidents and inadvertent accidents, on
the one hand, and persistent disregard for
patients' needs, on the other. If the [petrs]
disregarded [resp's] injuries or failed to take
steps to protect [resp,] then they should be
liable unless they can offer explanations based
on important state interests."
Given this standard, the majority concluded that the trial ct had
erred in excluding the testimony of resp's expert witnesses.
(3)

Right to treatment.

In the view of the majority,

this right, unlike the first two, "does not present a purely legal
issue," for courts must recognize their own limited knowledge and
doctors' expertise.

The majority also recognized that the "right to

treatment" comprehends a broad spectrum of treatments--everything
from minor, daily decisions about medication to "nonreversible
physical operations" such as lobotomies.
'-

Thus, the majority

concluded that judicial authority increases as the treatment becomes

..•

6.

more unalterable, for "whenever unalterable interferences with
bodily integrity place deprivations of liberty in issue, the law and
not medicine is the ultimate decision-maker."

As to the applicable

standard, the majority rejected resp's theory that he has a right to
judicial review of every "day-to-day" decision, and it also rejected
petrs' view that only deliberate indifference to medical needs
constitutes a violation.

Rather, the majority held:

"It should be

made clear to the jury that for the plaintiff to prevail it is
necessary to find that an individual confined in a facility for the
mentally retarded did not receive a form of treatment that is
regarded as acceptible for him in light of present medical or other
scientific knowledge."
In light of its decision to remand for new trial, the
majority did not address resp's other claims of trial error.

Nor

did it decide the question whether petrs are immune from violations
if the jury finds violations after the new trial.

The majority did

state, however, that the trial judge "should instruct the jury
regarding the possibility of immunity with the caveat that
defendants' reasonable belief is to be judged at the time their
actions were taken" and that petrs "are not responsible for
unforeseeable developments in the law."
The concurrence disagreed with the majority's delineation
of differing standards of review depending on the right involved.
In the concurrence's view, each of resp's rights involved mixed
questions of law and medical judgment.

Accordingly, the concurrence

would judge resp's claims under one standard:

whether petrs'

conduct "was such a substantial departure from accepted professional

7.

judgment, practice, or standards in the care and treatment of this
plaintiff as to demonstrate that the [petrs] did not base their
conduct on a professional judgment."
3. CONTENTIONS:

Petrs contend that the CA's decision

raises important questions which the CA decided incorrectly.
The questions are important, petrs contend, for at least
three reasons:
First, petrs contend that the CA's decision goes far
beyond anything this Court has decided about

the

mentally retarded or the competence of courts to determine liability
~

for violations of those rights.

In short, petrs contend that the CA

has created a new constitutional tort out of state malpractice law.
Petrs suggest that the CA went beyond (1) O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422

u.s.

563 (1974), in recognizing a right to treatment in the least

intrusive manner, and (2) Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979), in
establishing "compelling necessity" and "substantial necessity"
standards of liability under the Due Process Clause.
Second, petrs contend that the CA's decision will
encourage federal litigation.

There are approximately 150,000

mentally retarded persons in state institutions.

Under the CA's

decision, petrs contend, the federal courts will become
"repositories for most, if not all, personal injury claims arising
in those institutions."
Third, petrs contend that the CA's delineation of duties
and standards of liability is so unclear that it will seriously
hinder the care of the retarded.

In this regard, petrs adopt the

concurrence's view that physicians no longer will dare work at a

8.

state institution, insurers no longer will dare insure them, and
state executive officials no longer will dare fund them, all for
fear of uncertain and unpredictable liability.
Beyond contending that the questions are important, petrs
contend that the CA decided them incorrectly.

In petrs' view, the

CA's decision requires doctors and staff persons to engage in a
delicate balancing of vague constitutional rights and standards
everytime a decision must be made about the care of an
institutionalized person.

Furthermore, petrs contend that the

decision actually places conflicting obligations upon doctors and
staff persons.

For example, resp's right to treatment in the least

intrusive manner might mean that petrs should allow him to roam the
institution relatively freely, but the right of other persons to
personal security might mean that resp, who sometimes is aggressive,
should be restrained from roaming.

Finally, petrs contend that the

CA's decision ignores the relative incompetence of courts and juries
to decide whether medical judgments were proper or improper.
Beyond the merits of the constitutional questions, petrs
contend that the CA should have directed the dist ct to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that petrs are immune, under good-faith
qualified immunity, even if they did violate resp's rights.
Resp does not dispute that the questions decided by the CA
are important.
for review.

But resp contends that these questions are not ripe

The CA remanded for new trial, at which the dist ct is

to admit the testimony of resp's expert witnesses.

Until their

testimony is in the record, resp contends, (along with whatever
testimony petrs might offer) , this Court will not have an adequate

9

record upon which to the CA's decision.

0

After trial, the record

will contain testimony as to the availability, efficacy, and cost of
different forms of care and treatment.

As the record now stands,

resp concludes, the legal questions raised are too abstract to allow
the Court to make a sound decision in this important new area of the
law.
Turning to the merits, resp contends that the CA was
correct in deciding (1) that the 14th Amendment rather than the 8th
Amendment governs, and (2) that institutionalized, mentally retarded
persons have substantive due process rights to treatment, personal
security, and freedom from restraint.

Resp contends that most of

the lower federal courts that have considered the questions have
agreed with the CA here.
Finally, resp contends that the question of petrs'
immunity must await the development of a factual record as to petrs'
knowledge of resp's injuries and the law at the time.
There are two amicus briefs.
Assoc urges a grant.

The American Psychiatric

In its view, the CA's decision may do more

harm than good, for tempering or displacing medical judgments with
legal ones is "neither required by the Constitution nor desirable as
a method of upgrading state programs."

The other amicus brief was

filed by 35 states and American Samoa.

They contend that nearly all

of them are confronted with litigation raising exactly the issues in
this case.
4. DISCUSSION:
difficult.

The questions obviously are important and

In my view, the only reason not to grant would be to

follow resp's suggestion of awaiting the development of a fuller

10.

record at the new trial.

But I am inclined to think that a fuller

record would not enhance this Court's review materially, for the
CA's decision is not pinned to the facts of this case.
is a broad and theoretical statement of law.
I therefore recommend a grant.
There is a response and two amici.
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Opin in petn.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM
To:
From:

Mr. Justice Powell

January 4, 1982

Mary

No. 80-1429, Duane Youngberg, et al.

(superintendant, et. al.),

v. Nicholas Romeo, by his mother and next friend

Questions Presented

The major question presented is whether the involuntarily
committed enjoy a constitutional right to affirmative treatment
("habilitation").

The petn presents two questions.

The first is

2.

whether the CA3 erred in holding that institutionalized mentally
retarded persons have substantive due process rights (1} to receive
treatment that is both acceptable in light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge and which is the least intrusive
treatment available under the circumstances; (2} to be free of
restraints, whether for treatment or protection, absent a showing of
compelling necessity; and (3} to be protected from harm, however
caused, absent a showing of substantial necessity.
The second question is whether, when an appellate court
admittedly creates a new constitutional right in an action for
damages under 42

u.s.c.

§1983, it must, as a matter of law, direct

dismissal of that claim on the grounds of qualified immunity.

I.

BACKGROUND

The Court has never determined whether involuntarily
institutionalized mentally-retarded persons have a right to
treatment under the Constitution.
Halderman, 101

s.

Last year in Pennhurst v.

Ct. 1531 (1981}, the Court considered whether 42

U.S.C. §6010 1 gives the mentally retarded a substantive right to
"appropriate treatment" in "the least restrictive" environment.

The

Court concluded that it did not, and remanded for consideration of
(1} whether the mentally retarded had standing to compel compliance
with those conditions that are imposed on participating states by

1 Title 42 u.s.c. §6010 is
federal-state grant program.
"have a right to appropriate
in "the setting that is least

a "bill-of-rights" provision in a
It states that the mentally retarded
treatment, services, and habilitation"
restrictive of ••. personal liberty."

the act,

(2) federal constitutional claims, and (3) claims under

another federal statute.
The patient in this case is a member of the class in
Halderman, and his claims for injunctive relief are before the
courts in that action, not this one.

See Petn n.S at 5.

Here, resp

Nicholas Romeo seeks only compensatory and punitive damages from the
Director and two supervisors.

"----- ~
procedural safeguards: he does

Resp does not seek release or any
not dispute his inability to survive
, t

on the outside.

\ \...

---

Instead, he seeks a substantive right to better (or
""----""

~

...-,

~

different) treatment and conditions as a matter of constitutional
I

--

law, a right enforceable in a §1983 suit for monetary damages.

A.

The Facts and Proceedings Below
Resp is a profoundly-retarded 33-year old man, with an IQ

estimated between 8 and 10 and the mental age of a child of 18-24
months.

He lived at home with his parents until he was 26.

those years, Romeo suffered no serious injuries.

During

Mrs. Romeo did

testify, however, that she remembers seeing Romeo slap people when
frustrated and that she and his father "may have been bruised by
such slapping." 2

After his father died in May of 1974, his mother

was unable to control him.
Initially, on May 22, 1974, he was admitted to Penn.
Hospital Community Mental Health and Retardation Center.

His

admission report states that he was admitted "following assaultive,

2 Pltf•s Anws to Dfts• first set of interrogatories at 2.

4.
uncontrollable behavior at horne following the death of his father
who had cared closely for him."

R. 7-72.

His physical condition

)

was described as "basically
good........_.____
health except
for multiple bruises
'........__

-

and lacerations that were self-inflicted by banging himself against
walls and other objects."

His stay was described in these words:

"He presented a severe management problem requiring constant nursing
care, occasional wrist and ankle restraints.
attention and enjoyed a physical stimulation.

He responded well to
Although he could not

talk, he was able to learn a few small tasks of self-care.
Eventually, a good relationship was established with him and he was
transferred to Pennhurst without incident."

R. 7-73.

The transfer to Pennhurst took place on June 12, 1974.
Between that date and November of 1976, when the complaint was
filed, Romeo was not without any medical care or treatment.
Following his admission, he underwent a physical.

Thereafter, he

was hospitalized for hepititis (12/10/74 to 12/27/74) and to treat a
finger fracture (3/20/76 to 4/21/76) . 3

He was treated nine times

for boils, and nine times for diarrhea.

He was also treated for

acne, eye irritation, an eye infection, possible cellulitis of the
elbow, and colds.

In addition, he was treated for a "fissure R

foot."
The finger fracture (3/20/76) apparently involved some
laceration of the finger, and it is this event that began Mrs.
Romeo's current dissatisfaction with her son's treatment.

Shortly

3Exhibit B attached to Pltf's answers to defts' first set of
interrogatories.

5.

before that event, in February of 1976, Romeo underwent Pennhurst's
annual review.

That report states that, although Romeo 11 likes

attention from staff, .. he is 11 [a]busive to residents and staff: not
cooperative: doesn't seem to respond to commands well: eats feces. 114
His then-current program included a 11 2-hr toileting
schedule 11 and a program to teach eating and dressing skills.

A new

program was regarded as necessary 11 to stop him from throwing his
tray ...

A behavior-modification program was then designed for Romeo.

This program was to teach him to stop throwing his tray (by having
him pick-up everything thrown) and to decrease his violence by
putting 11 mitts 11 on him for 15 minutes each occurance.

This was

regarded as necessary (2/20/76) 11 [b]ecause of the number of injuries
Nicky's hitting, pinching and scratching has [sic] caused and
because of the danger that Nicky's behaviors present to other
residents and staff. 115

I~

~

The program to restain Romeo's violence was not, however,

implemente~because h~

mother

~uld

not

:gree~to

it. 6

~------5-58. Shortly thereafter, his finger was fractured.

indicate that Pennhurst does not know how it happened.

R. 5-57 to
The records
Entries from

the 11 daybook 11 and 11 progress notes 11 for this period indicate that
Romeo was very violent to staff as well as other inmates.

For

6 Earlier, in 1975, his mother requested that he be given a
helmet, but she did not want him to have to wear it against his
will. Pennhurst got the requested helmut for Romeo, but he would
not wear it voluntarily. Id.

6

0

example, at 6:00 p.m. on April 21, 1976, he slapped an aide in the
chest at 6 p.m.

At 8:00p.m., he slapped an LPN on the back and

attempted to kick an aide in the face twice.

On the following day,

between 7:00 and 8:00a.m., he slapped aides three times.
In July (the 13 & 18) of 1976, when Mrs. Romeo visited her
son, she observed that his eyes were black and his lip split open
with a hole where a tooth apparently went completely through.

This

set of injuries seems to have begun with a laceration above the eye
on 6/18/76 (suffered when he slipped into a door).
laceration was reopened (no notation as to how).
again on 6/25 by Romeo banging his head on window.

On 6/19/76, the
It was reopened
On 6/27, it was

again reopened, and his chin was bleeding (both self-inflicted).
Two days later, his mouth was bleeding from his own slapping.

On

7/8, he pushed another patient and received another small laceration
over the eye.

On 7/10, he pushed another patient into a wall and

received a lacerated upper lip and a nosebleed. 7

Apparently, Mrs.

Romeo saw the cumulative result of these incidents (and presumably
smaller, unreported incidents) when she visited in July.
By August of 1976, Pennhurst had received several
complaints about the way in which Romeo was being treated.

On the

6th, a log was kept of his behavior for 3 hrs and 7 min (8:25 a.m.
to 11:32 a.m.).
hour.

During that period, he slept for approximately one

In addition, he slapped others 20 times, grabbed or pinched

others 22 times, hit himself 15 times; bit himself 8 times, "dug his

7.

rectum" 15 times, hit the window or wall twice, scratched others
once, banged his head twice, and was pushed by another 3 times. 8
On Nov. 4, 1976, the complaint was filed.

The complaint

(at 3) alleged that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present,
pltf has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions.

These

injuries include: a permanently deformed finger; broken bones;
injuries to his sexual organs, boils, and human bites."

The

original complaint sought damages and injunctive relief from three
of Pennhurst's supervisory officials, who allegedly knew that Romeo
had suffered injuries and had failed to create procedures which
would have prevented them from occurring, thus violating his rights
under the eighth and fourteenth amendments.
After the complaint was filed, in late 1976, Romeo was
transfered from his ward to the hospital for treatment for a broken

-

arm suffered when he was being seated by a staff member.

While in

t he infirmary, he was physically restrained during portions of the
day.

In Dec. of 1976, a second amended complaint was filed alleging

that defts had kept him restrained in the infirmary for prolonged
periods of time each day.

In addition, he now sought damages for

defts' alleged failure to provide him with appropriate treatment
throughout his stay at Pennhurst.
An eight-day jury trial was held in Apr. of 1978.

During

the trial, the trial judge refused to allow testimony of experts
proffered by Romeo to show that Romeo could have been effectively

8.

treated under other programs (not involving restraints) and that the
lack of programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive
behavior.

He would also have testified that psychologists are

ethically bound to choose methods that do not use restraints and
that there is no dispute in the literature on this point.
tud~e

The trial

disallowed this testimony. He explained that it was relevant
~--------

to a malpractice suit but that he did not consider it relevant to a
§1983 constitutional claim.
At trial, in addition to evidence of the factual background
discussed above, a Pennhurst aide testified that she had seen one of
the other aides knock Romeo down in the shower and punch him
repeatedly in the face.

She reported this to the authorities, but

they purportedly felt unable to act on the unsubstantiated testimony

~~

of one employee.
At the close of the trial, the

~udg~inst~cted

the jury

~.

that "if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas
Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional rights.
73a.

J.A.

And the jury was instruced that if the defts shackled Romeo

other than in a good faith effort to treat him, then his rights wre
violated.

Ibid.

Finally, the jury was instructed that if Romeo was

denied programs "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," or if
defts were "deliberately indifferent to the medical and
psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his constitutional rights
were violated under the eighth amendment.

Id., at 73a-75a.

The trial judge denied the jury instruction proposed by
Romeo, which asserted that he had:

(1) a right to "such treatment

..
as will afford [him] a reasonable

to acquire and

maintain those life skills necessary to cope as effectively as [his]
capacities permit," Petn. App. 94a-95a, and (2) a right to treatment
"under the least restrictive conditions consistent with the purpose
of the commitment," id., at 95a.
The jury returned a verdict for the defts.

On appeal, the

CA3 vacated the judgment of the DC and remanded for a new trial.
All of the judges agreed that the eighth amenment was inapplicable
and that the expert testimony should have been admitted.

The CA

was, however, divided (5-4) as to the substantive rights
institutionalized mentally retarded.
With regard to the equal protection claim, the majority
(Adams, Gibbons, Weis, Higginbotham,

&

Sloviter) held that failureS_+

of the defts to provide for the pltf's safety can be justified only
I\

'- \

by a showing of substantial necessity.

And, because physical

restraint "raises a presumption of a punitive sanction," it can be
l \

~

justified only by a compelling necessity.

In addition, the majority

held that the pltf is entitled to an instruction that the defts must

-

----------.-.-..~

show that restraint was the "least restrictive method of dealing
with the patient, in light of his problems and the surrounding
-environment."

----

e~
Third, the majority divided the treatment
claim' into

three categories.

If a jury finds that no treatment has been

administered, it may hold the defts liable unless they can provide a
compelling explanation for the lack of treatment.

If some treatment

was administered, the defts will not be liable if that treatment was
"acceptable in light of present medical or other scientific
knowledge •••• Thus, if defendants can demonstrate a coherent

10.

relationship between a particular treatment program and a resident's
needs, they would not be lable."

Finally, "least intrusive"

analysis applies to the selection of a treatment approach if the
jury finds that the approach subjected the pltf to "significant

~Lf

deprivations of

~

eitz, Aldisert, Rosenn, &
the

in establishing its "multilevel standards"

and that a unitary standard should be applied.

They found the

----------------------

majority standards unreasonably strict irtd often indistinghuishable
from medical malpractice.

They would
have adopted this standard:
......

was the defts' conduct "such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice or standards in the care and
treatment of this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants
did not base their conduct on a professional judgment."

The

minority concluded that the Constitutiton "only requires

that

courts make certain that professional judgment in fact was
exercised."
With regard to immunity, the majority noted that the defts
"are not responsible for unforseeable developments in the law," and
held that, on remand, the judge should insturct the jury that their
reasonable good faith is to be judged as of the time they acted.
The majority recognized that "[t]he present controversy inhabits the
twilight area of developing law concerning the constitutional rights
of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded."

But the majority

did not, apparently, regard the law as so unsettled as to
-----------------------,---~
~
necessarily provide defts with a good faith immunity.

----------------------------The portions of the

-----

~

~

CA3's decisions finding substantive

11.
rights to treatment under the due process clause are discussed in
the next section.

a,
B.

Substantive oue Process and the Right to Treatment

cr

rl/

~

As mentioned earlier, the Court has never directly
addressed the question presented here although, in Sanchez v. New
Mexico, 396 U.S. 276 (1970), the Court dismissed an appeal from a
lower court decision holding that the involuntarily committed have
no right to treatment.

The appeal was dismissed for want of a

substantial federal question.
The purpose of this section is to provide background
information for resolving the right-to-treatment question.

This

section discusses (1) the analytic substance of substantive due
process; (2) the

s.

Ct. cases dealing with (a) prisoners'

substantive rights and (b) the rights of the involuntarily
committed; and (3) the lower court decisions
including the decisions below.
1.

The anal tic substance

In

recent years, the Court
--~~----~~------~~~~
activities relating c 1
relationships,

-

See, e.g., Roe v.

Wade, 410 U.S. 494, 499 (1977)

(right to abortion) ; Planned

Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)

(abortions for minors and

parental consent); Cleveland Bd. of Education v. LaFleur, 414
632 (1974)

(school board policy regarding pregnant teachers);

v. City of E. Cleveland, 431

u.s.

494, 499 (1977)

U~

Moore

(Powell, J.)

(zoning ordinace cannot proscribe extended family unit from living
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together); Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431
(right to contraceptives); Zabloci v. Redhail, 434

u.s.
u.s.

678 (1977)
374 (1978)

(right to remarry though paying child support).
Analytically, these cases begin with a finding of a
"fundamental right."

In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, the Court

began by examining the cases in which substantive due process had
been applied.
640 (1923)

u.s.

Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262

632, 639-

(reversing conviction of teacher for teaching German) and

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925)
(upholding challenge to Oregon law requiring all children to attend
public schools), the Court cited a "host of cases" recognizing that
"freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life
is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."

Moore, 431

u.s.

at 499.

It is, however, by no means clear what rights will be
considered fundamental in addition to those already recognized by
the Court.

-

The Court has stopped "far short of any general

recognition of a "fundamental value" in individual autonomy."

-

...-...._.

Gunther, Cases and Materials on Constitutional Law, at 607 (lOth ed.
d).A-

1981) •

Substantive due process claims based such a right were
1\

rejected in Doe v. Commnwealth's Attorney, 425

u.s.

901 (1976)

(affirming without opinion or argument lower court's decision
upholding constitutionality of statute regulating consensual sexual
behavior between adults) and Kelley v. Johnson, 425

u.s.

238 (1976)

(regulation of length of policeman's hair sustained).
Once a fundamental right is found, the level of scrutiny to
be applied seems to be, in the majority's view, the strictest.

It

',

13 •

.

is true that in Moore, the Court did not state that only compelling
state interests could justify the challenged regulation.

Instead,

the test was expressed as "whether the importance of the
governmental interests advanced and the extent to which they are
served by the challenged regulation" justify the interference with a
fundamental right.

u.s.

438 (1972)

Id., at 499.

And in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405

(contraceptives) the Court articulated the rational-

relationship test, though, in fact it may have exercised a somewhat
stricter scrutiny than the usual deference to legislative decisions.
See Gunther, Forward:

[A] Model for a Newer Equal Prottection, 46

Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1972).
however,

In Roe v. Wade, 410

u.s.

113 (1973),

the Court stated "where certain 'fundamental rights' are

involved, the Court has held that regulation limiting these rights
may be justified only by a 'compelling state interest' [and] that
legislative enactments must be narrowly drawn to express only the
legitimate state interests at stake."
Post-Roe v. Wade, the majority of the Court seems to have
adopted the l&ompelling-state interest level of scrutiny" whenever a
fundamental right is regulated as well as when it is totally
frustrated.

In Carey v. Population Sevices Int'l, 431

u.s.

678

(1977), the Court invalidated a number of restrictions on the
distribution and advertising of nonprescription contraceptives.

The

statute prohibited the sale of such items by anyone other than a
licensed pharmacist ~nd prohibited their sale or distribution to
minors.

The majority

interest standard:

·(~

Brennan,

J.)

used the compelling-state-

." 'Compelling' is of course the key word: where a

decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is

·..

J~~

involved, regulations imposing a burden on

~~~
it may be justified only

by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express
only those interests."
In

y~

Id., at 686

(citing Roe v. Wade).

separate opinion, you rejected the proposition that

------------------

strict scutiny is the appropriate standard of review in all cases
inolving regulation of adult sexual relations:

"In my view, the

extraordinary protection the Court would give to all personal
decisions in matters of sex is neither required by the Constitution
nor supported by our prior decisions."

Id., at 703.

Actually, the

strict-scrutiny standard had only been applied in cases involving
substantial interference with constitutional rights.
704.

Id., at 703-

As discussed above, your decision is Moore also failed to

apply strict scrutiny, though it was decided after Roe v. Wade.

2.

Supreme Court caselaw.

(a).

procedural rights of pre-trial detainees.

u.s.

520

(1979)

Substantive and
In Bell v. Wolfish, 441

(Rehnquist, J.), discussed in greater detail below,

pre-trial detainees challenged the constitutionality of their
conditions of confinement.

The lower courts held that a number of

the conditions under which the pltfs were held were
unconstitutional.

The CA3 held that the pltfs, who had not been

found guilty of any crime, could only be subjected to those
"restrictions and privations" which "inhere in thier confinement
itself or which are justified by compelling necessities of jail
administration."
This Court reversed, rejecting the "compelling necessity"
standard, and upholding the consitituionality of the conditions of

15.
confinement because the restrictions were reasonably related to the
institution's interest in security or other valid administrative
interests. 9

The Court also noted that conditions did not violate

the eighth amendment, observing that,

"[~]

fortiori, pretrial

detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at
least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by
convicted prisoners."

Id., at 520.

In Jackson v. Indiana, 406

u.s.

715 (1972), discussed in

greater detail in section II.A.2 infra, a pre-trial detainee was
found incompetent at a competency hearing and then held indefinitely
(until competent) in an institution for the mentally incompetent
without either criminal process or civil commitment.

It appeared

unlikely that the detainee (who was very retarded) would ever be
competent to stand trial.

The Court held that the state could not

continue to hold him without initiating civil commitment
proceedings, noting that, as a minimum, due process at least
"requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose of commitment."

Id., at 738.

In summary, pre-trial detainees have a right to conditions
reasonably-related to the security and administrative needs of the
facility.

.

.

.

And, although the eighth amendment does not apply

directly to pre-trial· detainees, they, a fortiorari, have a right to
.
confinement without cruel and unusual punishment (because they have
9You joined the majority in Bell except insofar as it upheld
routine body-cavity searches. 441 u.s., at 563.

t,

r.•
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the right to confinement without any punishment).

Moreover, the

nature and duration of confinement without criminal process must
bear some reasonable relation to its purposes.

(b) •

Gamble, 429

The

u.s.

~ubstantive

97 (1976)

rights of prisoneis.

In EStelle v.

(Marshall, J.), the Court considered the

extent to which prisoners have a constitutional right to medical
treatment.

The decision rested on the eighth amendment rather than

any substantive right to certain conditions of confinement.

The

Court concluded that "deliberate indifference to serious medical
needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain'" proscribed by the eighth amendment.
104.

!d., at

The Court noted that its holding did not constitutionalize
(2.....-

medical malpractice "merely because the v1im is a prisoner ••.• [A]
prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

It is

only such indifference that can offend 'evolving standards of
decency' in violation of the Eighth Amendment."

!d., at 106.

In Gamble, the prisoner had been seen by medical personel
17 times during a 3-month period.

They treated his back injury,

high blood pressure, and heart problems.

The complaint was based on

their failure to provide the proper treatment; an x-ray or other
tests would have revealed the true nature of that injury.

The Court

examined these facts and concluded that failing to order an x-ray
"does not represent cruel and unusual punishment.

At most, it is

medical malpractice, and as such the proper forum is the state court
under the Texas Tort Claims Act."

!d., at 107. 10

Footnote(s) 10 will appear on following pages.

..

In Procunier v. Martinez, 416

u.s.

396

(1974)~well,

17.
J.),

the Court considered the validity of prisoner-mail censorship
regulations and a ban on the use of law students and legal paraprofessionals to conduct attorney-client interviews with inmates.
The regulations were held invalid.

Because the censorship

regulations incidentally restricted speech, a first amendment right,
~

they were sustainable only if (1) they furthered

onfe1

or more

important and substantial governmental interests in security, order,
and the rehabilitation of inmates, and (2) they restricted speech no
more than necessary to further the legitimate governmental interest
involved.

The censorship regulations went so far as proscribing

criticism or expression of inflamatory religious view--and clearly
failed to meet this standard. 11

In reaching this decision, the

10 In a footnote, 429 u.s., at 96 n.lO, the Court cited four
lower court decisions illustrating violations of the eighth
amendment in the context of medical care:
"Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. ed 541 (CA2 1974) (doctor's
choosing the 'easier and less efficacious treatment' of
throwing away the prisoner's ear and stitching t~e stump
may be attributable to 'deliberate indifference ••• rather
than an exercise of professional judgment')~ Thomas v.
Pate, 493 F. 2d 151, 158 (CA7), cert. denied sub nom.
Thomas v. Cannon, 419 u.s. 879 (1974) (injection of
penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was allergic, and
refusal of doctor to treat allergic reaction)~ Jones v.
Lockhart, 484 F. 2d 1192 (CA8 1973) (refusal of paramedic
to provide treatment)~ Martinex v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921
(CA2 1970) (prison physician refuses to administer the
prescribed pain killer and renders leg surgery
unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to to stand despite
contrary instructions of surgeon)."

11 The restriction on the use of law students (not applicable to
sudents employed by practicing attorneys) was an infringment of the
due process clause because "[t]he constitutional guarantee of due
Footnote continued on next page.

~Jtr
r:fr
~8.
1.-M- 0~ ~Court did not determine the extent to which prisoners enjoy the
protection of the first amendment because the challenged regulations
implicated the first amendment rights of those on the outside with
whom the prisoners were communicating as well as the rights (if any)
of the prisoners themselves.

In~hodes
1981)

Id., at 408.

v. Chapman, 49 U.S.L.W. 4677 (No. 80-332 June 1 ,

(Powell, J.), the Court rejected claims that double-bunking

violated the eighth amendment.

In reaching this conclusion, the

Court noted that "[i]n assessing claims that conditions of
confinement are cruel and unusual, courts must bear in mind that
their inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that
judicial answers to them reflect that fact rather than a court's
idea of how best to operate a detention facility."
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441

Id., at 4680

u.s., at 539) (footnote omitted).

In summary, prisoners have a right to conditions that do
not

constitute a cruel and unusual punishment under "the evolving

standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
Gregg v. Georgia, 428

u.s. 153, 173 (1976).

Petrs have a limited

right to medical treatment; deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need violates their right to be kept free from cruel and

process of law has as a corollary the requirement that prisoners be
afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful
convictions and to seek redress for violations of their
constitutional rights. Id., at 419. Because the regulation
interfered with that right--a procedural, not a substantive, due
process right--it was also declared unconstitutional.

~.-.
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unusual punishment.

And regulation of prisoners' correspondence

with those on the outside must satisy the first amendment standards
applicable to regulation (in contrast to prohibition} of speech.
Finally, althought the conditions under which prisoners are kept
might constitute cruel and unusual punishment, double-bunking in
itself does not.

(c).

~dington

The rights of the involuntarily committed.

v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979}

In

(Burger, C.J.}, the Court

held that "clear unequivocal and convincing evidence" is required to
commit a mentally ill person involuntarily for his own care and
protection or the protection of others.

The Court noted that, as

parens patriae, the state has a legitimate interest in providing for
its citizens who cannot care for themselves.

And the state has

authority, under its police power, to protect other citizens form
injury.

Although the Court rejected the "beyond reasonable doubt"

standard provided in criminal process, it also concluded that a mere
preponderance standard would fail to adequately protect the strong
liberty

inte~t

of individuals being committed.

In O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422

u.s. 563 (1973} (Stewart,

J.}, the Court held that a state cannot constitutionally confine,
without more, a non-dangerous individual who is capable of surviving
in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible
family membeJY and friends.
In Parnham v. J. R., 442

u.s. 584 (1979} (Burger, C.J.},

the Court upheld a statute providing for commitment of minors by
their parents without an adversarial hearing.

An independent

?/YUV ~ T_

j:
~~7Jo_l~,
~?'(''~~~~

-

medical evaluation was considered sufficient.

The Court expressed

doubt that the risks of error in this process would be significantly
reduced by a more formal, judicial-type hearing.

In summary, the

~unta~y com~d

have the right to a

"clear and convincing" evidence standard in their commitment
proceedings, and the state has no legitimate reason for committing
involuntarily {for treatment) someone who is not dangerous and who
can survive on the outside.

And a minor can be committed by his

parents without an adverserial hearing when there is an independent
medical evaluation of his condition.

3.

The CAs and the right to treatment.

{a).

The CADC.

The

CADC first recognized a right to treatment based on a DC statute.
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F. 2d 451 {CADC 1966).
Harris, 419 F. 2d 617 {CADC

But in Covington v.
Fahy, & McGowan), the

CADC suggested

is independent of the DC

s;rute:

~new

legislation apart, however, the principle of the
least restrictive alternative consistent with the
legitimate purposes of commitment inheres in the very
nature of civil commitment, which entails an extraordinary deprivation of liberty justifiable only when the
respondent is 'mentally ill to the extent that he is
likely to injure himself of other persons if allowed to
remain at liberty.'" Id., at 623 {quoting D.C Code).

,

~

As far as I can tell, this language is the original source for the
proposition that the firs! amendment's_principle of;'least
~

'-'--

r~rictive m~ans"--a

~~.._...

principle developed in cases reviewing

statutes proscribing speech--applies to conditions of confinement of
the involuntarily commited.

In addition, it is the first support

..

'

'

for the proposition that any such substantive right exists
independent of statute.
propostion.

There is no analysis developing either

But the principles are immediately applied to treatment

decisions within a hospital:
"The principle of the least restrictive alternative is
equally applicable to alternate dispostions within a
mental hospital. It makes little-Bense to guard zealously
against the possibility of unwarranted deprivations prior
to hospitalizations only to abandon the watch once the
patient disappears behind hospital doors." Id., at 62324.
,/
In the context of determing whether patients have received the care
to which they are constitutionally entitled, the least-restrictivemeans principle presupposes, not only that it is an appropriate
standard for making medical decisions relevant to treatment, but
also that courts are competent to review such decisions and
determine what treatment is best.
{b).
1974)
{197S)

CAS.

In Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F. 2d S07 {CAS

{Rives, Wisdom, & Morgan), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. S63
{state cannot confine non-dangerous mentally ill person who

-

can survive on the outside, discussed above), the CAS became the
first circuit to find a right to treatment for the involuntarily
~ted

in the absence of any statutory provision, solely on the

basis of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
\

The

CAS's substantive-due-process analysis began with noting "the
}ndisputable fact that civil commitment entails a massive
curtailment of liberty" in the constitutional sense."

Id., at S20

{quoting Humprey v. Cady, 40S U.S. S04, S09 {1972) • 12
12 Humphre¥ involved procedural due process. There, the pltf
had been conv1cted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.
Footnote continued on next page.

I

I

'
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Judge Wisdom then advanced the proposition that any substantial
abridgment of "liberty" must be justified in terms of some
permissible governmental goal.

Three grounds for civil commitment

are generally recognized: the need for (1) treatment, (2) care,
(both parens patriae) and (3) the need to protect others (police
power).
In Donaldson's case, the jury had found him harmless, both
to himself and others.

The only legitimate governmental reason to

commit him was, therefore, treatment.

Judge Wisdom concluded that

it was a violation of due process to deprive a person of his liberty
upon the theory that confinement would be thearapeutic and then to
fail to provide any treatment.

Id., at 521.

Next, Judge Wisdom stated that long-term detention is
generally permitted only when an individual is guilty of a specific
act and has been accorded the protections of criminal process.

When

the government detains the incompetent by use of its police power
for their own safety and that of others, there must be a quid pro

In lieu of criminal sentence, he was committed to the "sex deviate
facility" in the state prison for a potentially indefinite period
pursuant to the Wise. Sex Crimes Acct. At the time he sued, pltf's
commitment was essentially equivalent to a civil commitment under
Wisc.'s Mental Health Act, except that he would have had a jury if
he had been civilly committed.
(He had already served a term equal
to the longest possible sentence--1 year--that could have been
imposed as punishment for his misdeamenor conviction.)
The DC dismissed his claims, but the Court remanded for further
development, noting that his equal protection claim would be
persuasive if he had been deprived of a jury or other procedural
protections merely by an arbitrary decision to seek commitment under
one act rather than another. The Court's reference (~Marshall,
J.) to "massive curtailment of liberty" was made in the context of
the procedural protections afforded by Wise. to ensure that
involuntary commitment was justified. Id., at 509.
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quo justifying the confinement given the absence of the protections
of criminal process. 13
In Wyatt v. Alderholt, S03 F. ed 130S (CAS 1974)

(Wisdom,

Bell, & Coleman), theCA held that the state must provide treatment-treatment to help each be cured or improve his condition--to the
civilly committed mentally retarded and mentally ill.

Judge Wisdom

rejected the argument that "the principal justification for
commitment lies in the inability of the mentally

ill and mentally

retarded to care for themselves"--and that care, not treatment, is
all that is necessary for the state to provide conditions consistent
with the terms of commitment.

Id., at 1312.

In his view, "care"

alone would not be sufficient justification for so "massive" a

13 To support this 9uid ~ro quo requirement, the CAS cited S
lines of cases. The f1rst 1nvolved citizens held in penal
institutions for nonpenal reasons, and these courts held such
conduct impermissible (2 CADC, 1 Mich., 1 Mass.). A second set (2
CADC 1 CA4, 1 Mass.) extended this holding by requiring that such
persons must be held where conditions are actually theapeutic. The
third line are cases in which courts have upheld ex-offender and
defective-delinquent status (providing for confinement of habitual
offenders to protect society and to provide rehabilitative care.
Some courts (1 CA4, 1 M.D. Ala.) have stated that the
constantitutionality of these statutes depends upon the realization
of the statutory promise of rehabilitative treatment. The fourth
set is the recent right to treatment caselaw, which, Judge Wisdom
reports, neither recognizes nor rejects explicitly a constitutional
right to treatment. When such a right is found, it rests on on both
statutory and constitutional grounds or the case is ambiguous as to
the precise ground (S CADC, 1 Mass.). The fifth group consists of
modern class actions challenging conditions in state institutions.
The cited courts had, for one reason or another, not dismissed the
actions.
(1 CAS, 1 ND Ill., 1 ND Geo., 1 D. Minn., 1 C.A.7, 1 D
R.I., 1 E.D. Tex., & 1 SONY).
In addition, the CAS cited, somewhat out of context, a S.
Ct. case using "quid pro quo" in the context of a special statute
for juveniles. See detailed discussion of this S. Ct. case in text
following n.lS infra .

.~

,., ..~.·~·.
..~:;:..
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"curtailment" of liberty.

LA/.:. r)
~-~-tf;
-

.

He also found that the hospitals of Ala.

were not providing even adequate custodial care.
The CAS may have abandoned its vanguard position in this
area.

In Morales v. Turnian, S62 F. 2d 993 (1977), the CAS

considered the appeal of a class action challenging the adequacy of
Texas' programs for juvenile offenders.
submission of a curative plan.

The DC ordered the

Because of intervening program

changes, the CAS remanded for the DC's reconsideration.

in doing

so, the CAS (Ainsworth, Morgan, & Roney) stated that "we have
considerable doubt about the legal theory of a right to treatment
that was relied on so heavily by the District Court."
(c).

The CAS.

In Welsch v. Likins, SSO F. 2d 1122 (CAS

1977), the CAS upheld a DC decision insofar as it held that due
process compells that minimally adequate treatment be provided for
involuntary patients in state institutions, but the CAS did not
explain the basis for this constitutional right.
v. Parwatiker, S70 F. 2d SOl (CAS 197S)

See also

....:;.__~.___

(Ross, Stephenson, &

~

Webster).
(d).

The decisions below.

Like the CAS in Donaldson v.

O'Connor, the majority opinion in the case at bar began with the
proposition that involuntary civil commitment entails a "massive
curtailment of liberty,'" quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 40S
S09 (1972) • 14

u.s.

S04,

The CA then stated that as a consequence, involuntary

commitment is circumscribed with due process protection, citing
14 For a discussion of the details of this procedural due
process case, see n.l2 infra.

25.

Addington v., Texas, discussed above, the procedural due process
case requiring clear and convincing evidence.

The court then

explained that commitment does not extinguish all aspects of an
individual's liberty interest--instead, the power of locomotion

-----

without restraint and the right to personal _security and freedom
from punishment are fundamental liberties that can only be
encroached upon when justified by an overriding, non-punitive
interest related to the reasons for confinement.
The majority considered Romeo's claims in the light of this
principle.

The CA described his claims as (1) the right to be free

from undue bodily restraint; (2) the right to personal security and
protection; and (3) the right to adequate treatment.

The CA

continued by noting that the first claim was based on undue
shackling, and it held that, though shackling may not be punishment
per se, it raises a presumtion of a punitive sanction.

The court

stated, without support, that "shackling" is not normally within the
range of conditions of confinement contemplated in a "habilitative
institutionalization."

And the CA concluded that careful scrutiny

is the proper judicial posture in reviewing such treatment--because
there is a right to treatment under the least restrictive conditions
consistent with the purpose of the commitment," and shackling can be
justified only by compelling necessity.
With regard to the right to treatment, the CA simply stated
that the individual's right to personal security and the state's
interest in providing

~are

protection from attack."

"converge to support a right to
Failure to provide for personal security

could be justified in a §1983 case only by "substantial necessity."

,•

.y
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With regard to Romeo's claimed right to treatment, the CA
merely noted that the right to appropriate treatment was independent
of the purpose of commitment (i.e., care, protection, treatment),
and adopted the convoluted three-part standard described at 9-10
supra.
Judge Seitz's minority opinion gave even less consideration
to the constitutional underpinings of the right to treatment.

He

merely stated that the constitutional right is no longer disputed
citing the cases of the other CAs (CADC, CAS, & CAS), discussed
above.

II.

DISSCUSSION
There are several ways in which the Court can resolve this

CqSe.
~

T~ost

obvious way is by determining whether there is a

right to treatment under the due process clause of the fourteenth

amendmen~.

A second

is~holding,

instead, that the defts are

necessarily covered by a good faith immunity because, at the time
they acted, they could not reasonably have known that there is a
right to treatment.

A .third way would be

~ispose

of the case on

the ground that the jury has already determined that the defts were
not more than negligent, and that mere negligence, i.e., medical
malpractice, cannot be a basis for a constitutional violation of a
I

substantive due process right (or, more narrowly, cannot be a basis
for a constitutional violation when the patient is involuntarily
committed any more than when the patient is a prisoner).

This

section will discuss each of these possible dispositions in turn,
and will then discuss the failure to allow the expert testimony
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proffered by Romeo and the effect that failure should have on the
disposition of the case.

Finally, it will address resp's argument

that the state has created a substantive liberty interest entitled
to due process protection.

A.

The Right to Treatment

1. The decisions of the lower courts.
In finding a
1/
\\
substantive due process right to treatment, the lower courts have
not clearly distingushed procedural and substantive rights.

They

have found a fundamental right in liberty after commitment, and have
used that "fundamental right" as the basis of their substantive due
process analysis.

But tbe courts have based their finding of that

right on a procedural due process case:
504, 509 (1972}

Humphrey v. Cady, 405

(discussed in detail in n.l2 supra}.

involved only a possible

possi~

u.s.

Humphrey

equal protection right to a jury

determination on the question of commitment because one state
statute provided for such process and another state statute (for no
apparent reason} did not.

The case was remanded for further

development, without even a finding of a procedural right.

Humphrey

does not, therefore, provide much support for the notion that postcommitment conditions implicate a liberty interest that is
"fundamental" in the sense in which that term is used in substantive
due process cases.

!) ~ 7

~

As discussed above, thg Court has stoj>ped "far short of any

general recognition of a "fundamental value" in individual

~ ./?a~y,"

see discussion at

f<. suera.

The lower courts have

ignored, however, the fact that post-commitment conditions are not

'·,
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at all similar to the rights this Court has found in substantive due
process cases.

As discussed above, those cases have generally found

substantive rights in areas closely related to the family,
procreation, and child-rearing. 1 S
The quid pro quo theory, relied on by the CAS in finding an
affirmative right to treatment in Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F. 2d
S07 (CAS 1974), should also be rejected.

The CAS considered a right

to treatment as part of the quid pro quo of confinement without the
procedural safeguards of criminal process.
The Constitution requires, however, that criminal process
be used only for criminal "commitments," not all commitments.

Ther

is no right to criminal process prior to civil commitment--see
Aldington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)

("clear and convincing

proof," rather than "beyond reasonable doubt," adequate for civil
commitment) .
The quid pro quo theory seems to have originated in a
decision of this Court, In re Gault, 387

u.s.

1, 22 n.30 (1967),

lSThe Court has been criticized for treating such values,
values neither explicitly stated in the Constitution nor based on
the Carolene Prpducts footnote as "fundamental." See Ely, The
Supreme Court 1977 Teim, 92 Harv. L. Rev. S, 12 (1978) ("No Carolene
Products Court this."). Ely's point is that the Carolene Products
footnote limited post-Lochner deference to le~islative decisions to
instances in which the pol1tical process coul be entrusted with the
decision--but not those in which that process itself simply is not
reliable--e.g., when the majority interferes with the rights of
"discrete and insular minorities," or with the ability of others to
use the political process is itself weakened. United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 u.s. 144, 1S2 n.4 (1938). Fundamental
(typically traditional) famil values are widely held, and there is,
t~ore, no need
·u 1cial inter erence on
e round tnat the
~ politic~ process~lf cannot a equa e y protect, these values.
(
supra.

~~,_L

£4·~~~

~

quoted by the CAS, in which the Court explained that if juveniles
are subjected to special procedures which are justified in terms
the special consideration and treatment thereby afforded them,
juveniles should receive the promised treatment (the
and would probably be entitled to challenge custody
special procedures on the ground that they were not
recieving "any special treatment."

Thus, the Court

A

is confined under X procedure because he will

treatment,

he can challenge his confinement if, in fact,

receiving Y.

This quid pro quo principle can, however,

the basis for a

right to treatment only by bootstrapping.
If a state confines a person to care an

I

to treat him, that person is entitled to
treatment.

In Donaldson, the CAS

stated that the "protection" go

protect him, but not
and protection, not

rejected the idea that

was a_lso shared by criminal

confinement and therefore co

d be achieved without criminal process

only by adding another . g al.

The CA gave no basis for this latter

proposition.

...

e former, the S. Ct. in O'Connor v. Donaldson

held that

is not a sufficient basis for curtailing

liberty.

even the CAS would not now argue that the state

cannot legiti ately confine for care someone who is not dangerous
but incapabl
Finally

s amicus brief on behalf of the
merits) at lS-23, does an

American

')

excellent job of ar uing that the concepts of least restrictive
_ \\

It

,

• ~

means and compell1ng necess1ty (the latter was imposed by the CA3 as

'•·

the standard for justifying shackling)
terms."
____....

~e

"inscrutable in clinical

For example, it is difficult to tell "whether confinement

o a room is more or less restrictive than the use of shackles or
administration of a

~rug

that permits the resident to remain with

ther residents in a group situation.

The difficulty is made worse

-------

by the fact that some treatments may be more · intensive but of
shorter duration

Furthermore, the lessening of restrictions

one resident may lead to an increase in restrictions on other
residents."

Id., at 21-23.

~

And I cannot make any sense out of the

CA's holding that a patient has a right to be free from h rm in the
/

absence of

substantial necessity.

necessity would justify harm?

What kind of

What kind of harm?

Any accident?

There is rarely a "need" for an accident--would this standard make
every tort occuring in a mental hospital a constitutional violat' n?

2.

Suggested substantive due process analysis.

Under the

express language of the Constitution, a state can curtail a person's
liberty only after affording due process.
Donaldson, 422

u.s.

And, under O'Connor v.

563 (1975), the state can curtail liberty by

institutionalizing someone to serve a legitmate state interest, but
it cannot do so to treat a non-dangerous person capable of surviving
on the outside.

After Donaldson, there are two legitimate reasons

for involuntary commitment: ' (1) to care for an inJdividual who
cannot care for himself on the outside; and (2) to protect an
individual or others from his own violence.

. ·,''

As discussed above, the

Donaldson Court explicitly noted that these goals can be achieved
through the legitimate exercise of the state's police power and

.•

•'
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parens patriae power.

Exercises of these powers, in the absence of

a "fundamental right," can normally be justified,;zr if there is a
"rational relationship" between the legitimate governmental end and
the means chosen to attain that end.
Given that this is not an area in which the Court has
recognized "fundamental rights, n 16 one would expect the ratJonal
relationship test to apgly: it is sufficient if there is a rational
relationship between the terms and conditions of confinement and the
purposes of confinement.

Moreover, the application of this standard

16 In cases such as the one at bar, the "fundamental rights"
rhetoric _is troubling. Fundamental rights include the right to send
your child tQ-prfvate school, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 u.s.
510 (1925), the right to teach while pregnant, Cleveland Bd. of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), and the right to remarry
while paying child support, Zabloci v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
But one detained pending trial and subject to all manner of
restraints, restrictions, and interferences, does not have a
"fundamental" liberty interest in the conditions of confinement:
"And to the extent the [lower] court relied on the
detainee's desire to be free from discomfort, it suffices
to say that this desire simply does not rise to the level
of those fundamental liberty interests delineated in cases
such as Roe v. Wade, 410 u.s. 113 (1973) [abortions];
Eisentadt v. Baird, 405 u.s. 438 (1972) [contraceptives];
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 u.s. 645 (1972) [unmarried
father's right to custody of children after death of
mother]; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 u.s. 479 (1965)
[contraceptives]; Ma*er v. Nebraska, 262 u.s. 390
(1923) [right to teac German in public school]." Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 534 (1979).
The interests denominated "fundamental" seem like frosting on a cake
compared to the interests of the involuntarily committed with regard
to their conditions of confinement or the interests of Bell v.
Wolfish's pre-trial detainees, who want to free of intrusions such
as internal body-cavity seaches. It may be that the detainee has no
such "right" and that the Constitution does not protest every
aspect of an involuntarily committed patient's confinement, but it
is surely not because the interests involved are not "fundamental."

,~

is supported by the two

s.
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. cases most relevant to the right-to-

u.s.

treatment question:

• Wolfish, 441

(Rehnquist, J.)

briefly above, dealing with the rights of

pre-trial detainees

520 (1979)

the conditions of detention) and

Jackson v. Indiana, 406

u.s.

715 (1972)

(also discussed above).

In Jackson, in a competency hearing, a state criminal court
found that Jackson was incompetent to stand trial (because he was
profoundly retarded).

At the time the case reached the court, he

had been held for 3 1/2 years in an institution for the mentally
incompetent without either criminal process or civil commitment.
Under state law, he could be held indefinitely--i.e., until such
time as he became competent.
The Court held that the state could not continue to hold
him without initiating civil commitment proceedings.

In a way, this

was purely a procedural due process case--the Court found that
Jackson was entitled to additional procedures.
The case also involved, however, Jackson's substantive
right to confinement conditions consistent with the terms of his
confinement.

Given the stability of his condition and the period

that had already passed, Jackson could not reasonably be regarded as
being temporaily confined until he became competent.

Yet, the only

procedure he had been afforded had been a competancy hearing.

The

Court held that temporary commitment following a finding of
incompetence at a competency hearing could not last beyond a
reasonable period "necessary to determine whether there is a
substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the
forseeable future.

If it is determined that this is not the case,

33.
then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment
proceeding

or release [him] • • .

Furthermore, even if it is

determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand
trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward
that goal."

Id., at 738.

The principle behind this conclusion was simply stated by
the Court in Jackson:
"At the least, due process requires that the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to
the purpose of commitment." Ibid.
This is at once a procedural and a substantive right.

Thus, if A is

committed for care and safety, A cannot be held under purely
punitive conditions.

A has a substantive right to non-punitive

conditions unless A has received criminal process.
Thus, Jackson supports the proposition that the
involuntarily committed have a constitutional right to be held under
conditions reasonably related to the purposes of commitment, a right
that is procedural and substantive.
care, he should

b~

If a person is committted for

confined in conditions reasonably related to that

purpose--(i.e., providing at least some minimal, subsistance, level
of care)--or else he should be accorded whatever procedures justify
confinement under the actual conditions in which he is kept.

At

times, of course, as O'Connor v. Donaldson itself suggests, this
will be purely a substantive right, rather than a procedural right-there are simply some purposes for which the state cannot legitimately
confine a person no matter what procedures are used, e.g.,
confinement of a non-dangerous person for treatment.
In the case at bar,

....______._

Rome~was

committed for care 'nd

'·'
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protection.

The conditions under which he is confined must be

reasonably related to these ends or else he has not received
procedural due process--he should receive instead the procedures
appropriate to his actual confinement conditions.

This can, or

course, also be expressed as a substantive right--Romeo has a
substantive right to conditions reasonably related to care and
pro~on

since he has been committed under procedures used by the

state in confining persons forl~are and protection~
The other case supporting the application of the rational
relationship test to the case at bar is Bell v. Wolfish, 441
520 (1979).

u.s.

As discussed above, Wolfish involved a constitutional

challenge to the conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees.
Like the case at bar, Wolfish involved persons who had not been
accorded criminal process and was decided by reference to the due
process clause.

Like the involuntarily committed, the pre-trial

detainees could not be punished at all because they had not been
accorded the criminal process that was their due prior to
punishment.
In Wolfish, pre-trial detainees challenged the
constitutionality of their conditions of confinement.

The lower

courts held that a number of the conditions under which the pltfs
were held were unconstitutional.

The CA3 held that the pltfs, who

had not been found guilty of any crime, could only be subjected to
those "restrictions and privations" which "inhere in their
confinement itself or which are justified by compelling necessities
of jail administration."
This Court reversed, rejecting the "compelling necessity"

..
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standard, and holding that the detainee's desire to be as free as
possible from restrictions and discomfort was not a fundamental
liberty interest entitled to the level of protection accorded under
Roe v. Wade, et al.

441 U.S., at 534.

All parties conceded that

the government had a legitimate interest in detaining the pltfs to
ensure their appearance for trial.

The Court explained that under

the eighth amendment, the detainees could not be actually punished
because they had not yet been tried.

Therefore, conditions could

not "amount to punishment of the detainee."

But the Court rejected

the argument that every restriction placed on a detainee was a
punishment; the relevant inquiry is whether the "particular
condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related
to a legitimate governmental objective."

Id., at 539.

If a

condition or restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate
governmental objective, it does not, " without more," amount to
"punishment."

Ibid (footnote omitted).

Under this approach, the terms and conditions of the
confinement of the involuntarily committed

should be considered to

see if they are reasonably related to care and protection.

With

regard to the right to food and other non-medical confinement
conditions, the involuntarily committed have a right to such food
and conditions as can reasonably be expected to sustain them.

With

regard to medical care, the involuntarily committed are entitled to
a level of care reasonably related to the state's purpose of caring
for them.

No medical care at all would clearly violate this

standard.

On the other hand, the Constitution requires only a

reasonable relation, not a perfect fulfillment, of the state's

i ..•
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purpose.

Perfect medical care would not, therefore, be mandated by

the Constitution.
Can the standard of Estelle v. Gamble, establishing the
level of medical care for prisoners under the eighth amendment be
adopted as an appropriate level for patients involuntarily committed
to receive "care"?

The power of the state confines both against

their will and makes it impossible for either to go independently to
the doctor of his choice.

In~graham

v. Wright, 430

u.s.

651 {1971)

the Court held that the eighth amendment does not

{Powell, J.),

app~y

universally.

There, the pltfs alleged that paddling school children constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amendment and the due
process clause.

In rejecting the eighth amendment claim, the Court

examined the history of the amendment and the caselaw construing it
and concluded that it was designed "to protect those convicted of
crimes."

Id., at 664.

The Court declined to extend the amendment's

protection beyond the criminal process, stressing that "[t]he
prisoner and the school child stand in wholly different
circumstances, separated by the harsh facts of criminal conviction
and incarceration."

Id., at 669.

Unlike the prisoner, the school

child is not classified as a criminal nor removed from family and
friends.

The Court concluded that the eighth amendment simply has

no place in the school room.
The involuntarily committed have not been found guilty of
crimes, so the eighth amendment does not apply directly to them.
But, like the detainees in Wolfish, the state is not yet empowered
to punish them

'

~·

in~

way--let alone in a cruel and unusual way.

.
I

_.

......................... ,_.,.

....,--,.,~--1

~kc.t~--~k~
And in Wolfish, the Court noted that"[~] fortiori, pretrial ~
detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes, retain at
least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by
convicted prisoners."

Id., at 520.

I would argue that Ingraham stands for the proposition that
some
grqyps, e.g., school children, are in a situation so unlike
,........
that of prisoners that the eighth amendment is simply of no
relevance to them.
y

But Bell v. Wolfish stands for the proposition

that other are so like prisoners that, a fortorari, they are
entitled to at least those conditions of confinement to which the
convicted are entitled, despite the fact that the eighth amendment
does not directly apply.

The involuntarily committed are much more

like prisoners and pre-trial detainees than they are like school
children.

Like prisoners, and to a perhaps lesser extent pre-trial

detainees, the involuntarily committed have been classified,
sigmatized, and removed from their family and friends.

They, like

the pre-trial detainees in Wolfish, should therefore be accorded, a
fortiori, at least those conditions mandated by the eighth
amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment.
But is the level of Estelle v. Gamble--deliberate
indifference to medical needs or the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain--a high enough standard for those who have not
been accorded criminal process?

It is precisely at this level--

tdeliberate indifference to medical need~--that it is clear that the
state is not confining the mental patient in conditions rationally

------

related to the purpose (care) given for commitment.

Moreover, on a

policy level, there is no intuitively obvious reason a prisoner

should receive less medical care than the
I would therefore suggest the
more generous standard

standard.
that would

medical-malpractice torts whenever
involuntarily committed.

Applying these principles to the facts of the case at bar,
it seems likely that the conditions under which Romeo was kept did
.:...-

not amount to pnishment, let alone cruel and unusual punisment, and
that the conditions were reasonably related to the

------------------------The

which he was confined.

purp~ses

for

CA found that he was being punished

because it considered shackling not within the range of conditions
of confinement contemplated in

a "habilitative institution" and, as

a result, though not per se punishment, shackling raised a
presumption of a punitive sanction.
There are several problems with this approach.

First,

there is the assumption that Romeo has a right to be in a
"habilitative institution."

The purposes for which he was

committed--care and protection--do not require a habilitative

ins~.

A custodial one will do.

Next, it is by no means

~~

clear that shackling is not within the range of conditions one would
expect to find in even a "habilitative institution" for the
profoundly retarded.

Indeed, physical restraints appear to be

widely used and are seen by some psychiatrists as necessary to
control violent behavior.

See H. Rosen & J. Digiacomo, The Role of
Physical Restraint, 39 Jr. Clinical Psychiatry 228 (1978). 17

17 Romeo offered experts who would have testified that no
ethical pshciatrist would have shackled a patient if any lessFootnote continued on next page •

....

).

..
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Moreover, a closer look at the facts, as discussed in
section I.A supra, reveals that restraints were used, not to punish
Romeo but because in all likelihood the defts did not know how else
to protect him from injury.

-

When they did not use restraints, he

was constantly being injured, and his mother filed this suit.

Only

thereafter, when the defts probably had no idea how to limit their
liability, did they use restraints.

Indeed, in this action, Romeo

is seeking what may be impossible for anyone to provide him in an
institutional setting: safety and freedom from restraints.

The only

time when these goals were both achieved seems to have been when he
lived at home with his parents.

After his father's death, however,

his mother was unable to control his violence and keep him
uninjured--see description of his condition when she first took him
to the hospital, supra at 3-4.

She now expects others to be able

to do what she could not do, and to be able to do it in the context
of a large institution.
If there is no presumption that shackling is punitive,
shackling seems reasonably related to the purposes of ARomeo's

-

confinement.

It protects him from injuries he would otherwise

r eceive as a result of his own violence.

The other conditions of

Romeo's confinement also seem reasonably related to its purposes.
Conditions were no doubt less than

ideal~

additional staff would no

doubt have made his life easier, and perhaps additional programs

restrictive alternative were available and that there is no dispute
in the literature on this point. See discussion in section I.A
supra. Both points are impeached by the article cited in text.
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could effectively restrain his violence and teach him additional
skills.

But Romeo was not confined for treatment purposes and he

had no right to treatment prior to confinement.

When a state

exercises its power to care for and protect an individual, there is
no basis for imposing, as a matter of constiitutional law, a duty to
provide treatment also.

B.

Immunity

ll

If there is no affirmative right to treatment, the jury
instructions appear to have been adequate. 18

------

~

---

But even if there is a

......,

constitutional right to treatment, the right was by no means clear
at the time of the defts' acts, and they should, therefore, be

be;

covered by good faith immunity with regard to that right.

This

approach was taken by the CAS in a recent case.
In Dilmore v. Stubbs, 636 F. 2d 966 (CAS 1981), the CAS
upheld the DC's dismissal of an action on the ground that officials
of the Miss. state hospital could not have known that their ppolicy
of temporarily placing admittees in the most restrictive ward for
18 It is true that the instructions used the eighth amendment
and the Estelle v. Gamble standard. And, as discussed above,
neither applies directly as a limit to conditions of confinement for
a group that has not received criminal process. But, as discussed
above, there is no apparent reason why criminals should, as a matter
of constitutional law, be entitled to less in the way of medical
care than the involuntarily committed. And in Wolfish, the Court
indicated that the eighth amendment standard of cruel and unusual
punishment a fortiori sets limits on conditions under which
detainees could be kept even though the amendment itself does not
directly apply. See discussion at 3 ~-37 supra. The references to the
eighth amendment would seem to be harmless error and the Estelle v.
Gamble standard appropriate unless you think there is a
constitutional right to treatment.

41.

observation and treatment would give rise to a constitutional
violation and therefore such officials were immune from damages in a
civil suit under §1983.
In Procunier v. Navarette, 434

u.s.

555 (1978), cert was

granted on whether negligence in handling prisoners' mail violated
the constitutional rights of prisoners.

Rather than reaching this

issue, however, the court held that the defts were immune from
damages in a §1983 suit because they could not have known that their
conduct would violate the constitutional rights of prisoners.
A similar approach could be taken in disposing of the case
at bar.

The jury was instructed that there was a right to an

Estelle v. Gamble level of treatment, and there is no way the defts
could have known that a higher standard would apply.
An argument can be made that the case should be disposed of
on immunity grounds.

Reaching the substantive merits of a claimed

new constitutional right may be inappropriate in a case for monetary
damages because of the inherent unfairness of assessing such an
award against defts in such an action; that unfairness may create
too strong a pressure against finding any such new right.

I do not

find this a compelling reason for ducking the issue on which cert
was granted, however.

Even if the new constitutional right is

found, on remand, jury instructions on good-faith immunity will be
given.

c.

Negligence.
The Court has now granted cert three times to determine

-

,,

whether a §1983 claim can be based on mere nelige9ce and has never
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reached the issue.

See Procunier v. Navarette,. 434

(1978); Baker v. McCollan, 443

u.s.

u.s.

555

147 (1979); Parratt v. Taylor,

- - -U.S.L.W. _ _ _ , No. 79-1734 (Mar. 2, 1981).

It now appears

unlikely that the Court will reach any across-the-board holding on a
single standard of culpability for §1983 liability.

In Parratt v.

Taylor, you indicated that you would not necessarily give the §1983
intent requirement uniform treatment:
"The intent question cannot be given "a uniform answer
across the entire spectrum of conceivable constitutional
violations which might be the subject of a §1983 action,"
Baker v. McCollan, 443 u.s. 137, 139-40 (1979). Rather,
we must give close attention to the nature of the
particular constitutional violation asserted, in
determining whether intent is a necessary element of such
a violation." Parratt v. Taylor, slip op. at 2 (Powell,
J., concurring in the result).
In Taylor, you did, however, indicate that in the context
of substantive due process claims, you would not view negligence as
a sufficient basis for finding a constitutional deprivation:
"As I do not consider a negligent act the kind of
deprivation that implicates the procedural guarantees of
the Due Process Clause, I certainly would not view
negligent acts as violative of these substantive
guarantees." Id., at 8.

This case could be used as the basis for holding that

r~

deliberate indifference, rather than negligence, is needed to hold
an official liable for a violation of substantive due process.

The

rejection of negligence as the basis of liability would be based on
the history and purpose of §1983 and would limit the dicta in Monroe
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

In Monroe, the Court suggested that

all tort concepts might be applicable in §1983 actions because it
"should be read against the background of tort liability."
187.

Id., at

This language actually occurs in the context of rejecting the

~.

X•

'·
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importation of a criminal-law standard of "wilfulness" into §1983
and adopting instead the civil concept of intent (a man intends the
natural consequences of his actions} found in tort law.
The "background of tort liability" language should be
limited to the intent requirement, and its extension to incororate
other elements of tort law, i.e., negligence liability regardless of
the underlying constitutional tort, should be rejected as
inconsistent with the history and purposes of §1983, which indicate
that the statute was not intended to constitutionalize tort law
whenever a deft was a state official.
Thus, although the decision would not hold that negligence
is never enough to express a claim under §1983, it would hold that
negligence is not enough to state a substantive due process claim.

D.

The Proffered Expert Testimony
During the trial, the trial judge refused to allow

testimony of experts proffered by Romeo to show that Romeo could
have been effectively treated under other programs (not involving
restraints} and that the lack of programming in Romeo's ward was the
cause of aggressive behavior.

He would also have testified that

psychologists are ethically bound to choose methods that do not use
restraints and that there is no dispute in the literature on this
point. 19

The trial judge disallowed this testimony. He explained

19 Even the most cursory glance through the literature reveals
that the footnoted sentence is not true. See H. Rosen & J.
Digiacomo, The Role of Restraint, 39 Jr. Clinical Psychiatry 228
(1978}.

that it was relevant to a malpractice suit but that he

id not

consider it relevant to a §1983 constitutional claim.
The CA3 did held that the trial judge

in disallowing

this testimony because it was relevant to the questi n of whether
had been deprived of his substantive to treatment a
the CA3.

delineated by

Petn at 26a-27a.
As a general matter, the admission of expe t testimony

rests within the sound discretion of the trial JU

will not be

overturned absent manifest error.

Spokane and Inland Empire

Railroad Co. v. United States, 241

u.s.

Edgar, 99

u.s.

351 (1915):

Spring Co. v.

645, 656 (1878).

In Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U?S? 31, 35
(1962), the Court explained the general rule:
"[E]xpert testimony not only is unnecessary but indeed may
properly be excluded in the discretion of the trial judge
if all the primary facts can be accurately and
intelligently described to the jury, and if they, as men
of common understanding, are as capable of comprehending
the primary facts and of drawing correct conclusions from
them as are witnesses possessed of special or peculiar
training, experience or observation in respect of the
subject under investigation."
In Rhodes v. Chapman, 49 U.S.L.W. 4677, No. 80-332 (June
15, 1981)

(Powell, J.), the Court upheld the exclusion of expert

testimony on prison conditions:
"As we noted in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s., at 543-544,
n.27, [expert] opin1ons may be helpful and relevant with
respect to some questions, but "they simply do not
establish the constitutional minima: rather, they
establish goals recommended by the organization in
question." Rhodes v. Chapman, n.l3.

Applying these principles to the case at bar, the key
question is whether the jury could understand the primary facts

,_ .... ··'*''•
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relevant to the consitutionally-mandated "minima" without the
testimony of resp's experts.

If so, the exclusion was not erroneous

no matter how relevant the testimony.

The answer turns, of course,

on the "constitutional minima" one would find in the case at bar.
If you agree that there is no affirmative right to treatment or to
the least restrictive treatment method, then the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion in disallowing the testimony.

If you think

that the involuntarily committed have a constitutional right to some
affirmative level of treatment under the least restrictive
conditions possible, then a jury is going to have no idea what the
primary facts are without expert testimony.

E.

Resp's State-created Substantive Liberty Right
Romeo argues that the state has created a right to

treatment (a liberty interest) and that the failure to provide him
with that treatment violates due process.

Insofar as Romeo is only

arguing that the state's deprivation of his liberty to "care and
protect" him gives him a substantive right to conditions reasonably
related to those purposes, I agree.
Jackson v. Indiana).

See Resp.

(red) at 15 (quoting

This principle is one of federal

constitutional law, however, and is entirely independent of the
particular language in any state commitment statute.
Resp makes another argument:

Penn., by statute, as

interpreted by the Pa. S. Ct., has given him a right to certain
services and certain treatment.

See id., at 27 (citing In re

Schmidt, 429 A. 2d 631, 636 (Pa. 1981)

(retarded persons are

entitled to "live a life as close as possible to that which is

46.

typical for the general population").

According to resp, the

failure to accord him this right (a liberty right) is a violation of
due process.
Resp argues that it is undisputed that state-created rights
are entitled to due-process proctection.

The cases he cites

involve--insofar as they involve state-created rights--procedural,
not substantive, liberty rights.

For example at 25, he states:

"[T]he state statute created a valid liberty interest in
the expectation of care which the State may not thereafter
arbitrarily abridge; See Vitek v. Jones, supra
[procedural rights of convicted felon transgered from
state prison to mental hospital]; Wolf v. McDonnell, supra
[procedural rights attached to state-created interest in
"good time"]; O'Connor v. Donaldson, supra (when the State
confines a person for a stated purpose, it must fulfill
that purpose) [state cannot confine involuntarily nondangerous mentally-ill person who can survive on outside];
Jackson v. Indiana, supra [there must be a reasonable
relation between the purposes of confinement and the
conditions of confinement]."
As the bracketed descriptions indicated, none of these cases involve
a state-created substantive liberty right.
Indeed, only Wolf v. McDonnell (right to procedures when
"good time" taken away) involves a state-created right.
The right to conditions of confinement reasonably related
to the purpose of confinement is a federal right independent of
state law.

O'Connor v. Donaldson held invalid a state law providing

for commitment solely for purposes of treatment.

After O'Connor v.

Donaldson, the only relevance of state law to conditions of
confinement is that state law defines the purpose of commitment,
justifying, as a matter of federal constitutional law, the
deprivation of liberty.

Federal constitutional law recognizes only

two purposes as legitimate: care or protection.

If a state has

47.

another purpose, it simply cannot deprive a person of liberty for
that reason no matter how good it would be for them.

And the fact

that the state has additional purposes--e.g., treatment--does not
automatically make the attainment of that that purpose a matter of
federal constitutional law.
In the case at bar, Penn.'s civil commitment law provides
for confinement for "care and treatment."

Resp.

(red) at 26.

Conditions that provide custodial care are consistent with the
purpose of "care," and more is not required by the federal
Constitution.

And the fact that the Pa. S. Ct. has stated that

there is an affirmative right to "normalization" for the mentally
retarded under that act does not make its achievement a federal

5~

issue.

!

Moreover, I do not understand how a state can possibly ~
create a substantive '1-i,. . b,_e_r_ t _y_ r-:i-g-h- t- . __O_n_e_ 1:.-s__b_o_r_n_ w_1:. t- h- -t-h_e___/~"i'-:;_-----J
substantive right to liberty.

--

It does not depend on any

beneficience conferred by the state.

When the state releases a

criminal to absolute liberty (without probation), it is not
conferring liberty upon him, liberty which it can either give or
withhold because it is truly the state's to dispose of.

Rather, the

state must release him when he has served the time the state
legitimately imposed as punishment.

A person out on bail enjoys

liberty at the grace of the state, but he only has a procedural, not
a substantive, right to that liberty.

After the appropriate

procedures, the state can take that liberty away again.

I find the

idea of substantive liberty turning on state law nonsense.
Finally, if resp's argument here works to make state-

~"'·"'·

.•

48.
created substantive "liberty" interests federal issues, I don't see
where it would stop.

Would every state created "liberty interest"

{expectation?) be entitled to federal due-process protection?
could conceivably include every state-created hope.

This

Resp has never

included state-law claims in this action, and his argument would
turn every state-law claim into a federal constitutional issue.

III.

CONCLUSION
There are three ways to decide this case: the substantive

right to treatment; immunity; and the lack of the relevant intent.
On the first point, the state has legitimate reasons for
committing resp in the exercise of its parens patriae and police
power.

As a general matter, exercises of these powers need only be

rationally related to the purposes of the exercise.

Unless you are

willing to find a "fundamental right" {a substantive due process
right) to treatment, the applicable constitutional standard is
whether the conditions of Romeo's confinement are rationally related
to the legitimate goals of care and protection.

In applying this

standard, the standard enunciated by Estelle v. Gamble would seem in
appropriate to adopt: when those in a state institution are
deliberately indifferent to a patient's needs, the state is not
holding the patient in conditions reasonably related to the only
legitmate reasons for committment, care and protection.

{If you

th4t::

thinklthere is no affirmative right to treatment and that the
standard of Estelle v. Gamble is appropriate, then the trial judge
did not abuse his discretion in refusing to admit resp's expert
testimony.)

v·

- '

49.

On the next point, the Court could order the reinstatement
of the jury verdict because the defts are covered by good faith
immunity.

The jury was instructed to find them liable if their

conduct met the Estelle v. Gamble level of deliberate indifference.
They could not reasonably have known, at the time they acted, that
the Constitution would impose a higher standard, and the jury
verdict should therefore be sustained on immunity grounds.
The case could also be decided on the ground that
deliberate indifference is needed to state a §1983 claim for
violation of a substantive due process right.
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To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In re:

Mary

No. 80-1429, Duane Youngberg, et al.

(super intendant,

et. al.), v. Nicholas Romeo, by his mother and next
( 19--~~t/"$ ~ ~

friend

~~~)

This memo discusses several possible articulations of the
substantive rights of the involuntarily committed to care and
protection.

1.

Negligence.

(a).

To establish a medical-malpractice

claim in an action against a treating physician, a pltf must
establish: (1) the existence of the physician's duty to the pltf,
usually based on the MD-client relationship;
standard of care and its violation;

(2) the applicable

(3) a compensable injury; and

(4) a causal connection between the violation of the standard of
care and the harm complained of.
The standard
of care
by negligence law is
._____
____, imposed generally
,_____..,
not one of acting in good faith, but rather of acting as would a
reasonable man in like circumstances.

For doctors, this objective

I{

standard is measured by the acts of a reasonable doctor in similar
\\.

circumstances.

The prevailing statement of the professional

standard is referred to as the "customary practice" formulation: a

2.
doctor has a duty to use the degree of care and skill

of a

ex~cted

----------------------------------------reasonably competent practitioner
in same class (with the same

-

specialty) and in the same or similar circumstances (which
traditionally limits the comparison to MDs in the MD's geopraphic
area).

King, The Law of Medical Malpractice, at 37-44 (1977).

~andard
·~

When the action is against the hospital, the negligence
of care is articulated slightly differently.

Private

hospitals are not the guarantors of the safety or health of their
patients.

The duty imposed on private hospitals is a duty to

------

exercise reasonable care in accordance with sound hospital practice

----------------------

to protect the health and safety of patients.
If doctors have a good-faith immunity, a substantive right
to care under a negligence standard will not result in liability
against a treating physician in the absence of a lack of good
faith.

And doctors in state institutions should have at least a

good faith immunity.

In past immunity decisions, the Court has

refused to extend liability when it would interfere with the proper
functioning of institutions.
409, 426 (1976)

(Powell,

J.)

E.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424

u.s.

(even qualified immunity for prosecutor

would have adverse effect upon the functioning of the criminal
justice system).
State institutions cannot be attractive places in which to
work.

-

If doctors are subject to personal liability on the basis of
--------~

~

judgments and decisions made in good faith, it will be even harder
for such institutions to attract and

ke~

the competent

professionals they need to provide patients with good care.

A

doctor should, therefore, be protected provided he has reasonable

,.

'

j.

grounds for believing that his action does not work a constitutional
deprivation.

See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 318 (1975)

(White, J.) •
1(.

Provided that doctors have this good faith defense, they

--

will be protected regardless of the substantive standard.
~

~v~
r·

Would

negligence then be the appropriate standard, applicable in actions

~~~or
~-

-

~

'-

injunctive relief or instances in which a doctor acts without

good faith?

This would impose the "customary practice" standard on

treating physicians and would obligate state institutions to provide
~
v==c;::::::
~~ reasonable care in accordance with sound hospital practice to ensure

~-

the safety of patients.

This standard is doubtless desirable.

But

it would mean that states could only commit those they could care
for at the generally accepted level afforded by private
institutions.

This would impose severe financial constraints on

states and would constitutionalize medical malpractice in state
institutions.

The choice before a state would then be one of two

extremes: either provide no care and protection or provide a fairly
high level of care and protection.

As a historical matter, the

Constitution certainly has not been regarded as imposing this choice
on states.

2.

The standards applicable to prisoners.

If the

involuntarily committed are only entitled to the substantive
standards afforded prisoners, their constitutional rights are not
violated if their treating physicians and the administrators of
their institutions are not deliberately indifferent
seri'6us medical needs.
'-""

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429

to their

u.s.

97 (1976)

4.

(medical treatment of prisoners).
conditions that

They would also have the right to

are not equivalent to "serious deprivations of

basic human needs"--conditions "cruel and unusual under the
contemporary standard of decency."
4677, 4679
~

(Powell, J.).

The eighth

~~ the
~

(1981)

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 49 U.S.L.W.

am ~ ent

is not, however, the relevant limit on

ability of the state to subject the involuntarily committed to

objectionable conditions.

First, the state does not have the right

to punish the involuntarily committed, and cannot, therefore,
subject them to treatment or conditions as long as the conditions or
treatment fall short of cruel and unusual punishment.

Moreover, the

state has committed these people to care and protect them.

This is

quite different from confinemen to punish--confinement to care
certainly suggests a higher substantive obligation on the state than
that imposed after the state has afforded the procedures required
prior to punishment.
In addition, the Estelle Court relied on the contemporary
standard of decency manifest in modern legislation codifying the
common-law view that "'it is but just that the public be required to
care for the prisoner, who cannot, by reason of the deprivation of
liberty, care for himself.'"

429

u.s.,

at 95-96.

With the

involuntarily committed, care should be given not just because the
patients are unable to obtain it on their own due to their
confinement, but because their very confinement--for care and
treatment--is unjustified in the absence of that care and treatment.
There is some force to the argument that, if a state cannot provide
a reasonable level of care and protection, it should have to face

,.

J·, .

5.

the political consequences of that inability, a pressure it will
only feel if it is not allowed to confine the incompetent without
such care.

3.

Suggested standard.

(a).

General living conditions.

Under Bell v. Wolfish (conditions of pre-trial detainees), at a
minimum, the involuntarily confined are entitled to conditions
reasonably related to their conditions of confinement, i.e., because
they are confined for care and protection, they should receive at
least decent and adequate food, living conditions, and clothing.

(b).

Protection and medical care.

Because they are

committed for protection, the involuntarily committed have the right
to conditions designed to afford some degree of safety.

On the

other hand, the fact that the state has confined them to protect
them cannot mean that the state is strictly liable for every injury
sustained.

Articulation of even a standard is difficult.

The

patient in the private institution would have the right to the
exercise of reasonable care in protecting the safety of patients by
the hospital administration.

As a minimum, under the "reasonably

related" standard of Jackson v. Indiana, the involuntarily committed
are entitled to conditions that can reaonably be expected to provide
enough safety to justify commitment.
Similarly, because they are committed for care, the
involuntarily committed have the right to medical care and
attention, at least sufficient to justify their committal.

o.

Is it possible to articulate the level of protection and of
medical care and attention which, together with decent living
conditions, would justify commitment to care and protect?

In my

bench memo, I suggested that it is at the point at which the
authorities are "deliberately indifferent" to the needs of the
involuntarily committed that the state is not providing conditions
reasonably related to the purposes of confinement.
That standard may be too low.

The "deliberate" part of

deliberate indifference certainly suggests more than mere
indifference--it suggests a studied, intentional, and cruel
attitude.

~ is is borne out by the examples of deliberate

indifference given by the Estelle Court:
"See, e.g., Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. ed 541 (CA2
1974) (doctor's choosing the 'easier and less efficacious
treatment' of throwing away the prisoner's ear and
stitching the stump may be attributable to 'deliberate
indifference ••• rather than an exercise of professional
judgment')~ Thomas v. Pate, 493 F. 2d 151, 158 (CA7),
cert. denied sub nom. Thomas v. Cannon, 419 u.s. 879
(1974) (injection of penicillin with knowledge that
prisoner was allergic, and refusal of doctor to treat
allergic reaction)~ Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F. 2d 1192 (CA8
1973) (refusal of paramedic to provide treatment)~
Martinex v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921 (CA2 1970) (prison
physician refuses to administer the prescribed pain killer
and renders leg surgery unsuccessful by requiring prisoner
to to stand despite contrary instructions of surgeon)."
429 U.S. n.lO, at 96.
Thus, by deliberate indifference (sufficient to be cruel and unusual
punishment) , the Court meant a rather extereme indifference to
unneccessary pain by a doctor or the intentional denial or delay of
access to medical care by others.
But if the doctors and supervisors in a state institution
are simply indifferent to the medical needs and safety of their
patients, has not the state failed to provide conditions reasonably

'

.

related to

th~e

individuals?

vr-

~I

I •

and protection for which they confined the

This standard would be at least somewhat lower than

the Estelle standard, because mere indifferent indifference--rather
than the higher standard of deliberate indifference (with its
overtones of intentional infliction of unnecessary pain) would
violate the constitutional rights of the involuntarily committed.
Another formulation might be that doctors are indifferent when they
fail to make any attempt to provide decent conditions or care to
residents of state institutions.
This standard would be far from the negligence standard.
The question would not be, what treatment or conditions would be
--.

customary in a private hospital or in treatment from a private
physician.

Instead, the question would be whether those the state

has employed to care for and protect the involuntarily committed
have made at least a reasonable effort to do so.
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CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: ·
Re:

J

No. 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo

The above could well have been set back-to-hack
with No. 80-1417, Mills v. Rogers.
Since I overlooked
that the next best thlng is to dlscuss them together.
(Each involves a good bit of "insanity"!)
Accordingly, I suggest discussion of Youngberg
be laid over until Fridayts conference.
Regards,

lfp/ss 02/22/82
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mary

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Feb. 22, 1982

80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo
This memorandum, dictated at home on Sunday,
reflects my initial reaction to your draft of Feb. 19.

I

should say that I am quite "cold" on the case, and on the
eve of two weeks of argument I will have no opportunity to
go back to the briefs or even to your fine bench memo.
Thus, for the most part my comments are suggestive and
inquisitive, rather than definitive.
My general impression is that the draft is quite a
bit too long.

In a case of this kind where there is no real

guidance in our cases, and subjective judgments will be made
by all of us, the less we write the more likely we are - in
all probability - to obtain a Court.
I now comment briefly on the various parts of the
draft.
Part I (p. 1-12)
This is an excellent statement of the case.
Part II (p. 12-24)
Subpart A (p. 13-18) •

The draft finds a liberty

interest continues following commitment, makes clear

th ~

this is substantive rather than procedural, but reasons that

2.

the Matthews v. Eldridge factors also apply for purpose of
analysis.

(13-17)

Subject to some editing that I have

undertaken, I think to this point, the draft is on target.
In stating, in accord with the Matthews forumla,
respondent's interests in the first full paragraph on page
17, I would think it desirable to state them in terms of
respondent's three claims (see p. 10 of your draft).

As now

framed, this takes no account specifically of the
claimedrights to be free of physican constraints or the
right to safety and protection.
Subpart B (p. 19-24).

My impression of these five

pages in particular is that they are a bit discursive, and
are not as sharply focused on the precise claims as may be
desirable.
Would it make sense, Mary, to eliminate subpart B,
and restructure Part III by identifying and addressing in
order respondent's claims (i) to be free from physicial
restraint, (ii) to protection and safety, and (iii) to
treatment.

After all, these are the interests claimed in

this case, and those that must be weighed against the state
interests.
There does not now seem to be a logical flow from
page 19 to the end of the draft.

If we structure this

around respondent's three claims, there would be a logical
flow.

Also, the draft could be substantially shortened.

3.

I note, for example, that in Part III the draft
returns - at least it seems to me - to what already has been
said about the presence of a substantive due process claim
and its distinction from procedural due process (see pp. 2830) •

It is clear that the state owes respondent a duty
to take reasonable measures to protect him from violence by
other patients.

The state owes a duty to other patients to

protect them from respondent's violence, and also to protect
respondent himself from his own self mutilation.

Thus,

reasonable shackling - on the basis of this record - is
necessary at times.
Medical care and treatment are quite different
kinds of duties.

I suppose care (other than medical care)

could be defined or identified as suggested on p. 24, to
mean food, shelter, clothing and reasonable safety. The
state{ concedes these duties.

In view of respondent's

specific allegations, and his profound handicap, special
safety measures - in addition to those generally applicable
- probably are required.

I would address "safety" biefly as

separate from the conceded duty to provide food, shelter and
clothing.
The most difficult question is what level of

medical care and treatment is required.

Here, I

are generally agreed that the substance of Chief

~~

e

'.

4.

Seitz's formulation is about right.
it more felicitously.

Perhaps you can frame

(Any hel~here from amici briefs?)

Part IV (p. 32-33)
I understand that you have not
of this part.

concluded~ft

My recollection is that Judge Seitz, and the

judges who agreed with him, would remand this case for
retrial under proper instructions with respect to the
applicable standards.

I believe Seitz also agreed with the

majority that on a retrial the testimony of respondent's
experts should be admitted.

Perhaps the best things for us

to do with respect to this is simply to say in a footnote
that we have no reason to disagree with the view that such
testimony should be admitted.

* * *
I am aware, Mary, that restructuring the opinion
as above suggested will require substantial rewriting.
emphasize that there is no time pressure whatever.

I

It may

be a good idea before you undertake changes in the
organization of the opinion, to have David read the draft
simply to have the benefit of his advice as to how to
organize it.

I may not have made the best suggestions.

This is not an easy case, and yet it is quite an
important one.

So take your time.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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~1ary
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Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
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80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo
This memorandum, dictated at home on Sunday,
reflects my initial reaction to your draft of Feb. 19.
should say that I am quite "cold" on the

ca~e,

I

and on the

eve of tvm weeks of argument I will have no opportunj ty to
go back to the briefs or even to your fine bench memo.
Thus, for the most T;>art my comments are suqqestive and
inquisitive, rather than definitive.
~Y

general impression is that the draft is quite a

bit too lonq.

In a case of this kind where there is no real

quidance in our cases, and subjective judgments will be made
by all of us, the less we write the more likely we ar.e -

in

all probability - to obtain a Court.
I now comment briefly on the various parts of the
draft.
Part I

(p. 1-12)
~his

5s an excellent statement of the case.

Part II (o. 12-24)
qubpart A (p. 13-18) •

~he

draft finds a liberty

interest contjnues following commitment, makes clear tht
this is substantive rather than procedural, but

re~sons

that

'

,I•

l

2.

the Matthews v. Eldridge factors also aoply f.or purpose of
anaJysis.

(13-17)

t::;ubiect to some

~ditinq

that I have

undertaken, I think to this point, the draft is on target.
In qtatinq, in accord with the Matthews forumla,
respondent's interests in the first full paragraph on page
17, I would think it desirable to state them in terms of

respondent's three claims (seep. 10 of your draft).

A~

now

framed, this takes no account specificallv of the
claimedrights to be free of physican constraints or the
right to safety and protection.
Subpart B (p. 19-24).

My impression of these five

pages in particular is that they are a bit discursive, and
are not as sharply focused on the precise

clai~s

as may be

desirable.
Would it make sense, Marv, to eliminate subpart B,
and restructure Part III by identifying ana addressing in
order respondent's claims
restr~int,

treatment.

(i)

to be free from physicial

(ii) to protection and safety, and (iii) to
After all, these are the interests claimed in

this case, and those that must be weighed against the state
interests.
't'here does not now seem to be a logical flow from
page 19 to the end of the draft.

If we structure this

around respondent's three clai.ms, there t!7ou1 d be a logical
flow.

Also, the draft could be substantiaJJy shortened.

3.

I note, for

exam~le,

that in Part III the draft

returns - at l.east tt seems to me - to what Already has been
said about the

nre~ence

of a subc:!tantive

ou~

process claim

and its distinction from procerlural t1ue process (see pp. 2830) •

It i.::: clear that the state
to take reasonable measures to
other pati.ents.

respondent a duty

m<~es

prot~ct

hi.m from vi.olence by

The state owes a duty to other patients to

protect them from respondent's violence, and also to protect
resoondent hi.mse1f from his own self mutilation.

Thus,

reasonable shacklina- on the basis of this record- is
necessary at times.
Medical care and treatment are quite different
kinds of duties.

I suppose care (other than medical care)

could be defined or identified as suggested on p. 24, to
mean food, shelter, c\othing and reasonable safety. The
states concedes these duties.

tn view of respondent's

specific allegations, and his profound handicap, special
safety measures - in addition to those qenerally applicable
- probably are required.

I would address "safety" biefly as

separate from the conceded duty to provide rood, shelter and
clothing.
The most difficult question is what level of
medical care and treatment is required.

qere, I think we

are generally aqreed that the substance of

~hief

Justice

.;.

'

'·
,
£

....'

,,

•

4.

Seitz's formulation is about right.
it more felicitously.

Perhaps you can frame

(Any held here from amici briefs?)

Part IV (p. 32-33)
I

understano that you have not concluded a draft

of this part.

My recollection is that Judge Reitz , and the

judges who agreed with him, would remand this case for
retrial under proper instructions with respect to the
applicable standards .

I

believe

~eitz

also agreed with the

majority that on a retrial the testimony of respondent's
experts should be admitted.

Perhaps the best things for us

to do with respect to this is simply to say in a footnote
that we have no reason to disagree with the view that such
testimony should be admitted.

* * *
I

am aware, Mary, that restructuring the opi.nion

as above suggested will require substantial rewriting .
emphasize that there is no time pressure whatever.

I

It may

be a good idea before you undertake changes in the
organization of the opinion, to have David read the draft
simply to have the benefit of his advice as to how to
organize it .

I

may not have made the best suggestions.

This is not an easy case, and yet it is quite an
important one.

So take your time.

L. F. P. , ,Jr.

ss
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mary

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

March 26, 1982

80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo
Your revised draft of 3/24 is quite good and I
congratulate you on putting together so well the "humpty
dumpty" that I handed you a few days ago.
I have indicated on the left margin pages on which
I have made an occasional "fly specking" editing change.
The only substantive point that still concerns me
is our reliance on the Matthews v. Eldridge formula.

In

thinking futher about this, I am not sure that it is useful.
Of its three factors, the one that often is decisive in a
procedural due process case concerns the "risk of error".
This factor is not specifically involved in a substantive
due process case.

I have dictated a very rough alternative

that would substitute for portions of pages 13-15.

I

suggest that you discuss with David whether my concern about
~

reliance on Matthews is well founded, and whether

something along the lines of my rider is preferable.

Of

course, you will have to edit and clarify my rough draft.

I

omitted Parham altogether, and perhaps this should be
included.

.'

2.

It is still also desirable to add a footnote
indicating in a general way what we mean by "professionals".
We can be reasonably certain that the average state mental
institution is understaffed with genuine professionals.
Rather, they use employees that a hospital like George
Washington would characterize as "orderlies", or "interns" sometimes people who have had no formal training.

Yet, some

people with practical experience are very good indeed.

Try

a draft of a rather broad definition to be added as a
footnote, making clear that

the term "professional" is not

limited to graduate M.D.'s in medicine, psychiatry, or even
physical therapy.
Subject to the foregoing, I think you have a fine
draft.

Let's have your editor review it and then move it to

a printed Chambers draft promptly.

I would like, if it

seems reasonable, to circulate both your case and Mills
before the Chief Justice makes assignments for the March
arguments.

This would mean circulating by April 2.
I have mentioned to Dick the importance of Mills

and Romeo being entirely consistent, both in substance and
terminology.

In addition to David, you and Dick should

collaborate.

ss
cc:

David and Dick
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~EMORANOUM

TO:

Mary

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

"'1arch 26, 1982

80-1429 Youngberg v. R.omeo

Your revised draft of 3/24 is quite good and I
congratulate you on putting togethet: so well the "humpty
dumpty" that I handed you a few days ago.
I have indicated on the left marqin pages on which
I have made an occasional "fly specking" editing change.
The only substantive point that stjll concerns me
is our reliance on the Matthews v. EJ.dridge formula.

In

thinking futher about this, I am not sure that It is useful.
Of its three factors, the one that often is decisive in a
procedural due process case concerns the "risk of error".
This factor is not specifically involved in a substantive
due process case.

I have dictated a very rough alternative

that \'10ttld substi.tute for oortions of pages 1.3-15.

I

suggest that you discuss with David whether my concern about
my reliance on Matthews is well. founded, and whether
nomething along the lines of my rider is preferable.

Of

course, you will have to edi.t and clad.fv my rough draft.

I

omitted Parham altogether, and oerhaps this shnuld he
included.

~-

2.

It is still also desirable to add a footnote
indicating in a general way what we mean by "professionals".
We can be reasonably certain that the average statP-

m~ntal

institution is understaffed with genuine professionals.
Rather, they use employees that a hospital like George
Washington would characterize as "orderlies", or "interns" sometimes people who have had no formal training.

Yet, some

people with practical experience are very good inoeed.

Trv

a draft of a rather broad definition to be added as a
footnote, making clear that

the term "professional" is not

limited to graduate M.D.'s in medicine, psychiatry, o r even
physical therapy.
Subject to the foregoing,
draft.

I

think you have a fine

Let's have your editor review it and then move it to

a printed Chambers draft promptly.

I would like, if it

seems reasonable, to circulate both your case and Mills
before the Chief Justice makes assignments for the March
arguments.

Thi.s would mean circulating by April 2.

I have mentioned to nick the imoortance of Mills

and Romeo being entirely consistent, both in substance and
terminology.

In addition to David, you and Dick should

collaborate.

t. F. P. , Jr.

ss
cc:

David and Dick

-~---------~---------
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To: Justice Powell
From: David, Mary, Dick
Re: Youngberg v. Romeo:

we are agreed that Part II of the opinion--in which
you describe

the

competing

interests

individual--needs some revision.
the

proposition

mental
freedom

that a

institution
from

a

the

state and

the

The opinion needs to defend

person who has

retains

bodily

of

"liberty"

restraint,

and

in

been committed

to a

interest

in safety,

training

(the

state

concedes food and medical treatment) •
It seems fairly easy to argue for a liberty interest
in

safety.

First,

there

are

cases

that

suggest

as

much.

Second, it would shock the conscience to permit the state to
house

such

patients

in

unsafe

conditions.

Third,

the

conditions in which persons are held must bear some reasonable
relation to the state's purpose in confining them in the first
place.

So long as a person is confined because unable to take

care of himself, the state can hardly hold him in conditions
in

which

he

is

endangered.

(However,

if

the

State

only

confined someone because dangerous to others, then this third
point would not be of any force.)
The

argument

that

a

patient

retains

a

liberty

interest in free movement is only slightly more difficult to

2.

make.

It

is more

difficult

because whereas

the

commitment

proceeding would not seem to reduce a patient's

interest in

safety, it clearly does restrict a patient's ability to move
about--either outside or within the institution.

Even so, it

would seem fairly clear that the state cannot simply shackle
someone

to

the

bed

tantamount

to

prison:

fortior ar i

think

a

you

can

for

no

punishment.

argue

reason
It

at

would

That

all.

not

be

permitted

liberty interest in free movement.

that

a

be

in

a

In sum, we

it is impermissible here.
persuasively

would

patient

retains

a

Yet the interest has been

qualified by the commitment proceeding such that a "compelling
necessity" standard for shackling--the standard adopted by the
CA3-- is not appropriate.
Much more difficult is the claim that a patient has
a liberty interest in training or "habilitation."
to

treatment"

question

has

been

here

before

The "right

in

O'Connor.

Justice Stewart found there that there was "no reason now to
decide whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or
to

others

have

a

right

confinement by the State."
difficult one.

to

and

finding

controversial,

'

that

Given that the question is so
the

draft

should

address

the

We think you have three choices:

You can find a liberty interest in training by

that civilized society

,~.

compulsory

In our current draft we simply assume

question head on.
1.

upon

He characterized the question as a

such a liberty interest exists.
important

treatment

recognizes such an

interest.

Jr-

3.

The

incorporation cases

such

as

Palko and

Adamson,

Just ice

Harlan's dissent in Ullman, and Justice Frankfurter in Rochin
establish
right"

the

or

sort of

rhetorical

substantive

due

approach

process

used

cases.

As

in

"natural

you noted

in

Furman, the eighth amendment cases and the incorporation cases
are

essentially

"objective"
legislation,

similar

in

indications

approach:
of

the

Court

contemporary

looks

to

ethics--state

lower court decisions, expert writing etc.

One

can make out a fairly persuasive case for a right to training.
Of course, you will be subject to the charge that you made it
1/
,,
up. Also, if it is true that contemporary morality recognizes
a

right

to treatment then it may be said

that there

/

is no

reason for the Court to create a constitutional requirement.
2.

Alternatively

right to training.

you

can

find

and

shelter--and

safety,

educational

or

habilitative

programs

There

are

there

is

no

If the State provides care--food, medical

treatment,

matter.

that

hard

between educating Romeo

choices

it

for

need

as
a

a

not

provide

constitutional

state

to

make

as

{to tie his shoes or dress himself)

and between providing better education for ghetto children in
Philadelphia. The constitution does not require the state to
provide

for

Romeo

simply

because

the

State

has

had

the

humanity to institutionalize him.

3.
level

of

Finally, you can find a right to some minimal

treatment

as

an

incident

of

the

right

to

safety,

..

l

4.

care, and freedom from restraint.
is

no

broad

right

to

Even if you find that there

treatment--subject

to

the

same

Seitz

standard as the right to safety and freedom of movement-- you
need not

rule

out all

______

"right"

to training.

Although

......,__ constitutional right to training,
would be no direct

extent

that

required.

training

Moreover,

was

necessary

when

some

there
to the

to

safety

it

might

be

minimal

amount

of

treatment

might significantly contribute to the comfort of a patient or
might make

shackling

unnecessary or

might be required as well.

less

necessary

then

it

It will be somewhat difficult to

give precision to this minimal "right" to treatment.

But in

--

any event there would be no general right to training such as
the draft now proposes.

Kissinger always presented Nixon with 3 options--two
of which were usually crazy.

We have done the same!

Probably

the third of these alternatives is the most desirable, but it
is unclear whether it would gain a Court.

For that matter, it

is unclear from the Conference which of the alternatives has
the most support.
Finally--and

however

you

choose--you

may

wish

to

sharpen the standard a bit, or express it in more traditional
language.
stated.

We are quite divided on how the standard should be
Perhaps we can discuss this further after you decide

the right to training question.

j

~11.(-<
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Memo to Mary, David and Dick
Your

memorandum,

leaves me little choice!
that,

following

written

on

April

Fools

Day,

In gentle language you warn me

Kissinger's

present three "options" -

practice

with

Nixon,

you

two of which are "crazy".

One

of the "crazy" options is the one that I incorporated in
the draft opinion.
At

least you treated me better

treated Nixon.

than Kissinger

I cannot imagine his identifying for the

President the "crazy" ones.
Kidding aside,

I am not yet entirely persuaded

to give up at least a part of my "crazy" view that there
is an obligation to provide some "training".
that,

in

part

definitions.

at
I

least,

have

differences

of

It may be

view

turn

on

taken another look at Joel Klein's

amicus brief, and he argues for the following - stated in
the briefest summary:
Civil

commitment

deprivation of liberty.

constitutes

a

significant

The mentally retarded therefore

have a substantial liberty interest in not being confined
without "habilitation".

This is a new term for me.

Joel

'"

.'

.

defines it as a term used by psychiatrists rather than the
term "treatment":
"The
word
'habilitation'
rather
than
'treatment', is used to refer to programs for
the mentally retarded because mental retardation
is
a learning disability and training
impairment
rather
than
an
illness.
While
psychiatric treatment may comprise part of a
prgram for the mentally retarded, the principal
focus of habilitation is upon training and
development of needed skills." {Brief, p. 4, n.
1) •

The argument makes the following points:
of

habilitation

confined

person

will
has

retardation does not

deny
to

the

only

regain

real

freedom,

lessen by itself.

lack

chance
as

the

mental

Habilitation is

necessary to develop skills for

the patient's own care,

and

is

a

capability

where

this

possible

for

the

patient to live independently or with the help of family.
Even if this

type of training does not lead to eventual

release, it may increase the liberty achievable within the
instituion itself.
The

analogy

provide medical care.
97),

we

Amendment

said

that

drawn

state's

duty

to

In Estelle v. Gamble {429

u.s.,

at

principles

"establish

provide medical care

is

the
for

to

the

derived

government's
those whom it

from

the

Eighth

obligation

to

is punishing by

incarceration".

-·

The principal medical needs of a person

i ~a mental institution are psychiat~

In this case the

state

duty

-

concedes,

as

I

-

~)

understand

it,

a

to

provide

medical care as this term in used for physical ailments.
And,

certainty

provided

by

in

most

M.D.'s

cases,

and

is

psychiatristic

medical

care

care

also.

is
This

includes a great deal more than prescribing drugs.
Of course,
their

needs.

would

conclude

My

psychiatric patients vary widely in

guess

they

capacity of anyone

is

that

Romeo's

professional

condition

is

judgments

beyond

the

to improve by treatment or training.

But I would assume that a large percentage of patients can
and

do

respond

to

programs

designed

to

improve

the

patient's capacity to function more normally within the
institution if not outside of it.
I put this question:
constitutionally

based

if a confined person has a

liberty

interest

in

reasonable

medical care, would this not embrace the type of such care
that
Putting
confined
medical
care?

provided by psychiatrists?
it differently,
in

a

care for

mental

is the state's duty to patients
institution

limited

to

provide

ell health ailments except psychiatric
'

(ra,"', ,., )

V,

r J' {.
b

,..)._,((/ < (

I
4

~ fr

!C.

(

.,;,

··.

It may be that our difficulty has arisen in part
from

viewing

"training" as something separate and apart

from the overall duty of "care", that concededly includes

,t
L,Vt.Jt,tl J \

housing,

food,

suffered

a

z

clothing and medical care.
stroke,

physiotherapy.

medical

Specifically,

care

where

If an inmate
would

are

we

include

drawing

the

line and is it justified by any constitutional rationale?
I

have

not

mentioned

"safety", as I agree with it.
from

injury

to

himself

or

your

discussion

of

The safety of a patient -

by others

-

is

certainly

a

liberty interest that a state owes even persons criminally
Indeed, the term "care" viewed in its normal

convicted.

sense seems broad enough to include this and each of the
needs that we have identified separately.
The

foregoing

reflects

my

concern

as

to

the

soundness of limiting the "sane" option as narrowly as I
read your memo.

What does my "braintrust" think?

* * *
I

add that when we agree on the

that the liberty interest requires,
state

discharges

its

duty

when

't

I would hold that a

decisions

professionals as we have defined them.

type of care

are

made

by

Moreover, we should make clear
liability

should

reasonable

care

not
is

be

imposed

attributable

where
to

the

that
the

individual
absence

failure

of

of
the

state itself to provide the necessary resources in terms
of personnel and facilities.
responsible
requests

people

in

that would

and facilities.
reason,

fails

There would be a duty on the

an

institution

assure

to

make

reasonably adequate

budget
staffing

But if a state legislature, for whatever
to

provide

the

funds,

personnel

in

the

institution should not be subject to damage suit liability
therefor.

There would be injunctive remedies available.
May I conclude by thanking all three of you, and

particularly
finding

a

Mary,

for

reasonable

this important case.

your

and
I

patience

principled

and

basis

interest
for

in

deciding

appreciate your making me face up

more thoughtfully to the foregoing type of problems, and
again - in fairness - Mary alerted me to these and similar
ones in her bench memorandum.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.
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&

Dick

,

~~4.}-~~
~) '

to
In re:

tJlA..t..

Th-e~

assume~~~:::

~

d-.f~ ~.) ~

No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo

This memo

l4J

~

i : : : : :t

)7

~ .1

,

:-:::c:;;t:7T

freedom from restraints along the lines discussed in our earlier

I

memo; the focus here is on the right-to-treatment issue.

In the

first part of this memo, we articulate the rationale for the
I

position that there is a right to treatment; the purpose of this
section is . primarily to make sure we understand this position as
you described it in your memo.

The second half defends the ~

"middle position" suggested in our memo of last week.

I.

A.

THERE IS A RIGHT TO TREATMENT

Holding
Depending on the factual situation, one of two specific

"rights" would be found.
(1)

If "habilitation" would lead to the restoration of

liberty, there would be a constitutional right to habilitation.
This right would exist regardless of the purpose of confinement
(care, protection, etc.).

Thus, the federal Constitution would

place a substantive limit on the state's ability to confine

'·'

2

0

civilly: if a reasonable (or some level) of care (habilitation)
can reasonably be expected to end the need for involuntary
commitment, the state cannot commit without providing such care.
(2)

If "habilitation," including self-care skills, would

lead to greater liberty within the institution, there also would
be a consitutitional right to habilitation.

Thus, the federal

Consitution would place another substantive limit on the state's
ability to confine for civil reasons: if a reasonable (or some
level) of care (habilitation) can reasonably be expected to
significantly increase the patient's ability to function
independently within the institution (his liberty), then the
state cannot commit without providing such care.

B.

Rationale
What are the bases for these limits on state action?

It

is possible to draw some analogy to the duty to provide medical
care to prisoners in Estelle.

But in Estelle, the Court did not

hold that prisoners have a right to reasonable medical treatment.
Instead, the Court held that prisoners are constitutionally
entitled to some level of medical care because contempory
standards would regard "deliberate indifference" to serious
medical needs as cruel and unusual punishment.

If Estelle were

based on the state's duty to provide medical care, would not the
constitutional right (though not, perhaps, the §1983 cause of
action) have been some right to reasonable medical care, not just
the absence of deliberate indifference?

I think more support

~-.

\.

3.

than Estelle is needed, unless we are to adopt only the Estelle
standard.
As suggested in our earlier memo, one source for a right
to treatment, including training or "habilitation"

'

is a Harlan-

Frankfurter-contemporary-standards substantive-due-process
analysis.

This analysis would conclude that, for those

involuntarily committed, civil commitment does not extinguish the
liberty interests described in #1 & #2, above.

(#1 need not

actually be mentioned, since it is not presented by the facts of
this case) .
Once that right is found--a right to reasonable
habilitation if it can be expected that such habilitation will
significantly improve the individual's ability to function
independently within (or without) the institution--then the
opinion could go on to hold that the state discharges its duty
when these decisions are made by professionals.

The opinion

would also stress that in an action for damages, the professional
is not personally liable if an inadequate treatment decision was
due to lack of funds.

c.

Problems with The Right to Treatment
Several of the possible problems with this approach were

mentioned in the last memo.

Use of the substantive-due-process

approach always opens the Court open to the charge that it has
"made up" a constitutional right.

And, if this standard is

dictated by contemporary morality, there may be little reason for

4.

the Court to create a constitutional right as a limit on
majoritarian decisionmaking.
Another problem is that, in an action for injunctive
relief, the suggested right-to-treatment standard would not be an
~

easy one with which to work.

What if there are professionals in

the institution, but they say (or others say) that their
decisions are not professional ones because of lack of funds?
Will the standard "degenerate" into medical malpractice: whether
a reasonable professional have made this decision?

Although our

case does not involve injunctive relief, I don't see any basis
for distinguishing the two if the rationale suggested above is
adopted.

Similar problems (in the context of suits for

injunctive relief) could also be raised regarding rights to
safety and freedom from restraints if the standard chosen is one
of delegation of decisionmaking to professionals.

II:

NO RIGHT TO TREATMENT PER SE

The major criticism of the middle-of-the road position
suggested in our earlier memo is: how can you find a
constitutional basis or, indeed, any other basis, for
distinguishing between forms of medical treatment (i.e., physical
theraphy following a stroke) which we would regard as required by
the Constitution, on the one hand, and the habilitation Romeo
wants on the other.
In response, it can be argued that this is no different
from other "lines" with which we work, and no more unprincipled.

5.

Even laymen usually can distinguish with ease between "training"
or "education" (designed to teach an individual a skill
....., he ......has
never had} and medical treatment, designed to ensure health.

At

times, this line may be difficult--especially when one compares

-

psychiatric medical treatment and the "habilitation" claimed by
Romeo.

But I do think that this line can be one maintained.
And the constitutional basis for finding no liberty

interest in any right to treatment per se would be no different
from the consitutional basis for the broader right to treatment,
discussed above.

The Court would note that

no case has ever

recognized such a right and would then turn to consider whether
contemporary standards of decency nevertheless impose such a duty

--

(}.!1-

on the state.

Contempo¥y standards may not be offended by civil

commitment of those in Romeo's condition even though the state
does not assume any obligation to habilitate, at least when
habilitation cannot lead to release (we can leave that harder
case for another day}.

Whether to expend limited state resources

-

on habiltation of those who can never be released simply so that

-----------------

they can be somewhat more independent within the institution is a
decision which "we, as a nation," may have delegated to state
legislatures.

(parahrasing Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman}.

(The opinion would, of course, recognize a protected liberty
interest in safety and freedom from restraints--but it should be
possible to do so on the basis of prior cases rather than
substantive due process.}.
If one considers the facts
and claims in the
case at
........
,_,..--.._..---

-

bar, it is suprisingly easy to classify various forms of

.·

~·'

.' '

6

0

/}')
(b)
d)
"training" as related t~dical care, safety, or reasonable use

--

-

of restraints (and therefore constitutionally required without a
----~

right to treatment per se) and those forms of "training" which
would not be constitutionally requried in the absence of a
specific right to treatment.

For example, a behavior-

modification program designed to curb Romeo's violence would be
related to safety and restraints and thus constitutionally
required (under the appropriate standard) regardless opf whether
there is any general right to treatment.

Similar, toilet

training would be related to medical care since Romeo's current
behavior in this area causes infections.

But teaching Romeo to

tie his shoes or dress himself, rather than have another perform
these tasks, would not be constitutionally required because such
treatment would be "pure" training.

-

If the opinion were written along these lines, it could,
of course, stress (in addition to those factors mentioned above)
---

li

\\,

that the Court is not reaching the right-to-treatment question in
a case in which treatment might lead to freedom.

Here, it is

conceded that Romeo cannot be trained to live in freedom--there
is no need for the Court to consider whether treatment might not
be constitutionally required when it could lead to freedom.

In

this other case, the state interest's would, of course, be much
different from those in the case at bar since indefinite
confinement will often cost the state more than "habilitative"
treatment.

And, of course, the individual's liberty interest in

treatment would be clearer and stronger than in the case at bar
since it could lead to actual physical freedom.

7•
•

When you have chosen an approach, some further
discussion of the appropriate standard would be helpful.

Many of

the problems mentioned above regarding application of the
professional-judgment standard in suits for injunctive relief
would apply also in the context of the right to safety and
freedom from restraints.

meb 05/11/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In Re:

Mary

Justice Brennan's note in No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo

Justice Brennan makes two points.

One is that resp waived

any right to treatment peir se and the other that we should treat
I

this case and Mills in the same manner.

I attach a copy of the

transcript of oral argument.

1.
standard.

It is true that the resp did not argue for the Adams
But I do not think one can honestly argue that resp

waived all rights to treatment other than those related to safety
and restraints.
After we got the note, David went down to the Brennan
chambers to argue with Mark Campisano, but Justice Brennan came in
and David ended up arguing with him!

Justice Brennan conceded that

the waiver point was an unreasonably harsh reading of oral argument-it's based on a statement at 47 of oral argument, a statement by
the lawyer during which Justice Brennan cutoff the lawyer.

The

lawyer's truncated statement cannot reasonably be regarded as an
exhaustive description of the rights resp seeks (and therefore a

2.

waiver of other rights).

Cf. 28-29 of Oral Argument where the

lawyer discusses the right to treatment.
In any event, David's discussion with Justice Brennan
indicates that Justice Berennan will not press this waiver point
....

4

again.

2.

With regard to

th ~~, there are several

points to nate. First, Mills involved a claim to federal procedural
••
protection based on state substantive law. And during the time the
case was before the federal courts, state law appeared to have
changed.

In Youngberg, resp claims only federal substantive rights.

-

And there has been no change in state law.
Second, resp in Youngberg claims only damages for breach of
federal substantive rights.

According to resp's lawyer at oral

argument, the damage claim could not have been brought originally as
a pendent state-law claim, at the time the complaint was filed,
because of the then-existing Pa. soveign-immunity law, and would now
be barred by the state statute of limitations.
Arg., at 36.

See Tr. of Oral

At least in the brief in this Court, the Mills

plaintiffs argued that their claims could be satisfied by Mass.'s
new state law.

No similar claim is made here because a suit for

damages could not now be brought in Pa.
~I
.
.
b
BQga~oe t h e cla1ms 1n Young erg
1\

u~

{f~ral

substantive) are

so different from the claims in Mills {fede al procedural based on
state-created rights

~~h ~

have a

hard time imagining what it means to treat this case like Mills.

3.

In his discussion with David, Justice Brennan kept
stressing how important it was that the states be free to experiment
in this area.

This point is also made in his memo.

Perhaps this is

another area like Fair Assessment (the tax case we heard earlier
this year) in which he would have the federal courts abstain
regardless of what arguments were or were not made by resp here.

,jn.prmtt <!fxrud xrf tfrt ~b ,jtatt,g
'~lbudtingt~ J . <!f. 20gt'1'
C HAMBERS OF

JUSTIC E

w...

May 11, 1982.

J . BRENNAN, JR.

No. 80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo.

Dear Lewis,
You have written a fine draft opinion in a very
difficult case. My concerns focus on the position
taken by respondent at oral argument, which to my mind
made unnecessary the extensive discussion of respondent's constitutional rights that you have undertaken.
At pages 9-13 of your draft, you discuss respondent's claim of "a constitutional right to 'habilitation,'" Draft at 9, which leads you into a discussion
Of--Rodriguez and Paul v. Davis. I do not think that
this discussion is required, for two reasons. (fi;Sf)
at oral argument, respondent withdrew completel~
the position taken on this point in Judge Adams' opinion in the Third Cjrcuit, as well as from the position
that respondent himself took on this point in his brief
filed in this Court: In fact, respondent pointedly refused to defend Judge Adams' opinion to the extent that
it "announced a right to treatment in the sense of
treatment to achieve maximum potential." Tr. of Oral
Arq. 46-47, 48. Rather, he took the position-- which
I gather is your own -- that petitioners were only "obligated to use behavioral programming to ... reduce violence and prevent aggressive [behavior]," and that
this obligation was "a part of the minimum care that's
required." Id., at 47. As a result, \!_hY Q...o we ~e ~d to
ascribe to resondent the position that "the Sta e ••.
nas- a const1 ut1ona
u y -o pro 1 e reasonable training, both to preserve existinq skills and develop new
ones," Draft at 9? Respondent has given up that posi-

'.

...

...
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tion, and now presses a claim for "habilitation" only
to the extent -- again as you suggest -- that such
treatment is required to ensure "safe conditions" and
to permit "freedom from bodily restraint" to the extent
possible.
Second, and particularly significant, I think, respondent took the position in his brief and at oral argument that Pennsylvania law has created "a liberty interest in habilitation." Brief of Respondent 25-29,
Tr. of Oral Arg. 36. Indeed, at oral argument I asked
respondent, "Well, is it your view that ... the statute
... provides everything that you say constitutionally
you're also entitled to?" Ibid. Respondent answered,
"Yes, yes," ibid., and then launched into an explanation, irrelevant for our purposes, of why he had not
made a statutory claim, id., at 36-37. As a result of
respondent's position, is he not right that "there is
no need for this Court in this case to decide whether
the Constitution of its own force and without regard to
state statutory law entitles retarded persons to minimally adequate habilitation when confined in state institutions"? Brief of Respondent 29.
I recall that at Conference some of our colleagues
suggested that this field was best left to state experimentation, at least for the time being. That essentially was respondent's position at oral argument,
and I see wisdom in it. Moreover, you are following
that course in Mills v. Rogers: To be consistent,
shouldn't we follow it here too?

SN ,
w. J. B., Jr.

Justice Powell.

-iay 12, 19 8 2

80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear 'Rill:
When I returneet this morninq, I found your letter
of May 11. Than~ vou fo~ writinq, and I appreciat~ your
makinq it a orivat~ letter.
I will now try to answer the two quPstions you

r i.se.
l.

t do not think w~ fairly can sav that
the claim for "habilitation" (training)
in this case when we qranted it. ~he
absence of a '~aiver ic:; clear., I think, from a readinq of the
transcript. T send to you with this letter the copy of the
transcript thiit my clerk and I have used in preparing the
draft. The ~ritical paqes are 46-49. As often happens at
oral argument, it is not clear at all that vou and Mr.
Tiryak w~re understanding each othe~. It is clear, I think,
that he supported Ju~ge Adams' opinion.
respon~ent waived
that ~lear1y was

t have aqain tak~n a look at respondent's brief.
On page 7, he summarizes the three separate holdinqs of CA3,
including "a right to habilitation that was acceptable in
light of oresent meoical or other scientifjc knowledge." At
pages 23-28, resoondent argues for "an independent
constitutional right to •inimally adequate habilitation".
~espondent's brief relies expressly on the brief
of American Psychiatric Association in which "habilitation"
ig defined ("the principal focus of habilitation is upon
training and development of needed skills" p. 4, fn. 1}.
Respondent's brief also stated that "the riqht to minimal
adequate habilitation should depend upon the prospect of a
cure rather than amelioration of the ~isabilities of
retar~atlon."
~espondent, of cou~se, argues that "the Court
of ~ppeals (judqmant} should be affirmed".

2.

2. Your second suggestion is that we follow the
course ! propose in Mills v. Rogers and remand this case for.
a determination whether under Pennsylvania law there is a
"liberty interest in habilitation".
I would hesitate to
propose this for several reasons. There are major
differences between the two cases. Mills involved a claim
to federal procedural protection that could not be decided
properly without reference to state substant i.ve law. Some
five months after CAl decided Mills, and after we granted
certiorari, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
decided Roe rLL· At least on its face, Roe III appears to
to make a substantial change in Massachusetts law. we
remanded Mills to enable CAl "to determine how Roe III may
have changed the law of Massachusetts and how any changes
may affect this case". Draft of Mills, p. 14.
The situation in this case is entirely different.
We have been advised of no change in Pennsyvlania law. ~he
courts below decided the case in light of their
understanding of the Pennsylvania statute, as then
interpreted. Moreover, the only claim before us in
Youngberg is fo~ damages for a violation of a substantive
federal right. Respondent's counsel, at oral argument,
advised that the damage claim could not have been brought
originally as a pendent state-law claim because of the then
existing Pennsylvania sovereign immunity law. The damage
cla.im now would be barred by the state statute of
limitations. See Tr. Oral ~rgument, at 36. In Mills, the
plaintiffs argued that their claims could be satisfied under
Massachusetts law.

Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

.

;"•

.iu:prmtt <!fqttrl qf tfrt ~b' .§taft~
Jfuipttgtlltt. ~. <!f. 2llgt'1~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNAN , JR .

RE:

May 13, 1982

No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
Thanks so much for your prompt response to my suggestions
in the above.
I suppose my difficulties with this case count for my hope
that we could find a way of disposing of it without having to
answer how far treatment was constitutionally required. While
I am not as sure in my own mind as apparently you are that
11
the absence of a waiver is clear 11 , I can•t say that a reading
of the transcript supports a conclusion that he clearly did
waive the claim for training. And I might say the same about
the brief.
Respondent•s basic argument was that what the Pennsylvania
statute gave him the Federal Constitution also required. He
sought damages for the denial of those claims. I suppose insofar as he relies on the statute he can•t succeed because
although Pennsylvania has now abolished sovereign immunity,the
statute of limitations bars the claim. Hence he has to press
the claim on the Constitution. That means I suppose that we•11
have to decide what the Constitution gives him. I may finally
agree that the Constitution goes no further than your opinion
suggests. But I have not yet come to rest on that.
I am returning with thanks your copy of the transcript of
the oral argument.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

'.

.iu:.prttttt <!Jau.rt of Urt ~ta .itattg
jt:udpngtott. !J. <!f. 2ll&f11~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

May 14, 1982
Re:

No. 80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely, ~

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

Jnvrttttt ato:ud cf ±4t 1hittb Jtatt.s'
'!lht.&'ftittgton. ~. Clt· 2llbi~'
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 20, 1982

No. 80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis,
I generally agree with your excellent handling of the
right-to-treatment claim. I am concerned about an issue which is
not directly discussed.
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 715, 738 (1972), the
Court held that, at a minimum, due process requires some rational
relation between the nature of a mental health commitment and its
purpose. In the present case, Pennsylvania has agreed to commit
and care for Romeo because he cannot ~ake care of himself, and
his mother is also unable to do so. / The purpose of his
~n ommitment, as I understand it, is to provide some reasonable
~ ~ degree of care, safety, and limited freedom of movement within
the institution ~ Yet, if, as a result of the care and treatment
or lack thereof, in the institution, he loses some of the basic
skills he had on commitment, he will have lost what little
"liberty" he had left.
Absent reasonable care and training, necessary in the
judgment of professionals charged with his care, the nature of
Romeo's confinement may not be rationally related to the purpose
of his confinement. This concept may fit comfortably within your
conclusion that the respondent is entitled to "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions."
If you think you would be willing to address this
problem in your opinion, I would hope to join. Otherwise, I may
decide I should write something separately to address it.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

~nvrtutt Qfltltd af

tqt ~itth

~tatt.s

Jhurftington, ~- ~- 2.0bl~~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR

May 20, 1982

No. 80-1429

Dear Lewis,

Youngberg v. Romeo

'·

I generally agree with your excellent handling of the
right-to-treatment claim.
I am concerned about an issue which is
not directly discussed.
In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 715, 738 (1972}, the
Court held that, at a minimum, due process requires some rational
relation between the nature of a mental health commitment and its
purpose. In the present case, Pennsylvania has agreed to commit
and care for Romeo because he cannot take care of himself, and
his mother is also unable to do so. The purpose of his
commitment, as I understand it, is to provide some reasonable
degree of care, safety, and limited freedom of movement within
the institution. Yet, if, as a result of the care and treatment,
or lack thereof, in the institution, he loses some of the basic
skills he had on commitment, he will have lost what little
"liberty" he had left.
Absent reasonable care and training, necessary in the
judgment of professionals charged with his care, the nature of
Romeo's confinement may not be rationally related to the purpose
of his confinement. This concept may fit comfortably within your
conclusion that the respondent is entitled to "reasonably nonrestrictive confinement conditions."
If you think you would be willing to address this
problem in your opinion, I would hope to join. Otherwise, I may
decide I should write something separately to address it.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

,jnprmu <!Jcttri cf tlrt ~b ,jtattll'
._Mlrittgtcn. ~. <!J. 20.;t'!~
CH A M B E R S OF

JU S T IC E

w .. .

J . BRENNAN , JR .

May 20, 1982.

No. 80-1429 -- Youngberg v. Romeo.

Dear Lewis,
Your draft op1n1on is a very fine job, and in most
respects I find it quite persuasive. My principal concerns focus on Part II-B, Draft at 9-13. You conclude
that Part by holding that "involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in training~ se." Id.,
at 13. This holding differs, of course, from the analysis adopted by Chief Judge Seitz in his concurrence in
the CA3:
"I believe that [Romeo] has a constitutional right
to minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence of a constitutional right to care and
treatment is no longer a novel legal proposition.
See,~~' Donaldson v . O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507
(5th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Rouse v. Cameron, 373
F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Although the seminal
right-to-treatment cases were concerned with the
mentally ill, recent cases have extended this
right to the mentally retarded. See,~~'
Welsch v. Likins, 550 F . 2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977);
Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) ."
644 F. 2d, at 176 (Seitz, C. J., concurring).
You expressly reject this analysis. Draft at 15, n.
29. But my recollection of our Conference discussion
is that while no formal vote was taken, a majority of
our colleagues were in favor of embracing Chief Judge
Seitz's view on this issue, as on the other issues in

...._
No. 80-1429 -- Youngberg v. Romeo.

2.

the case. If my recollection is accurate, then I would
be willing to join that view and so could not join your
opinion as Part II-B is currently written. I might add
that since petitioners have already conceded that Romeo
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
personal security and freedom from bodily restraint,
Draft at 8 & n. 17, this issue-- whether Romeo has a
constitutional right to "training," id., at 9 & n. 19
-- seems to be the principal issue remaining in the
case.
Of course we had no formal vote at Conference, and
our colleagues will doubtless let you have their reaction in due course.

Si ~
w. J. B., Jr.

Justice Powell.
Copies to the Conference.
,.

meb 05/22/82

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

Mary

In Re:

No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo (and Justice O'Connor's
memo)

I don't understand what Justice O'Connor is talking about
in her second paragraph.

The institution is most unlikely to be

able to maintain Romeo's skills, ability to interact, etc., at the
level they were when he lived with his parents.

Moreover, Justice

O'Connor seems to suggest that any skill or ability is a "liberty"
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, though she gives no guidance
as to the constitutional basis for this conclusion (a conclusion not
unlike the holding of our earlier draft).

I think the language you suggest at the bottom of the memo
is fine, but I am somewhat worried about also including Justice
O'Connor's point about the purposes of commitment. In
Indiana, 406

u.s.

Jackson v.

715, 738 (1972), a person was incarcerated pending

competency to stand trial;
nor criminal process.

he was afforded neither civil commitment

Because his incompentency was due to mental

retardation it was unlikely that he would ever be competent to stand
trial.

Yet, by the time the case reached this Court, he had been

...
'

'

2.

involuntarily confined, without criminal process or civil
commitment, for several years.

In an opinion written by Justice

Blackmun, the Court held that the State could not hold him
indefinitely pending competency with no civil or criminal procedures
and little or no likelihood that he would ever attain competency.
In reaching this holding, the Court stated that, at a minimum, due
process requires some relationship between the purpose of commitment
and its terms or conditions.

In that case, there was no such

relationship because, though he was committed pending competency,
there was little or no chance he would ever become competent.
Jackson v. Indiana did not deal with the conditions of
confinement--and it is those conditions that are at issue in Romeo.
Moreover, in Jackson, the deft was being held for only one
constitutionally permissible reason--pending competency to stand
trial--whereas in Romeo, the Pa. commitment statute states that any
person needing commitment for care can be committed for care and
treatment.

And the state has conceded that Romeo is entitled to

adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical treatment.

That may

be all the "care and treatment" required by the state commitment
statute.

-

In any event, the meaning of care and treatment in that
-------~

statute is purely a question of state law, and state law was cited
r

~

..........

~

._......_.....

•

by respondent for the first time in his reply brief to this Court.
See n. 23 of our opinion

(The Jackson v. Indiana and Pa.-

commitment-statute argument was made by the Adams majority at the CA
level, but they made it on their own--resp did not argue or even
cite either the Pa. commitment statute or Jackson v. Indiana to the

~~

~

3.

CA.

And the Adams majority gave no guidance as to the meaning of

the terms "care and guidance" at state law.).
To say that in Pa., the precise "purposes" of commitment
under the commitment statute is unclear is an understatement, which
is not suprising given the late point at which Pa. law is being
argued.

Resp cites two cases for the proposition that the

committment statute gives him substantive rights at state law, but
neither of those Pa. cases actually construe the commitment statute.
Indeed, a reading of those cases reveals that there is no reason for
Pennsylvania courts to ever construe the commitment statute's
substantive implications because there is another set of Pa.
statutes, not cited by resp even now, giving him substantive rights.
Presumably these statutes aren't cited because they don't fit in
with the Jackson v. Indiana-type analysis, basing a federal right on
the purpose of commitment.
As this discussion suggests, the precise purpose of

---

..

Romeo's commitment under the relevant Pa. statute is unclear enough
....

as a matter of state law that we might be better off avoiding any

.

statements such as that suggested by Justice O'Connor (i.e.,
concerning the purposes of his commitment); such statements might
end up giving Justice Brennan a real reason for remanding--to
certify the question of the purpose of Romeo's commitment under the
commitment statute as a matter of state law.

Because the answer to

that question probably would have no implications for state law
given the other substantive state-law statutes give the mentally

_______

retarded the rights Romeo seems to seek, the rather
bizarre effect
....._.._

-----

would be to ask the state court to decide the

federa~n.

'.

4.

I think this approach incorrect, not only because of that
aspect, but because, first of all, a state substantive right may
create a federal procedural right but not a federal substantive
right (and resp only argues that a state substantive right creates a
federal substantive right).

J'~

In addition, resp does not argue--as

did the deft in Donaldson and Jackson, for either freedom or another
procedure.

He only wants substantive rights.

~Because

Romeo could

be committed solely for safety of others, and because he does not
seek either release or, in the absence of release, another
procedure, his Jackson v. Indiana argument should fail.

Finally, as ;>~

a matter of federal law, I don't think Romeo could be committed

just~~

for care and treatment (if he was capable of surviving on the
outside and wanted to do so).

See Addington v. Texas, 441

(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422

u.s.

563, 576 (1975).

~

u.s. 418~~
Why should • . yJ

it matter, for federal substantive law, that the state has confined
him for reasons in addition to those that are constitutionally
permissible (i.e., for his own survival and the safety of himself
and others) •

I think this point sharply distinguishes the case from

Jackson, in which there was only one constitutionally permissible
reason for confinement (confinement pending competency) and the
Court required a rational relation between that single
constitutionally-permissible reason for commitment and the "terms
and conditions" of his confinement.

Here, Romeo could be confined

constitutionally purely for the safety of others.

If that were

done, under the Jackson v. Indiana rationale, he would only be
entitled to high walls--not much of a federal right.
~

.

.J_

~~/~

5.

Instead of saying something about the purposes of Romeo's
commitment, what would you think of expanding footnote 23 to
something along these lines?
earlier draft).

(most of this is actually from any

Perhaps Justice O'Connor would then be willing to

go along.

note 23, at 11 (first

as in current opinion, with only slight

~

changes) .

Respondent does argue that he was committed for care and
treatment under state law, and that he therefore has a state
substantive right entitled to substantive, not procedural,
protection under the Due Process Clause of the/ Federal
Constitution.

But this argument is made for the first time in

repondent's brief to this Court.

It was not advanced in the courts

below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for
reversing the trial Court.

Given the uncertainty of Pennsyvannia

law and the lack of guidance from the lower federal courts as to the
precise meaning of "care and treatment" under state law, we decline
to consider respondent's argument now.
433

u.s.

See Dothard v. Rawlinson,

321, 323 N.l (1977); Duigman v. United States, 274

u.s.

195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des
Mines, 164

u.s.

2612, 264-265 (1896).

Moreover, there are serious problems with the substance of
respondent's argumenmt.
Indiana, 406

u.s.

Respondent relies primarily on Jackson v.

715 (1972).

There, a mentally retarded person was

6.

incarcerated pending competency to stand trial for a criminal
offense.

Given the cause of his incompetency, it was most unlikely

that he would ever become competent, yet, by the time the case
reached this Court, he had been held several years without either
criminal process or civil-commitment proceedings.

The Court held

that he must be afforded civil-commitment proceedings since there
was little, if any, likelihood he would ever be competent to stand
trial.

In reaching this decision, the Court stated that due process

requires, at a minimum, terms and conditions of confinement that
bear some rational relation to the purposes of confinement.

Id., at

738.
Respondent argues that the wording of the relevant
Pennsylvania commitment statute reveals the purposes for which he
was committed--care and treatment--and that statute creates a statecreated right to treatment entitled to federal protection under
Jackson because due process requires some relationship between the
conditions of confinement and its purposes.

In Jackson, however,

the Court was considering only the need for a relationship between
the single reason justifying confinement as a matter of federal law-temporary confinement pending competency to stand trial--and the
"terms and conditions" of confinement.

It is most unlikely that, as

a matter of federal law, Romeo could be committed for care and
treatment if he were actually capable of surviving on the outside.
See Addington v. Texas, O'Connor v. Donaldson.

Romeo could, as a

matter of federal law, be confined to protect others.
notes at n. 1 & n. 2, supra; Addington v. Texas, 441
(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422

u.s.

See text and

u.s.

563, 573 (1975).

418, 426
Respondent

7.
may have been confined for additional reasons under state law, but
that would normally entitle him to state, not federal, substantive
rights.
If respondent were seeking different conditions of
confinement unless he were released or given additional procedures,
we would be presented with a quite different case.

But respondent

is not seeking another state procedure, one that could commit him
solely because he is violent, nor is he seeking release in the
absence of an additional procedure.

u.s., ___
422 u.s.,

Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 401

(Jackson wanted another procedure); O'Connor v. Donaldson,
at 568 (Donaldson requested release).
Moreover, we see no reason why a federal substantive right

to treatment should vary with the wording of the relevant state
commitment statute or with the precise reason given for commitment.
Why, as a matter of federal law, should a mentally retarded person
involuntarily committed to protect himself and others receive less
treatment or inferior conditions than one involuntarily committed
only because he is unable to care for himself?

It is true that

state substantive rights implicate federal procedural due process.
And it is also true that we have never held explicitly that state
substantive rights cannot be the basis for federal substantive
rights under the Due Process Clause.

In

Smith v. Organization of

Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 n. 48 (1977)

(Brennan, J.), we

indicated that even when a federal procedural right exists, the
existence of a related federal substantive right is not automatic,
but is an entirely distinct question.

.hvrtuu Qtourl ttf tlft ~h .ifattg
.uJri:ngton.1J. Qt. 2ll.;t'l~
CHAMeERS OF

May 24, 1982

.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re:

No. 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
My own views for this case coincide with those of
Chief Judge Seitz. My notes and recollections may be
in error, but I, too, thought that a majority favored
the Seitz approach.
Sincerely,

A-

Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

May 24, 1982

80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Sandra:
I am recirculating Youngberg this afternoon.
In addition to a few stylistic changes, those made in
n. 27 on p. 14, and in the text on p. 18, will - 1 believe comply with your suggestion that we make clear that this
opinion is con~fstent with Jackson v. Indiana.
Of course, Jackson has very little to do with this
case, as I think the addition in n. 27 makes clear.
I

appreciate your bringing this to my attention.
Sincerely,

Justice O'Connor
LFP/vde

.·

.•
j

,,

•

'•

May 24, 1982

~

ROMEO SALLY-POW
80-1429 Younberg v. Romeo

1~

Dear Bill:
I t is good know that we may not be

ria~~
~

this case.
As I understand your concern, it

extent of a constitutional right to "treatment'.
is symonymous with "habilitation" in the arcane world of
psychiatry, and is defined in the brief of the American
Psychiatric Association.

See n. 1, p. 1, my draft

opinion.
I gave a great deal of thought to how far we
should go in holding, as a matter of federal
constitutional right, that a state must provide training.
The proposed holding is stated on p. 18 of my 3rd draft as
follows:
"Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally
protected interests in conditions of reasonable
care and safety, reasonably non-restrictive
confinement conditions, and such training as may
be required by these interests. These
conditions of confinement comport fully with the
purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S.715, 738 (1972); seen. 27,
ante.

2.

Respondent apparently wants a more expansive
"right" to training.

Although, he never clearly spells

this out, asserts a constitutional right to "reasonable
training" both to preserve existing skills and develop new
ones.

It is clear that Respondent's "existing skills" -

limited as they are - will be and improved preserved under
the standards of my draft. It is equally clear, I think,
that the state's obligations with respect to safety and
personal confinement also will improve his ability to live
within the institution.

The state is presently providing

training in this respect.

See opinion p. 4 and n. 7.

It is not easy to define other limits to a
state's duty.

I find no basis for imposing a

constitutional obligation on

every state mental

institution to provide for each patient all training that
competent professionals think might possibly be desirable.
I have left open, however, situations where training may
enable the patient to live

outside of an institution.

We could say simply that the duty is to impose
"reasonable training" under the circumstances.

This would

be one way to write this case (and a rather inviting way),

3.

but we would leave unanswered the question that we granted
the case to resolve.
The draft opinion agrees with Chief Judge Seitz
in important respects. See pp. 6, 15.

But, the Seitz

language that you quote, is too general to be very
helpful:

"constitutional right [exists] to minimally

adequate care and treatment".

This sheds no light on the

difficult questions of what specifically what kind of
treatment and for what purpose?

Moreover, Judge Seitz

bracketed "care and treatment", without making clear
whether

he was distinguishing between the two.

The state

has conceded a broad duty of care, including the right to
provide adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care.
As you note, the principal issue remaining in the case is
the right to "training", but we would accomplish little by
simply adopting Judge Seitz's general language.
When we are construing "liberty interests" to
create rights not specified in the Constitution, one tends
to be cautious.

It already is established by our cases

that "liberty interests" include personal safety and a

4.

right not to be shackled unless necessary.

I thought it

best to relate training to these established rights.
In sum, I have written the opinion in light of
Romeo's condition and needs.

We would have a different

case where the liberty interest involves the prospect of
the patient returning to life outside of an institution.
I will be glad to consider any language you may suggest.
Sincerely,
Justice Brennan

May 25, 1982

80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Bil1:
I

20.

have not overJooken replying to your. letter of May

I had to speak at washington & Lee University on

Friday, and generally am behind in my opinion work.
I also aqree largely with Chief Judge Seitz, an~ had
not thouqht that my draft opinion departed substantially
from his view. I will, however, take another careful look
and be in touch with you.
S5ncerely,

Justice Brennan
Copies to the Conference

LFP/vde

....

·.

meb 5/26/82
To:

Mr. Justice Powell

From:

IN re:

Mary

No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo
David and I are both a little worried that the rider for

page 15 sounds like we may be reaching the entire "habilitation'' issue.
Unless the reader knows what we mean by the "purpose for which the
individual is

committed,'~

i.e., in this case, Romeo was committed

for care and safety by his mother, as n. 27 explains, I am not sure that
this sentence will not be read as a broad holding of a right to •minimally
adequate habilitation."

I am also troubled by tying the federal rights

(anymore than we have to to get Justice O'Connor's vote) to the
purposes of commitment.

What i f

Romeo's mother had stated that she was

committing him because she could no longer care for him or provide safety
for him and she wanted him to be habilitated (as much as possible) through
participation in Pennhurst programs.
David and I would make the following suggestions--they are
alternatives, with the favored suggestion first.

~tc.4~r.ta.d·~ ~r l~td'~r .A t p . ft('
1.

,,

We have already determined that in this case we need not reach

the difficult question whether someone involuntarily committed to a state
institution for the mentally retarded has a constitutional right to treatment
orthabilitation unrelated to the need for safety and freedom from fui5ta~~g~s.
S e1 an e, at:
. c.as4!
-Lin this c~e~, we hold that when the rights of the involuntarily committed
mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate interests of the State, i
including administrative and fiscal restraints, due process requires that
c:Jfie:!e

in~i j1 ~he State subject ·these individuals only to reasonable

physical constraints,

(ii)

it provide them reasonably safe conditions, and (ii

(iii) it afford them such training as is necessarty to achieve
reasonable safety and freedom of movement within the institution.
2.

II

We could the delete the "we /10ld" sentence at

"'
15-16 entirely, and provide some other transiMtion
into the "deference
.._/

to the professional'' discussion, which comes next.

The problem with this

approach is that the constitutional right is then only stated in

-2terms of

~

a right to a professional decisionmaker, with great

deference to that decisionmaker.

In other words (in fact, in David's words)

this gives one the constitutional right to a negligent professional decision.
It sounds better to say there is a right to some reasonable level of
care, safety, etc., but that great deference will be given to
professionals to keep courts from running institutions, etc.

lfp/ss 05/27/82
MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mary

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

May 27, 1982

80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo
Your editing of my rider A, page 8 has improved
it.
I also have made some changes in Parts III-B and
IV.

I think the change included in my rider A for page 15 -

though a major one - is necessary for consistency with what
we say in the basic change set forth in our long rider, page
8.

At this point (i.e., p. 15, 16) we are stating general

rules rather than addressing Romeo's situation.
Romeo's case on page 18.
to training per se.

We come to

There, I would omit the reference

Again the language in the first

paragraph of p. 18 will be of general application.

It is

limited significantly by what we have said with respect to
reasonableness being determined by the appropriate
professional.

If we can put a Court together on an opinion

along the lines we are now discussing, we do leave questions
open for the future.

But I believe our emphasis of

deference to a professional judgment - not the best
available such judgments - adequately protects a state's
legitimate interest.
If you and David are content with these changes, I
suggest that you ask the print shop to incorporate them in
what we might call either a second chambers draft or a

'

..

;

2.

tentative fourth draft, giving us only a half a dozen copies
for us to review in Chambers.

Possibly, I would submit

copies to Brennan and then to Rehnquist.

If we can satisfy

them, I am confident the large "silent" segment of the Court
will be inclined to go along.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss

lfp/ss 05/27/82
MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Mary

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

May 27, 1982

80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo
Your editing of my rider A, page 8 has improved
it.
I also have made some changes in Parts III-B and
IV.

I think the change included in my rider A for page 15 -

though a major one - is necessary for consistency with what
we say in the basic change set forth in our long rider, page
8.

At this point (i.e., p. 15, 16) we are stating general

rules rather than addressing Romeo's situation.
Romeo's case on page 18.
to training per se.

We come to

There, I would omit the reference

Again the language in the first

paragraph of p. 18 will be of general application.

It is

limited significantly by what we have said with respect to
reasonableness being determined by the appropriate
professional.

If we can put a Court together on an opinion

along the lines we are now discussing, we do leave questions
open for the future.

But I believe our emphasis of

deference to a professional judgment - not the best
available such judgments - adequately protects a state's
legitimate interest.
If you and David are content with these changes, I
suggest that you ask the print shop to incorporate them in
what we might call either a second chambers draft or a

.......

·

~

.

-'
'

..,·

...,.... ,

2.

tentative fourth draft, giving us only a half a dozen copies
for us to review in Chambers.

Possibly, I would submit

copies to Brennan and then to Rehnquist.
them,

I

If we can satisfy

am confident the large "silent" segment of the Court

will be inclined to go along.

L.F.P., .Jr.

ss

)

'

·-

.June 2, 1982

Dear Bill:
I am delivering a fourth draft of Youngberg in
view of your kindness in bei.ng willing to take a
precirculation look at it.
Our correspondence has prompted me to make
substantial changes on page 8 and 9, and particularly pp.
10-16. As you will see, I have - as you suggested - drawn
primarlly on Chief Judge Seitz's opi.nion. Further
consideration of the case also persuades me that I was
tryi.nq to write too broadly. In this case, in view of
Romeo's extremely unfortunate condition, he can never be
released from an institution and the minimally adequate
training that he seeks is related to his safety (from self
abuse as well as by others), and to minimize physical
restraints. No other specific training is sought in his
complaint.
In sum, my opinion as revised decides this case
only, and on its rather special facts. I have left open t.he
question of what type of training may be appropriate in
other cases.
Sincerely,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss
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June 17, 1982

80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

This case is here from CA3.
Respondent is a profoundly retarded perso~
involuntarily committed to a state institution.

He argues

that he is entitled to safety ~freedom from restraints,~nd
4~~/tA.-~.
trainingA He seeks monetary damages/ from three of the

~

_j nstitution's adminis~a~.

Amendment,
rather than the Eighth, provides the proper basis for the
asserted rights.
Although we agree as to the applicability of the
Fourteenth

Amendment ~we

disagree with the standard

articulated by the Court of Appeals.

We therefore vacate

that decision;land remand for further proceedings.
We hol
safet

and

that respondent is entitled to reasonable

~re~om~ rom

unreasonable restraints.

Respondent

also is entitled to training;/r easonably necessary to provide
such safety and freedom from restraint; .

2.

FinallyJ we hold;fthat in determining whether these
rights have been violated t'courts should give
decisions made by

pr~ ionals;fwithin

~eference

to

the institution.

Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion in which
~

.o\

Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor joined.

The Chief

Justice filed an opinion concurring in the judgment.
1

~ttttrttttt

"Jllltrt d tqt ~ttittb .§ta:i

Jlrurlrittgton, ~. <!}.

2ll~~~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY o'CONNOR

June 15, 1982

j
··~

No. 80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Harry,
Please join me in your concurring opinion.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun

Copies to the Conference

of f!rt 'Jllnfu~ ~tattg
:.rur!rin¢cn.lB. OJ. 20~~~

~upr tmt <!}curl

CHAMB E RS OF

JUSTICE

w.. . J . BRENNAN ,

RE:

/

June 15, 1982

JR.

No. 80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Harry:
Pl~ase

join me in your concurring opinion in

the above.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

meb 06/12/82

~-.!~

To: Mr. Justice Powell

From:

In Re:

~a,_~ ~~z~

p2.~~9~

Mary

.dt.-U

vt, U/..e-. ~

~ tt- ~ IAJ7Ut ~
G

No. 80-14 2 9 , _Y_o_u_n_.g'--b_e_r_g'---v_._R_o_m_e_o_

k

~

~*''

I have prepared the following footnote as a suggestion if
you want to respond to the Chief Justice's contention that there is
no way for the Court to avoid the right-to-treatment-per se issue on
the basis of the record and pleadings before the Court.

The

footnote would be a new footnote 23, as marked at p. 11 (copy
attached).

note 23:

In his concurrance in the judgment, the Chief
k'~~~
Hu..~~
Justice gives two reasons the Court cannot avoid ~ issue.i~ tfiis
~

~

The first is that "[r]esporident asserts a right to
'minimallly adequate' habilitation '[q]uite apart from its
relationship to decent care.'"
Respondent 23).

(quoting Brief for

Post, at

But the argument made at 23 of respondent's brief

is not related to the types of training
rather the sources of

~

~

~

~

wfiie&

right to training.

Re is eRtitJed, but

At 23, respondent

argues that the right to training arises directly from the Due
Process Clause of the Constitution, as well as from another source
discussed at 12-23 of respondent's Brief (i.e., the State's duty to
provide decent care to involuntarily confined retarded persons).

7/c:i5=z:k,,..w a,;:;~ Lk. ~ ~t;

~~ ~ ;; t~jln

2.

the trial court,

respondent asserted a broad claim to such treatment as [would]
afford [him] a reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those
life skills necessary to cope as effectively as [his] capacities
rr M: {<1.f9e ~i:R~ Ap~ a e tK> Petn. for Cert. 94).
H a... ~ ~-1:::1- ~LIthis claim was droppe~ th ~ re ar ter. In his brief to this Court,

permit."

Pe!!e crt

'\

respondent does not
respondent's

-

~.v-1-d-

~~s e±~im

~
l~ r

But

and, at oral argument,

explicitly disavowed any claim that respondent

is constitutionally entitiled to such treatment as would enable him
"to achieve his maximum potential."

Tr. of Oral Arg. 46-48.

...iltpt'nttt

-

--~

<!fouri ttl tqt 1britt~ .itattg

JfasJringht~ ~.

<!J.

2llgi~~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

June 9 , 1982

Re:

No . 80-1429 - Youngberg v . Romeo

Dear Lewis:
in

e simple solution wil
judgment in this case .

Justice Powell

join

.§u.prttttt Q}trurl of tqt ~ttitt~ .§tafts
'JJagfringttrn. ~. (!}. 2llpJ!.~
CHAMBERS OF

..JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL

June 9, 1982

Re:

No. 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

/.M.
T.M.

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

2.

As to n. 19, p. 9, the reference to "federal
substantive right" is merely a claim by respondent. The
note simply says that we do not address the claim.
In sum, I personally liked my first draft because
it 'o~ould have resolved more issues and - as you suggest. given more specific guidance. But r had no support for it
from anyone except 1Hll Rehnquist. l!'ootnote 24, p. 11,
assures, ho't1ever, that an "indentiftable 1 i.herty interest"
must be found to support any particular type of training.
The training approved in my opinion is limited to that
related to the established liberty interests of safety and
freedom from undue restraint.
This means there will be other cases.
the way the system works.
Sincerely,

The Chief Justice
lfp/ss

But this is

J;u.prtutt

atltltti of tqt ~b J;tzdtlt

JfagJrin:ghtn. ~ .

ar. 2llp~~

-

C H A MBER S OF

T HE C HIEF J U ST I C E

June 8, 1982

Re: No. 80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo
Dear Lew is:
I am concerned about some of the revisions you have made in
the 4th draft of your opinion in this case. I agreed with your
earlier drafts, that "involuntarily-committed mentally retarded
persons do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in training per se." 3rd Draft, at 13. Now, however, although
you purport to avoid the issue, the opinion states that "[a]
court properly may start with the generalization that there is a
\/ right to minimally adequate training," 4th draft at 11, n. 24-defined loosely as such training as is "reasonable in light of
identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the
case ;r.-1 a • 5e"e" a :rsa- i a:-;-a t 14 •
I fear that such a vague standard may subject numerous
professional training and treatment decisions to intrusive
scrutiny, and "second guessing," by the federal courts. You give
some credence to this possibility when you suggest that Romeo's
proffered expert testimony--indicating that "additional training
programs, including self-care programs, were needed to reduce
[his] aggressive behavior," 4th draft, at 10--might suffice to
establish a violation of the "right" to "minimally adequate
training." Although you later state that reviewing courts must
"show deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified
professional," 4th draft, at 14, I think further clarification
may be required at pages 10-11 of the 4th draft.
Further explanation may also be in order as to why the case ~
is b~.in~ed, presumably for a new trial. 4th Draft~at 17. '
For examp e, t e District Court instructed the jury that it
should find petitioners liable if they "were aware of and failed
to take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo." See 4th Draft, at 4. Certainly if petitioners
took "all reasonable steps" to prevent such attacks, they did not
deprive Romeo of his rights to "reasonably safe conditions" and
to such training as was necessary to achieve reasonable safety.
While this instruction may have been undercut by the District
Court's other instructions concerning the "deliberate
/ indifference" standard, see id., this is never discussed in your
op n1 n.
ct that the trial court referred to the
Eighth Amendment instead of the Fourteenth Amendment would not
mandate a new trial if the jury was otherwise instructed on a
proper theory of liability. I think the District Court deserves
more guidance.

Finally, I have the following more minor concerns:
(a) At page 2, n. 3, you refer to Romeo as having been
"incarcerated" in Pennhurst. This term seems inappropriate
he is not really "incarcerated."

here~

(b) At page 9, n. 19, you "decline to consider" respondent's
claim that because state law creates a right to "care and
~
treatment," he therefore has a federal substantive right to such
"care and treatment" under the Due Process Clause. This loses
~
me. The claim to a federal right to have some state right
enforced seems to me so obviously without merit that it should ~·
either be rejected or not mentioned.

J

If every state right is federally enforceable, the line
between state and federal courts vanishes.
Regards,

Just ice. Powell

~uvuuu

<!Jltltrl o-f tlft ~ttitt~ ~brltlY

'JJM!fittghtn. ~. <!J. 2llgt>!..;t
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 8, 1982

Re:

80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Jt

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/

,j;upum~ QJ~url ~f Ur~ .,nitt~ ~tatt.tr

'Jla.trirhtghln. ~. QJ. 2ll.;t~.;l
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

June 7, 1982

Re:

80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
If you can eliminate two sentences, neither of
which is necessary to the decision, I will join your
opinion.
First, in footnote 18 you state that the Eighth
Amendment "has no direct bearing on nonpenal
institutions." Surely that statement is much broader
than necessary because persons convicted of crimes may
be kept in nonpenal institutions, at least temporarily,
and, I should think, a state might provide for a system
of punishment within a mental institution. Rather than
trying to sort out the possible refinements, could we
not simply omit the footnote.
Second, on page 14 you state that the professional
judgment standard is higher than the deliberate
indifference formulation applied in the context of
penal institutions citing Estelle v. Gamble. Again,
could we not omit this sentence. Its only purpose, as
I would interpret it, would be to lower the standard
applicable in prisons. I should think a failure to
meet the professional judgment standard in a prison
context would almost invariably constitute deliberate
indifference. Even if the Court disagrees, I see no
reason to endeavor to be this precise because in either
context, it is clear that the standard is lower than a
common law malpractice standard.

-2-

If you can make these two changes, I will join
your opinion.
Respectfully,

)4Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

l.

•

J

..'

~tt;trttttt ~curt

cf

t4 t ~nitt b ~ bdt,l\'

Jla,sftiugtcu.~. ~· 2llbi,.~
CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O' CONNOR

June 7, 1982

No. 80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis,
Please join me in the 4th draft of your
opinion of the Court.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

Copies to the Conference

,jupunu <!Jonrl of tfrt ~b .§tattg
Jfa,glfhtght~ ~. <!J. 21lbi~~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE WM . .J . BRENNAN , .JR.

RE:

June 7, 1982

No. 80-1429 Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your circulation of June 4.

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

~nprtmt Qlttttrl of

tlft ~tb ~taft.&'

~~·~· "l· 20~~~
CHAMBERS 0 F

JUST I CE BYRON R . WH ITE

June 7, 1982

Re:

80-1429 - Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis,
Please join me.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
cpm

.Su:p:rmu Q}curi cf tift 'Jtnittb .Statt~
...-u~ ~. Q}. 2!1~~~
CHAMBERS OF"

June 4, 1982

JUSTICEW .. . J . BRENNAN , JR.

RE:

No. 80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
Thanks so much for your response.
content.

I am

r•11 be happy to join the previewed

draft when circulated.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

.§u.prmtt <!Jcurl cf tfrt ~b .§tat.e.tr

'Jifrurfri.ngLtn. to. <!J. 20c?~.;l

CHAMBERS OF"

June 4, 1982

JUSTICEW ... . J . BRENNAN,JR.

RE:

No. 80-1429

Youngberg v. Romeo

Dear Lewis:
~hanks

content.

so much for your response.

I am

I'll be happy to join the previewed

draft when circulated.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell

June 4 , 1982

80-1429 Youngberg v . Romeo

near Bill:
Tt was typically good of you to review my
uncirculated draft in this tiresome case.
Chief Judge Seitz's language, that you quote ,
comes in the preliminary part of his opinion, prior to his
considerinq the claim presPnted by respondent in this case .
He quoted the broad psychiatric definition of
"habilitati.on", used in some of the amici briefs , afte r
emPhasizing the difference "between the mentally ill and the
mentally retarded". Re did relate his use of the term
•treatment" (synonymous in this case with "training") to the
general definition.
Several pages later (id., at 181) Chief Judge
Seitz acldressed the merits of respondent's treatment claim .
His earlier generalized definition was not a holding with
respect to respondent. When he considered the merits, he
did not identify any specific treatment beyond those
considered in my draft opinion . In view of Romeo ' s
condition , the allegations of his complai.nt, and the purpose
of his commitment, I think it is appropriate - perhaps
necessary - that we cecide this case narrowly on its fac ts
as I have tried to do. No doubt other, and more difficult
cases, will come to us later .
What do you think?
Sincerelv ,

Justice Brennan
lfp/ss

._

I

."June 4, 1982

80-1429 Younbgerg v. Romeo

.Dear Harry:

\'

~he substantial changes I have made in this case
are , responsive to the concerns Bill Brennan expressed, and
which you also wrote me about.

The opinion now focuses narrowly on the facts of
this most pathetic case, and leaves broader questions for
another day.
Sincerely,

Ju~tice

'lfp/s~

Blackmun

.hprtmt C!Jcurt of tfrt ~b .ihttt.&'
~u!pnghtu. ~. C!J. 2ll&i"'~
CHAMBERS OF

.JUSTICE

w .. .

June 3, 1982 .

.J . BRENNAN, .JR.

No. 80-1429 -- Youngberg v. Romeo.

Dear Lewis,
This is a really hard case, but the changes in your
most recent draft go pretty far towards meeting my problems. I expect to be able to join, but will be interested
in what others may offer in the way of further refinements.
One question: Chief Judge Seitz states at one point in
his concurring opinion that "habilitation"
"refers to 'that education, training and care required
by retarded individuals to reach their maximum development' •••. It is in this sense that I use the term
'treatment' in this opinion." 644 F. 2d, at 176 (citation omitted, emphasis added).
Your draft states that
"Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise
define--beyond the right to reasonable safety and
freedom from physical restraint--the 'minimally adequate care and treatment' that appropriately may be
required for this respondent." Draft at 11.
In light of Chief Judge Seitz' statement, do you think that
your statement is quite accurate?

Sinc~re,ly,

w.

Justice Powell.

~~
~l.

B., Jr.
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1 Washington

roots campaign over the last 15
months by civil rights groups working with a coalition of Democratic
and moderate Republican senators.
"This is another watershed In civil
rights,'' said Sen. Robert J. Dole (R:
Kan.), who joined Sens. Charles
McC. Mathias Jr. (R-Md.) and Edward M. ·Kennedy (D-Mass.) in authoring .the final compromise. "It will
stand the test of time and ease the
fears" of its opponents, Dole said.
- Reagan, who opposed the measure
in its original form last year but embraced it in the face of its overSee VOTING, A9, Col.1

~liJ~tallCt: of lJ.S. policy" to \Vage
"economic warfare" against the Soviets.
One option before the president
would have allowed U.S. companies
to go through with deals made with
the Soviets prior to Dec. 29. This
would have enabled Caterpi1l~r
. Tractor to sell $90 million worth of
pipelaying equipment and General
Electric to sell more than $100 mil· lion worth of gas turbine rotors. ':)
Officials said this possibility, · fa. vore9 by Haig, had beeri rejectelin
favor of the "toughest" option.
.~.
"The objective of the 'Qnited
States in imposing the sanctions has
been and continues to be to advance
See PIPELINE, AlO, Col. 1 -.. ·:
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Rega11 Sees Interest Rate.s Up~

.With Policy Change
Possihl~-~
.
By John M. Berry

_ .

Washington Pos tStafl\Vrller

Treasury Secretary Donald T.
Regan, predicting · that interest rates
are headed higher, yesterday revealed that the Reagan administration has begun a study of ways to '
change its economic policies if the :
high rates short-circuit the expected
-economic recovery.
.
"I don't think I'll talk about . . .
what our specific plans are, but obviously these are questions that we
have addressed to ourselves over the
past three months. We are trying to
come up with solutions," Regan said
during an interview at The Wash· ington Post.
, "If interest rqtes don't come down

.

...,..

rather quickly, [and) unemployme~t
hangs high, the obviOUS COUrSe :'of
action [that] would be demanded, at
least, from us by the Congress wciu1d
be, do something, don't just stand '
there," he continued.
· :,.-~.
-. - "I have a study on my desk .. :·of
: what-other presidents did in similar .
circumstances .... We have to consider what our actions might be.", ~ .
Another administration source
described the policy reexaminatu;n
as "far-reaching," but said it was "9c·
curring within the framework ···of
present presidential policies." How- ·
ever, the source added, "Some of tl)_e
options are not so routine."
-~':·
Regan, as he has in the past, put
See REGAN, A2, CoL 5
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High Court .Est~blis~es Righ.ii
·For Retarded in Institutions~~:.~~

1entenced to ·
-·:'.
IV icted of the ·
I
budgetary restraints of the i~stlt~~
~ainst him.
By Fred Barbash
~rday that if
_ Washington Post st,ar!'Wrlter
tions and not require them to "ma'ke'
t guilty by ~
The Su~reme Cour.t yesterday. for each decision in the shadow." 9f P.os'-.
:y
vill be com- the first time established constitu- sible lawsuits. . .
The opinion, carefully balancing
EJ'1 beths tional rights for people committed to
·t ~a h ld institutions for the mentally retard- · the competing interests in one of the
0 e e
ed, including unprecedented, but .most publicized cases, of the current
tnine if he
luld be en- limited, guarantees of a minimum term, applies directly to hospitals ·for
the mentally retarded but also is
level of training. ·
e court deThe .court also said institutions expected to affect inental hospitals.
danger to have an obligation, enforceable in There are an estimated 150,000 ped: .
Ut of men- the courts, to provide a reasonable pie in state institutions for the men.
.. · ':.,'
amount of physical freedom as well tally retarded.
. M. Adel" as safety for involuntarily committed
"Persons who have been involunterday to patients.
tarily committed are .entit1ed .. (o
~!aim and
At the same time, Justice ~ewis F. more considerate treatment and con-·
time'has Powell Jr., writing for the 8-to-1 ma- ditions of confinement than crimi', for the jority, cau~ioned judges to respect nals whose conditions of confine.
SPP ('()TlD"' • ~ -the professional judgments and
11. 1

~v'

I

J

-1

I

Court Grants ights to MCiiHill
'1:;..

f- ·

:I
\.
j

)

\ .

I

''

'I

''
I

'

J
l

I

COURT, From Al
'antees for patients to be free of physical re"
men'l are designed tO punish," Powell said.
·straints, and guaranteed rights to comprehensive · ·said, ~
The decision left many questions unanswered, training and development programs.
.
erence
such' as what constitutes reasonable freedom, and .. She lost at trial, but the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court profes~
many points unclear, in an apparent attempt to .of Appeals, in a divided ruling, ordered a: new trial lenges
alloV.• flexibility for professional judgments. It also · . because of misinterpretations 'of constitutional law ence b,
allowed numerous defenses for hospital officials by the District Court.
eratior
sued for mistreatment, including a defense that '· ~ Pennhurst appealed, but yesterday the Su- Moreo'
the problems were caused by "budgetary re- · ~ preme Court agreed with the appeals court and judges
straints."
··
"·issued its own guidelines for these cases. The jus- priate
The.
Nevertheless, the decision is a cornerstone in tices agreed unanimously that the case should be
what has become a "patients' rights" movement returned to the lower court for a new trial.
· consid(
comparable in many respects to the prisoners' and
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger agreed with said, u1
defendants' rights thrust of the '60s and '70s. much of the ruling, but dissented from any right from a
Ne!!flY all the states face litigation in this field. ·
to treatment.
. ..
standru
Twenty-one, fearing federal judges would soon
Powell said that the patients should have at sponsit
begin looking excessively over their shoulders, least the constitutional protections afforded pris- · such a
asked the Supreme Court to resolve the issues, oners, such as a right to safe conditions and the
ExpE
prese:rving to the extent possibl~ maximum flex- right to be free from unnecessary physical re- that e,
ibility for their state institutions.; .
.
straints. He noted that unlike prison inmates, the Younge
Y.esterday's case began with a suit brought on patients at issue in yesterday's case "may not be the law
behalf of Nicholas Romeo, 33, a man with the punished at all."
"It is
merital capacity of an 18-month-old child.
The right to treatment is a more difficult prob- Normru
Romeo's mother had him legally committed in . !em, Powell said, because the Constitution guar- Health
May, 1974, ·to the Pennhurst State School and · antees no substantive services to' anyone. He said first tin
Hospital near Philadelphia. That state-run insti- the least that could be demanded, however, was have to
tution has been the subject of numerous suits. and ·: that the involuntarily committed receive the train- patienu
complaints of mistreatment. .
·, ing they need to function safely in the hospital, training
~he became concermid about her son's treat- . ~without hurting themselves or others. This would friend o
merit after learning that he had been injured at :- ~lso help them avoid the need for shackling and atric N.
least 70 times both by his own hand and by others :~physical confinement.
_ .
taining
reac,ting ·to his aggressive behavior. She also::~: Powell based his ruling ,on the due process cials, sai
learned that officials had repeatedly confined him ·:clause of the 14th Amendment, which protects the
The l
in physi9al arm restraints during portions of each· ~:personal physical liberty of individuals from un- case. Th
dayj' · r
:fair or unreasonable incursions by the states. The · Massad
She sued the officials for damages under federal ~ .. qu~stion, he said, was how to determine what is Mills u.
ciVil rights laws, see~ing broad constitutional guar-" : .. fair in this situation.
·
lower co
~·
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By Ruth Marcus

Washln~ton

Post St.atl WrltA!T

.: ... Prosecutors who file more seri:6us charges .against defendants
~arter they request a jury trial are
• not automatically subject . to a
"'~presumption of prosecutorial vin: dictiveness," the Supreme Court
\
:ruled yesterday.
~: In an opinion written by Justice
.. John . Paul Stevens, the court
~:ruled, "6 to 3, that the risk of pros. ~cutors imposing a penalty of more
~~evere ·charges on defendants who
assert their right to a jury" trial is
~loo low to make that presumption.
.... ..
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Filing of M~re Seri~rtts Charges Held Valid
After Defendant Reqiui~sts -~ Jury _Trial

a

Th'e ruling came in the case of
William J. Brennan Jr. and
Learley Reed Goodwin, who at- Thurgood Marshall dissented, ar. tempted to flee police after being guing that prosecutors "would alstopped for speeding on the Bal- . most always prefer'~ "that defen. timore-Washington Parkway 'and dants waive their "troublesome"
was charged with various misde-' right to jury trial, and that a pros' meanors and petty offenses.
. ecutor's 'elevation of charges
·
After Goodwin insisted on a
against a defendru1t who refuses to
, trial · by jury rather . than appear ,1" en u......, n""':c......... t ........ ....... _ .......
...
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'antees for patients to be free of physical re" ... In determining what is reasonable," he
,h," Powell said.
straints, and guaranteed rights to comprehensive said, "we .emphasize that courts must show tlef.
'
questions unanswered, ·training and development programs.
erence to the judgment exercised by a qualified
easonable freedom, and ·
She lost at trial, but the 3rd U.S. Circuit Court professional. By so limiting judicial review of chalm apparent attempt to .of Appeals, in a divided ruling, ordered a new trial lenges to conditions in state institutions, interfer;ional judgments. It also . because of misinterpretations ·of constitutional law ence by the federal judiciary with the internal opes for hospital officials ·by the District Court.
erations of these institutions should be minimized.
tcluding a defense that
, Pennhurst appealed, but yesterday the Su- Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think
;ed by "budgetary re- : preme Court agreed with the appeals court and judges or juries are better qualified than appro'issued its own guidelines for these cases. The jus- pdate professionals in making such decisions."
Reg. 32.0
lion is a cornerstone in tices agreed unanimously that the case should be
The decisions of the professionals should be
the look
ients' rights" movement returned to the lower court for a new trial.
considered generally valid by the courts, Powell
;cts to the prisoners' and
Chief Justice Warren E. Burger agreed with said, unless there is "such a substantial departure
imitate. T
t of the '60s and '70s. much of the ruling, but dissented from any right from accepted professional judgment, practice or
sundresse
litigation in this field. ·
to treatment.
standards as to demonstrate that the person refor summ
!deral judges would soon
Powell said that the patients should have at sponsible actually did not base the decision on
y over their shoulders, least the constitutional protections afforded pris- such a judgment."
- nights. Fi
tl't to resolve the issues, oners, such as a right to safe conditions and the
Experts in mental health law said yesterday :' fresh_prin
possibll;l maximum flex- · right to be free from unnecess'ary physical re- · that even with its ambiguities, the ruling · in
bright sha
itutions.
straints. He noted that unlike prison inmates, the Youngberg v. Romeo was an important change in
n with a suit brought on patients at issue in yesterday's case "may not be the law. ·
carefree,
teo, 33, a man with the · punished at all."
- ··
"It fs a positive step in the right direction," said
travel. St
m 18-month-old child.
The right to treatment is a more difficult prob- · Norman S. Rosenberg, director of. the . Mental
.
represent<
im legally committed in _ lem, Powell said, because the Constitution guar- Health Law Project. Rosenberg said it was the
collection
nhurst State School and antees no substantive services to' anyone. He said first time the court had said that such institutions
·hia. That state-run insti- the least that could be demanded, however, was ·have to do anything besides basic maintenance for ·
in all star
·ect of numerous suits and · _that the involuntarily committed receive the train- patients, the first time any "affirmative right" to
Lanz Sho~
·
• ing they need to function safely in the hospital, training had been granted. Joel Klein, who filed a
'ent. .
except Pe
ed about her son's treat- _: \vithout hurting themselves or others. This would friend of the court brief for the American Psychitt he had been injured at : • qlso help them avoid the need for shackling and atric Association expressing concern about main,is own hand and by others ::physical confinement.
taining professional autonomy for hospital offissive behavior. She also: ·-~ " Powell based his ruling ori the due process cials, said he felt that need had been satisfied.
rd repeatedly confined him· ~: clause of the 14th Amendment, which protects the
The court also disposed yesterday of a relat!ld
1ts during portions of each· · :personal physical liberty of individuals from un- case. The court said an intervening decision of the
.
·. ~ fair or unreasonable incursions by the states. The Massachusetts Supreme Court required return ·of
1 for damages under federal:. ::: question, he said, was how to determine what is
Mills v. Rogers for further consideration in the
~broad constitutional guar: : '"fait in this situation.
lower courts .
.... ": ... t
~~ ... ~ .
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Filhig of l\1~re Serious Charg~s ·Held yalid
Afte* Defendant Requests aJury Trial
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Th'e ruling came in the case of
William J. Brennan Jr. and
Learley Reed Goodwin, who at- Thurgood Marshall dissented, artempted to ·flee police after being guing that prosecutors "would al:
stopped for speeding on the Bal- . most always prefer': that defen. timore-Washington Parkway and dants waive their "troublesome"
was charged with various misde-, right to jury trial, and that a prosmeanors arid petty offenses.
ecutor's elevation of charges
After Goodwin insisted on a
against a defendant who refuses to
trial by jury rather than appear
before a federal magistrate, his do so "manifestly poses a realistiq
case was transferred to a prosecu- likelihood of vindictiveness." '
Justice Harry A. Blackmun
tor, who obtained a four-count felagreed
with the dissenters that
ony and misdemeanor indictment.
.d . ~...-- ~- - •• : ....... ,.,..~ """
there should be an automatic pre-
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said, the government had adequately "dispelled the appearance
of vindictiveness" in the case. · ;
In another action the court con·
tinued a trend of deferring to ·
states by sharply limiting the
power ·of federal courts to declare
state taxes unconstitutional.
Justice Sandra D. O'Connor, in
a 7-to-2 opinion, heid that the fed. eral Tax Injunction Act bars U.S.
courts from declaring state taxes
un'constitutional and from· enjoining their collection.
·
· ·
The opinion overturned a lower
court ruling that California cannot constitutionally require. religio~s
schools unaffiliated with a church
to pay unemployment taxes.'
O'Connor avoided the issue of '
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JUstices Rule Retai-ded ·
Have Right to Training
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Special to l'bt New Yorl< nm.

"'wASHINGTON, Jl!ne 18- The Su-- will probably includ~ the new tnal that
preme Court ruled today fll;at mentally the appeals-court originally ordered . . '
retarded people in state institutions are • Writing for the Court, Justice Powell
constitutionally entitled to safe condi- dealt quickly with the first two issues in
· tions, freedom from unreasonable the case, safety and f~edom from unphysical restraint and at least "mini- reasonable physical restraint. Because
malty adequate" training in caring for the Court has recognized that convicted
criminals have these rights, he said, it
themselves.
·
The decision was unanimous in most is evident that retarded people, "who
respects and was immediately hailed as may not be punished at all," are enti'
an important legal victory by advocates tied to equivalent protection when they
for the retarded. It was the Supre(Tle are · involuntarily committed to the
Court's first rulmg on the constitutional · state's custody.
·
rights of the retarded, and it marked
Justice Powell described as "more
the second time this week that the Court troubling" the right-to-treatment isSue.
took an ,expansive view of individual Pennsylvania, which, was joined in its
appeal b)l 21 states acting as friends of
rights under the 14th Amendment.
, On Tuesday the Court ruled, 5 to 4, the court, had argued \rigorously that
that illegal alien children are entitled to the retarded did not have a constitu- '·
a free, -public education under the 14th tiona! right to a particular approach to
.Amendment's equa.I protection gu.ar...n- treatment and that evaluating the ad- ·
tee. The decision today was based on equacy of tfeatment was not a proper
that amendment's gUarantee of . due jud_icial function. . . - l . .·
j
process orlaw.
· .,
· '·
Justice Powell said, however, that
. The Case was
individual suit for the case did not require the Court to decide "the difficJ.!lt question" of whether
damages against officials of the Penn- a mentally retarded person " has some
hurst State sChool, a 's tate. institution general constitutional right to training
for the retarded 'in Pennsylvania. The per se" because .the traini.ng sou~t by
mother of a profoundly retarded Penn- Mr. Romeo was considerably more limhurst resident, Nicholas Romeo, ited.'
·
•
.
brought the $1.2 million suit on her son's
Advanced ,._,,,.: 1ft" •~ Q. uestion ,
behalf ;'1-fter. he suffered numerous in• • .............,. ..,
Lawyers for Mr. Romeo, who has an r
juries and was 1tied to his tied for
months at a time. ·
intelligence quotient of no higher than
. Fundiunenta.l Li~rty Interests
10, argued only that he was entitled to
A Federal jury ruled for the officials enough training to enable him better to
umaU<mal
after the trial judge instructed the control his aggressive behavior so that
:Crew- jurors that Mr. Romeo's constitutional he could be allowed more freedom of
Penn's rights had been violated only if the offi- movement Without hiuting himSelf or
'
'.
·
·
!merl· cials had been "deliberately indiffer- others.
~·
l: Chlle ent" to his needs~ On appeal, L'le United · : '\. : , t.
States Coiirt of Ap~ls for the Third . Tbe Supreme Court agreed .. Mr..
Circuiforderedanew'trial.
,· . .
Romeo's "liberty interests," Justice
The appeals court said that retarded Powell said, "require the State to propeople who had been involuntarily com- vide minimally adequate or reasonable
I
,I : . mitted
to the care of the state, as Mr. training to insure safety and freedom •
Romeo was, retained "fundamental lib- from 'undue restraint. " He added, "In
erty interests" in personal safety and view of the ld?ds of treatment sought by
,
freedom of -movement. The state can respondent and the evidence of record, . '
justify limit,ing those _freeaoms, the.ap-. we need go no further in this case." ·
lor Mat- peals court said, only by demonstrating
The decision, Youngberg v. Romeo,
an "overriding" state interest.' The ap- No. 80-1429, therefore deferred to a fu'try that peals court also ruled that the retarded ture case a decision on whether a reI deduc- had a constitutional right to training tarded person is entitled to training for
;reed to once the state accepted responsibility any other purpose, such as to achieve
dreturn for their care
·
'
maximum potential. It was on this point
·
'•
. '.,
that Chief Justice Warren E. Burger de- .
!figure,
Pennsylvania - appealed to the SubeCause , preme Court, arguing that the Constitu- parted from the rest of the Court. "I
hington, tion required it to do no ·f!lore than pro- would hold flatly that respondent.has no
vide adequate food, clothing, shelter, constitutional right to training, or 'haand basic medichl care. ' ·
bilitation,' per se," the Chief Justice
'attin~y
In an opinion by Associate Justice said. He refused to sign Justice Pow,
?Ublican Lewis F. Powell , the Supreme Court ell 's opinion, concuning only in theremsylva-·
·
tbers of adopted tlie appeals court's basic prem- sult.
lashing- ises and rejected the state's view that
In a concurring nprr;ion Associate
ate. But the Constitution did not also extend to Justices Harry A. Blackm~. William
.safety, freedom ~rom restraint, and
l with a
J . Brennan Jr., and Sandra Day O'Consome form of training. ,. · :
IS.
nor, . all of. whom joined the majority
Further _P roceedings Ordered
'saying
opinion , said they would have gone be:Oaker's
But the Court diffefed with the a·p- yond Justice Powell 's opinion to hold .
"time a · peals court on how to .decide whether that the retarded w~re also entitled to
~gton, these rights have been viqlated in a spe- enough training to "prevent a person's. '
ilme on cific case. It therefore vacated the a ~ pre-existing self-care skills from de- ·
1lses be- peals cou.rt's decision and sent the case ·teriorating ·because of his commit·· ·
back for further p~. which ment."
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George F. Will

Granting Rights to the
In his 33 years, Nicholas Romeo has not been
givw much. Recently, however, he, and approximately 135.000 persons similarly situated,
acquired some rights.
The word "landmark" is used too casually concerning Supreme Court rulings. But in its ruling
in Romeo's case, the court stepped, gingerly but
unanimously, into new territory. For the first
time it has affirmed substantive rights of involuntarily committed retarded persons in institutions.
In this context, "involuntarily" does not mean
against the individual's will, but rather that the
individual's will was not engaged.
Romeo is profoundly retarded. Since the death
of his father seven years ago, he has been a resident of Pennsylvania's much-criticized Pennhurst
institution. He cannot talk and lacks basic selfcare skills. When petitioning for his admission to
Pennhurst, his mother said: "He becomes violent
-kicks, punches, breaks glass. He can't speakwants to express himself but can't."
In Pennhurst, he was injured 63 times, by his
own violence or that of other residents, in the two
years before his mother went to court. When in
Pennhurst's infirmary for treatment of a broken
arm, he was physically restrained in bed during

~ 6 j2 7j'iN--.
Retarded (£~)

parts of the day, with "soft" restraints on his anns.
The staff said this was not for punishment but for
his protection, a.'1d that of other patients.
Now the court has held that there are constitutionally required conditions of confinement,
derived from the 14th Amendment. The ruling
is a delicate assertion of judicial oversight, tern·
pered by assertions of deference to professionals in the field of institutional care.
The opinion, \Hitten by Justice Lewis Powell,
affirms three rights: to safety, to freedom of
movement and to training. The first two
"needs" are rights conditioned by institutional
necessities, and the right to training is defined,
minimally, as training necessary for enjo:yment
of the first two rights. But Romeo claimed only
a right to "minimally adequate habilitation."
The court calls even this claim "troubling,"
for several reasons. One is that "as a general
matter, no state has a constitutional duty to
provide substantive services for those within its
border." The court says the term "habilitation"
is defined neither precisely nor consistently in
psychiatry. (Actually, it is unclear how such habilitation is a psychiatric matter.) The court
also says that professionals differ "strongly" as

tD whether effective training of all severely or
profoundly retarded persons is possible.
The court does not know what the experience
of recent years proves: that pessimistic prognoses, even by professionals, concerning all
kinds of retardation, are apt to be wrong (a].
though, alas, somewhat self-fulfilling). But the
court knows that an institutionalized person requires rights-enforceable claims-because he
or she is wholly dependent on the state.
All Romeo sought, and all the court affirmed, is
a right to "training suited to" the two "needs" of
bodily safety and minimum physical restraint.
The court stressed that "This case does not present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded persDn, involuntarily committed to a state
institution, has some general constitutional right
to training per se." The court actually pruned a
lower court ruling, which it considered so broad as
to permit excessive judicial intrusiveness. The
court said there is a "presumption of correctness"
regarding the decisions of professionals, who
"shall not be required to make each decision in
the shadow of an action for damages."
Nevertheless, this ruling will, like a hovering
angel, cast a comforting shadow on the approxi-

mately 135,000 retarded persons in institutions,
many of whom are li'ving in stomach-turning
conditions. Furthermore, it expresses, and
thereby nourishes, a social sensibility important
to 6 million other retarded citizens.
The affecting surge of gratitude among
friends of retarded citizens, including friends
whose retarded friends are not institutionalized,
is perhaps disproportionate tD the rights af.
firmed by the ruling. But the satisfaction is
commensurate \\ith the expressive, as distinct
from the technical, power of the ruling.
Americans are litigious, but not lawyer-like.
American society is not animated by the dry distinctions that characterize judicial craftsmanship.
Ruling:; like this one, and Broun u. Board of
Education, the 1954 school desegregation decision, are examples of law's tutelary functions.
In 1954, the elemental message was: blacks are
full citizens. In 1982, the message is: retarded people, too, are members of the community that the
Constitution constitutes. The fact that these messages have had to be sent do\\n from t.he Supreme
Court-the Mount Sinai of American government
-i~ a measure of how bad things were then, and
are in some places today.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1429

DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
NIC::HOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[May -

~ ~ 1 -~A--'-'~

~stu;e_.Wbiie, Y.Z.~ ---yy--,_-- .....

, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 against three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional
rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' is used to refer to programs for the mentally retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability and training impairment rather
than an illness .. . . [T]he principal focus of habilitation is upon training and
development of needed skills. " Brief of American Psychiatric Association
as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1.

80-1429-0PINION
2

YOUNGBERGv.ROMEO

in May 1974, his mother was unable to control his violence.
Within two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother
sought his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania
hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50
§4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Mrs. Romeo became concerned about these
InJUries. After objecting to respondent's treatment several
times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976, in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged that
"[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff has
suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
2
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18a.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
was suffering injuries and failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment ~frograms for his mental retardation." All claims for injUilctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 5
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,
not medical doctors. See Brief of Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no longer at Pennhurst.
• Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
• Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 6 A comprehensive
behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior/ but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 8 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 9
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of his constitutional rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also
was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit,"
his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth
Amendment. Id., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four6
Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
'2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
8
1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
9
The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla.
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111a. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment was
the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying
the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundal~C!~a.:::"~l---:mentanibert~ be limited only by an "overriding," non-punitive state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-159. It
further found that the involuntarily committed have a liberty
interest in training or habilitation designed to "treat" their
mental retardation.
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 10 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
"compelling necessity." ld., at 159-160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
ld., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
10
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.
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has been administered, those responsible e liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light o present medical or
other scientific knowledge." ld., at 16 167 and 173. 11
Chief Judge Seitz, ~ting for the min ·tiJconsidered the
standards articulate
y the majority: as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
2
at178.'

I ~

~
~

.,l

~
{~,·
.J dM/1

~~

Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three cat~
egories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in ~~
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they c~n provide a compelling explana~
tion for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
restrictive analysis" appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
12
Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert critigi~~Qd....('"'
(-1~lWI~·~·~Elf abandoning the common-law method of deciding the case
at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the facts
of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And, on a
pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those administering state institutions would receive ~idance from the "amorphous
constitutional law tenets" articulated by ~jo~Jd., at 184. See
id., at 183-185
· ~
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to c~ticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
11

PJ< s J.e:t-
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981). We now reverse.
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 13 In this case, respondent has
been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does
not challenge the commitment. Rather, he argues that he
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety,
freedom of movement, and training within the institution;
and that petitioners infringed on these rights by failing to
provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e. g.,
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed, the
state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care. 14 We must decide
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement}rtraining and, if so, under what circumstances
these interests are infringed in violation of due process.
A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involof this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
13
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a state cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights, Brief of Respondent 13 n. 12.
"Brief of Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief of Respondent 1~16.
See also Amici Curiae Brief of Connecticut and Twenty Other States 8.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.
~

r

'r

.

A.. ,l-

I~
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untary commitment proceedings do not extinguish-indeed,
petitioners do not argue on principle to the contrary. 15 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. 16 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. ( In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18--19 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment proceedings.
B
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling: a constitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve
See Brief of Petitioner 27-31.
It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and
that amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions. See
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U,S, 651,- (1977). But the Eighth Amendment has been applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendmenmt. If prisoners in state institutions have a federal right to some degree of safety, it is because their safety implicates a
liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. See, e. g., Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46 (1947); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
15
16
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his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent concedes that no amount of training will make possible his release. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense
of the state. See Tr. Oral Arg. 33. And, since we already
have found constitutionally protected liberty interests in
freedom from restraints and safety, some training 17 may be
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a constitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only
the narrow question of whether one who has been committed
involuntarily has a right to additional training-other than
that related to safety or the ability to function free of restraints-when such training might improve his capacity to
function more independently within the institution, but cannot make possible his release.
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined,
he has "no one but the state to turn to for help in gaining additional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and
abilities" he has. Brief of Respondent 23. Respondent concludes that the state therefore has a constitutional duty to
provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing skills
and develop new ones. In making this argument, respondent compares mental retardation to an infectious disease, for
which the state has quarantined the individual, and cannot
then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retardation is not,
however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of a certain
level of intellectual ability, 18 and the "habilitation" respondent
17
We use the term "training'' as synonymous with "habilitation," with its
"principal focifs"-certainly in a case like Romeo's--being on "training and
development of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra.
18
See A. Baumeister, American Residential Institutions, at 21-22, as
printed in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (Baumeister,
ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Retarded in the
United States, at 1 (1965). See also Brief American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. 1, supra)
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seeks, such as training to teach him for the first time skills he
does not possess, correlates more closely to education than to
medical treatment. 19 And we have never found a right to
education under the Constitution. 20
As a general matter, a state is under no constitutional duty
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g.,
Harris v. McCrae,
U. S. 297 (19 0) (publicly funded
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464 (1977) (medical treatment). When states do choose to provide services, they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See Richardson
v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83--84 (1971); Dandrige v. Williams,
397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, states need not
"choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not
attacking the problem at all." !d., at 486--487. Here, the
state has committed respondent who concedely cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food, shelter,
clothin~ and medical care, as well l}.~e~ conditions of
safety and reasonable freedom from fiodily restraint. The
narrow question presented is whether it also must afford him
training to develop particular skills, even though it is not
claimed that any level of training could enable respondent to
live outside~/i:nstitution.

(7vA.I
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an
IQ of 8-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person.
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and increase Romeo's IQ.
•• There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills.
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any issues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills
(educational).
20
See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973).
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation available to ot~ers ill[Pennsylvania institut~

fe..hnh~ot.r-.-t ·
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We hesitate to find a new liberty interest cognizable under
the Fourteenth Amendment in this instance. As we noted in
determining that there is no general right to education in San
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973):
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." I d., at
33-34.

Cia.~

A similar restraint is seen in cases considering new "liberties" under the cjue.J]rocesf In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693
(1976), we noted tliat th liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have their origins either in state law-for
puposes of procedural due process--or in the guarantees of
the Bill of Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to
the states. /d., at 710-711. In addition, as noted earlier,
some liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the
meaning of that word itself, i. e., freedom from bodily restraint by the state. But a right to training fits none of
these categories. Respondent is not seeking procedural due
process. 21 Nor does he claim a right historically regarded as
Respondent does argue that the Pennsylvania commitment statute provides a state-law basis for a federal substantive, not procedural, right.
He maintains that he was committed for care and treatment under state
law, and he therefore has a state substantive right entitled to substantive,
not just procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, and was
not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the trial
court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any
guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to consider
it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 3273 n. 1 (1977);
Duigman v. United States, 274 U. S. 196, 200 (1927); Jordan Mining Co.
v. Societe des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1921).
21
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within the meaning of the concept of "liberty." And respondent points to no right to training either implicit or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
The right respondent claims is a substantive due process
right. Only when an action of a state against an individual is
sharply at odds with our common sense of "liberty and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319,
- - (1937). 22 In deciding whether to provide individuals
such as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must
make a difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources. We cannot say that due process requires that such
lfl~
individuals must be given training in the development of
skills that cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to
1'r-o~~~~
commit scarce resources on programs to attempt to train ~
f\L-n:...r d.(! J. ,
23
.....--~
.
or on other social and welfare programs of manifest
~-.---...~
ment, is a difficult one that state and federal governments
./r . .
must face. The Constitution does not dictate an answer, and
this is not a decision that courts are competent to make.

..___J__

~

~t;"S~

~

See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, - - (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (In order to determine whether the defendant was
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at, at-- (Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state
has "subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our
polity will not endure it.").
23
Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 Analysis and
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A
Rational Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37
(1981); Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the
Substance of Things Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981).
22
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We therefore conc~e that involuntaily-committed mentally retar e o not have a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in training per se. As noted above, they do have
constitutionally protected interests in safety and freedom
from bodily restraints, and those interests may require some
kinds of training. We turn next to consider ~ whether
Pennsylvania may have viola;;; these two rights.
~
~
A
~
We have established that Romeo retains liberty · terests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint that rvive his
commitment. Yet these interests are not absolu , indeed to
some extent they are in conflict. In operating
institution
such as Pennhurst, there are occasions in whi it is necessary for the state to restrain the movement of esidents--for
example, to protect them as well as others om violence. 24
Similar restraints may also be appropriate in training pro'1h.( An<la;linstitution cannot protect its esidents from
danger of violence if it is to permit them ny freedom of
vement. The question then is not simpl whether a libe y interest has been infringed but whether the extent or
nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safe~ is such as to
violate due process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the state's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979), for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees' confinement conditions. We agreed that the detain-

-' rilE

24
In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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ees, not yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished. But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were
reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and
not tantamount to punishment. 25 And we have taken a similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to
civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v. J.R., 442
U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to
state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental
consent. In determining that procedural due process did not
mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests of the
state, including the fiscal and administrative burdens additional procedures would entail. 26 I d., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against various state interests. If there is to
be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
determining whether a state.llilii adequatelyl protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B

We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessa
idance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the state and the rights of
the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 713, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose).
26
See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing evidence." We reached this decision by weighing the individual's
liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.
25
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safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." Z7 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context
of penal institutions. Persons who have been involuntarily
committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of
confinement are designed to punish. It is lower than the
standard of "compelling" or "substantial" necessity consid- /_
ered necessary by the Court of Appeals ~ ustify use of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safetyl'l/ We think
that such a standard would place an undue burde~ on the administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also would
restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional judgment
as to the needs of residents.
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate interests of the state, including administrative and fiscal constraints, due process requires that (i) the state sub· ect these
individuals only to reasonable physical
stramts; (ii) it provide them reasonable safeQ1 conditions-;-ana (m) 1t affOrd
them such training as is reasonably necessary to achieve
these ends. 28 We recognize that this holding may impose
Z1

W.e.--:~agre~th
Chief Judge Seitz~=-~~ard
e
o
He finds that such a right

to
exts en
per se.
does exist, whereas we fin no sue right cognizable as a liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at ,
'lJj We have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in
somewhat different language from that used by Chief Judge Seitz.
Rather than stating that the involuntarily committed enjoy the right to
have certain decisions made by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, a t - , we
hold that they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety and reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that once such a

11(, (CJ.i.e4

u.Jj~
t;Jv._

~~

..
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some additional burdens on states. I determining what is
"reasonable," however, we emphasiz that courts must show
deference to the judgment ex cised by a qualified
professional. 29
By so limiting judicial review of hallenges to conditions in
state institutions, interference b the federal judiciary with
the in~rnal operations of the institutions · be mmimized ~ Moreover, there ce ainly is no reason to think

____"'- n ent to a nght t at also can be characterized as procedural.
that the involuntary committed are entitled
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professional exercising his
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v .
.f.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text
at - - , supra.
30
See Parham v. J.R ., 442 U. S. 584, 608 n. 16 (1979) (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals: "[l]t is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system . ... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees:
"[C]ourts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional
requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact
rather than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility.");
Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural
due process claim in context of prison: "[T]here must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs an~bjectives and the provisions of the
. .
ter v. a · ez,
Constitution of general application."), r
96,
,
(197 )
e pro ms of prisons in America are comlex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible to resolution by degree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within
rovince of the legislative and executive branches of the ove

\.:=-
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judges or juries are better qualified than the appropriate professional in making such decisions. 31 See Parham v. J.R.,
442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 544
(1979) (Courts should not "second-guess administrators on
matters on which they are better informed."). For these
reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 32 is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision
by the professional is such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base
the decision on such a judgment. In an action for damages
against a professional in his individual capacity, however, the
professional will not be liable if he was unable to exercise his
professional judgment because of budgetary constraint
such a situation, good-faith immunity would bar liability.
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ment. ') See also Townsend & Mattson, The Interaction of Law and Specia ducation, 1 Analysis and intervention in Developmental disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
31
It may not be immediately apparent that decisions regarding safety
conditions, the use of restraints, l}Bd re!at~d ~~~i~ng. pro~~ms involve the
exercise of professional judgmen~ But~
professional judgment is exercised in determining whether a certain
training program can reasonably be expected to facilitate a resident's
(
interation with staff and other patients without violence. Similarly, professional judgment is exercised in determining whether a resident, whose
('
violent tendancies have not been entirely curbed, should be allowed to interact with others or whether the risks of injury to self and others justify
isolation or even the use of restraints .
32
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject

9
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~~'2A~.,t,.,o"'t~h..,e....s-u~p-ervision of qualified persons.
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n e mg is case, we have
ghed those post-commitment interests cognizable as · erty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fou enth Amendment against legitimate state interests and e constraints under which most
state institutions necessa ·1y operate. We repeat that the
~
state. concedes a. duty to provide adequate food, shel~
1\ clothmg and medical care.
The state also has the unq___:_
_ _
- - - - - - - , tione
·
easonable safety for aifresidents
~~~~within the institution.
restrain residents ·
e hold,
however, that there is no constitutional right to habilitative
training per se. Yet we should not be understood to hold
that the state is under no obligation to provide some training.
'--.;:...;;.;;.;____.-~T::..!h~e:.;s:::.:t:::
at.::e~is under a duty to provide respondent with such
~r:ea~Bm as the appropriate professional considers reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not to provide training when training could significantly
reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable safety, reasonably non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be
required by these interests. In determining whether these
rights have been violated, decisions made by the appropriate
professional are entitled to a strong presumption of correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions
of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may
have to make decisions with respect to a number of residents
with widely varying needs and problems in the course of a
normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
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In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, weremand for further proceedings consistent with this decision.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80--1429

DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JuSTICE POWELL delivered the ppinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 against three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional
rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father
1

The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus of
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1.
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50
§4406,
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. (W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18a.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was
2
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
7~78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no longer at Pennhurst.
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
5
Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23.
• Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. ld., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and FourPrior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiff's hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
•1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
10
The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla.
7
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111a. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170.U
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
"compelling necessity." !d., at 159-160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
11
The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, thought it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F . 2d, at 165 and n.

40.
12
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
/d., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administere.d, those responsible are'liable only 1f1he
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." /d., at 166-167 and 173. 13
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or J'tandards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 14
13

Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
14
Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
~_j;;:a"f.

~~~

~

We consider here for the fir time the substantive rights
""' ~ involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this case, respondent has
been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does
not challenge the commitment. Rather, he argues that he
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety,
freedom of movement, and training within the institution;
and that petitioners infringed on these rights by failing to
provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d.,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined ·chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
15
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
. . ." U. S. Canst., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
16
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.

?

rV
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whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
further decide whether particular interferences with these
interests offend due process.
A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
17
Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.
18
It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1977). But the Eighth
Amendment has been applied to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If prisoners in state institutions
have a federal right to some degree of safety, it is because their safety implicates a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See, e. g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
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arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B
Respondent's remammg claim is more troubling: a constitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve
his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent concedes that no amount of training will make possible his release. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense
of the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, since we already have found constitutionally protected liberty interests
in freedom from restraints and safety, some training 19 may be
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a constitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only
~------.~ot<.l!h£e..!n~a~rr=._:o~w~question whether
n..,..committed inV' voluntarilylhas a right to additional training-other than that
related to safety or the ability to function free of restraints. when such training might improve his capacity to function
more independently within the institution, but cannot make
possible his release.
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined,
he has "no one but the State to turn to for help in gaining additional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and
abilities" he has. Brief for Respondent 23. Respondent
concludes that the State therefore has a constitutional duty
to provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing
skills and develop new ones. In making this argument, re-

D

19
We use the term "training" as synonymous with "habilitation," with its
"principal focus"--certainly in a case like Romeo's-being on "training and
development of needed skills." See n. 1, supra.
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spondent compares mental retardation to an infectious disease, for which the State has quarantined the individual, and
cannot then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retardation is not, however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of
a certain level of intellectual ability/0 and the "habilitation"
respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for the first
time skills he does not possess, correlates more closely to
education than to medical treatment. 21 And we have never
found a right to education under the Constitution. 22
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g.,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical
treatment). When States do choose to provide services,
they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, States
20
See A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History
and Character 21-22 in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded
(Baumeister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Retarded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. 1, supra)
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an
IQ of S-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person.
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and increase Romeo's IQ.
2
' There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills.
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any issues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills
(educational).
22
See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973).
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation available to others in Pennhurst.
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need not "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." I d., at 486-487.
Here, the State has committed respondent, who concedely
cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care, as well as reasonable conditions of safety and reasonable freedom from bodily
restraint.
Under these circumstances, we hesitate to find a new liberty interest in "training" in skills unlikely to lead to a patient's release from involumtary confinement. As we noted
in determining that there is no general right to education in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
u. s. 1, 33-34 (1973):
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
A similar restraint is seen in this Court's cases involving
claimed "discoveries" of new "liberties" under the Due Process Clause. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we
noted that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have their origins either in state law-for puposes of
procedural due process-or in the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to the States.
Id., at 710-711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some
liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the
meaning of that word itself-for example, freedom from
bodily restraint by the State. But a right to training fits
none of these categories. Respondent is not seeking procedural due process. 23 Nor does he claim a right historically
Respondent does argue that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right entitled
to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of
23
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regarded as within the meaning of the concept of "liberty."
And respondent points to no right to training either implicit
or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
The right respondent claims is a substantive due process
right. Only when an action of a State against an individual is
sharply at odds with our "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312,
316 (1926). 24 In deciding whether to provide individuals such
as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must make a
difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources.
We cannot say that due process requires that such individuals must be given training in the development of skills that
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to commit
scarce resources on programs to attempt to train the profoundly retarded, 25 or on other social and welfare programs of
the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below,
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to consicler it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977);
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896).
"See also Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (In order to determine whether the defendant was
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples ... .");Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state
has "subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our
polity will not endure it.").
20
Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
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manifest merit, is a difficult one that state and federal governments must face. The Constitution does not dictate an
answer, and this is not a decision that courts are competent
to make.
We therefore conclude that involuntaily-committed mentally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in training per se. As noted above,
they do have constitutionally protected interests in safety
and freedom from bodily restraints, and those interests may
require some kinds of training. We turn next to consider
whether Pennsylvania may have violated these two rights.

III
A
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded , 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).
26
In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail. 28 I d., at 599-600.
27
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose).
28
See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.

80-1429-0PINION
YOUNGBERGv.ROMEO

Accordingly, whether respondent'
nsti
onal rights
have been violated must be dete med by balancing his liberty interests against -¥ari~ ate interests. If there is to
be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 29 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower
d, than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity test~ ·
~;¥·~ et ea Me@ealuu·-;· hy the Court of Appeals o JUS 1 y use o re~
straints or conditions ofless than absolute safety. We think1~t;fiat the fornttila ttdoptBd bj' tfie G6tirt of A:pJ5eals would place
~ we do disagree with Chief Judge Seitz's view as to the existence of a
right to training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we
find no such right cognizable as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses "treatment" rather than "training.").
-----_JL---------,1
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~~~~
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an undue burden on the administration of institutions such as
Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise
of professional judgment as to the needs of residents.
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate interests of the State, including administrative and fiscal constraints, due process requires that (i) the State subject these
individuals only to reasonable physical constraints; (ii) it provide them reasonably safe conditions, and (iii) it afford them
such training as 1s ~setutbty necessary to achieve reasonable safety and reasonable freedom of movement within the
institution. 30 We recognize that this holding may impose
some additional burdens on States. In determining what is
"reasonable," however, we emphasize that courts must show
deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified
professional. 31
By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized. 32 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think
We have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in
somewhat different language from that used by Chief Judge Seitz.
Rather than stating that the involuntarily committed enjoy the right to
have certain decisions made by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at 178,
180-181, we hold that they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety
and reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that
once such a decision is made by a professional in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment, courts will defer to it.
31
Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be characterized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing'' by a professional exercising his
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v.
J.R ., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text
at--, supra, and in note 30, infra.
32
See Parham v. J .R ., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
30
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed.'").
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system . .. ."); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell , 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
33
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.
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damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity
would bar liability. See note 10, supra.
IV

In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. The state also has the
unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the institution. And it may not
restrain residents except when and to the extent professional
judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety. We
hold, however, that there is no constitutional right to
habilitative training per se, though we should not be understood as holding that the state is never under any obligation
to provide training. The state is under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate professional
would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It
may well be unreasonable not to provide training when training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the
likelihood of violence.
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable safety, reasonably non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as may be
required by these interests. In determining whether these
rights have been violated, decisions made by the appropriate
professional are entitled to a strong presumption of correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions
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of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may
have to make decisions with respect to a number of residents
with widely varying needs and problems in the course of a
normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
So ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1429
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JuSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 against three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional
rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father
1
The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is . . . a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness .... [T]he principal focus of
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1.
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50
§4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
2

Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18a.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. N evertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no longer at Pennhurst.
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
5
Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23.
6
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. ld., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four'Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88', 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiff's hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
9
1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
10
The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses--trained professionals--indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla.
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111a. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. !d., at 164-170.n
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
"compelling necessity." !d., at 15~160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
11
The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, thought it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.

40.
12
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974) , the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.

•'
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
/d., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." /d., at 166-167 and 173. 13
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 14
Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
14
Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor'

3
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. Id. ,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
15
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
. . ." U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
16
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.

j
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further decide whether particular interferences with these
interests offend due process.

A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes.'8 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concur17
Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.
18
It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and
__/
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1977). JBut the Eighth )
Amendment has been applied to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. If prisoners in state institutions
have a federal right to some degree of safety, it is because their safety implicates a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause. See, e. g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947);
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (19370

J
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ring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B
Respondent's remammg claim is more troubling: a constitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve
his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent concedes that no amount of training will make possible his release. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense
of the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, since we already have found constitutionally protected liberty interests
in freedom from restraints and safety, some training 19 may be
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a constitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only \
the narrow question whether a mentally retarded person,
committed involuntarily, has a right to additional trainingother than that related to safety or the ability to function free
of restraints-when such training might improve his capacity
to function more independently within the institution, but
cannot make possible his release.
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined,
he has "no one but the State to turn to for help in gaining additional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and
abilities" he has. Brief for Respondent 23. Respondent
concludes that the State therefore has a constitutional duty
to provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing
skills and develop new ones. In making this argument, respondent compares mental retardation to an infectious disease, for which the State has quarantined the individual, and
9

We use the term "training'' as synonymous with "habilitation," with its
"principal focus"-certainly in a case like Romeo's--being on "training and
development of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra.
'
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cannot then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retardation is not, however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of
a certain level of intellectual ability, 20 and the "habilitation"
respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for the first
time skills he does not possess, correlates more closely to
education than to medical treatment. 21 And we have never
found a right to education under the Constitution. 22
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g.,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical
treatment). When States do choose to provide services,
they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, States
need not "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." ld., at 486-487.
See A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History
and Character 21-22 in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded
(Baumeister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Retarded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. 1, supra)
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an
IQ of 8-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person.
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and increase Romeo's IQ.
21
There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills.
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any issues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills
(educational).
22
See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973).
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation available to others in Pennhurst.
20
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Here, the State has committed respondent, who concedely
cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care, as well as reasonable conditions of safety and reasonable freedom from bodily
restraint.
Under these circumstances, we hesitate to find a new liberty interest in "training" in skills unlikely to lead to a patient's release from involumtary confinement. As we noted
in determining that there is no general right to education in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
u. s. 1, 3~4 (1973):
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
A similar restraint is seen in this Court's cases involving
claimed "discoveries" of new "liberties" under the Due Process Clause. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we
noted that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have their origins either in state law-for puposes of
procedural due process-or in the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to the States.
Id., at 71~711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some
liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the
meaning of that word itself-for example, freedom from
bodily restraint by the State. But a right to training fits
none of these categories. Respondent is not seeking procedural due process. 23 Nor does he claim a right historically
23
Respondent does argue that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right entitled
to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of
the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below,
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the
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regarded as within the meaning of the concept of "liberty."
And respondent points to no right to training either implicit
or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
The right respondent claims is a substantive due process
right. Only when an action of a State against an individual is
sharply at odds with our "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312,
316 (1926). 24 In deciding whether to provide individuals such
as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must make a
difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources.
We cannot say that due process requires that such individuals must be given training in the development of skills that
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to commit
scarce resources on programs to attempt to train the profoundly retarded, 25 or on other social and welfare programs of
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977);
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896).
24
See also Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (In order to determine whether the defendant was
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples... .");Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state
has "subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our
polity will not endure it.").
25
Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
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manifest merit, is a difficult one that state and federal governments must face. The Constitution does not dictate an
answer, and this is not a decision that courts are competent
to make.
We therefore conclude that involuntaily-committed mentally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in training per se. As noted above,
they do have constitutionally protected interests in safety
and freedom from bodily restraints, and those interests may
require some kinds of training. We turn next to consider
whether Pennsylvania may have violated these two rights.

III
A
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).
26
In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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involuntary commitment.

Here, petitioner was committed by

a court on petition of his mother who averred that in view
of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor
control his violence.

Ante, at 2.

Thus, the purpose of

petitioner's commitment basically was to provide
reasonable care and safety, conditions not available to
him outside of an instituion.
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organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail. 28 I d., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
27
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose).
28
See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.

._,,
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determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in. fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 29 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. At the- same time, this standard is lower
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional
judgment as to the needs of residents.
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate interests of the State, including administrative and fiscal con21J We do disagree with Chief Judge Seitz's view as to the existence of a
right to training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we
find no such right cognizable as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses "treatment" rather than "training.").
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straints, due process requires that (i) the State subject these
individuals only to reasonable physical constraints; (ii) it provide them reasonably safe conditions, and (iii) it afford them
such training as is necessary to achieve reasonable safety and
reasonable freedom of movement within the institution. 30
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional
burdens on States. In determining what is "reasonable,"
however, we emphasize that courts must show deference to
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 31
By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized.32 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think
00
We have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in
somewhat different language from that used by Chief Judge Seitz.
Rather than stating that the involuntarily committed enjoy the right to
have certain decisions made by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at 178,
180-181, we hold that they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety
and reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that
once such a decision is made by a professional in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment, courts will defer to it.
31
Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be characterized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing'' by a professional exercising his
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v.
J .R ., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text
at - - , supra, and in note 30, infra.
32
See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S. , at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("(C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system . .. .");Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed."').
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for
damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity
would bar liability. See note 10, supra.

IV
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitiMcDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
33
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons .

..
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mate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We red uate food,
peat that the state concedes a duty to rovi
shelter, clothing and medical care. The state also has the
unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the institution. And it may not
restrain residents except when and to the extent professioJBl_
jud ent deems this necessary to assure such safetj - We
hold, however, that there is no constitutional nght to
abilitative training per se, though we should not be understood as holding that the state is never under any obligation
to provide training. The state is under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate professional
would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It
may well be unreasonable not to provide training when training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the
like1ihood of violence.
/ Respondent thus enjoys constitu~·~··~···
ests in conditions of reasonable safety, reasonably non-reJ
~~
strictive confinement condit · s, and such trainin as rna be
,.:7 i ] 3
required by these interests. ~~~~~fHij~~~~~~~+-- I~
~~.w.;;;....w~~..u~o:t:.U....lU,I,.Uiil~, decisions made by the appropriate
professional are entitled to a strong presumption of correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions
of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may
have to make decisions with respect to a number of residents
with widely varying needs and problems in the course of a
normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liabil-

j rU
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ity was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

So ordered.
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No. 80-1429
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[May-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 against three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional
rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus of
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1.
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50
§4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18a.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was
2
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no longer at Pennhurst.
• Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21- 23.
6
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 ,Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and FourPrior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5 1
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time,
i. e. , 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
9
1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
0
' The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla.
7
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. I d., at 111a. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170. n
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that i1 can be justified only by
"compelling necessity." Id., at 15:1--160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
11
The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.

40.
12
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F . 2d, at 173 n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171- 172.
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
!d., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." I d., at 166-167 and 173. 13
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 14
13
Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss !this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
14
Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-

80-1429-0PINION
YOUNGBERGv.ROMEO

7

We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II

We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. Id.,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
15
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw .
. . ." U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
16
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.
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further decide whether particular interferences with these
interests offend due process.
A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at ail-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration. Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B
Respondent's remammg claim is more troubling: a constitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve
17
Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.
8
' 1t is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1977).
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his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent concedes that no amount of training will make possible his release. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense
of the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, since we already have found constitutionally protected liberty interests
in freedom from restraints and safety, some training 19 may be
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a constitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only
the narrow question whether a mentally retarded person,
committed involuntarily, has a right to additional trainingother than that related to safety or the ability to function free
of restraints-when such training might improve his capacity
to function more independently within the institution, but
cannot make possible his release.
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined,
he has "no one but the State to turn to for help in gaining additional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and
abilities" he has. Brief for Respondent 23. Respondent
concludes that the State therefore has a constitutional duty
to provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing
skills and develop new ones. In making this argument, respondent compares mental retardation to an infectious disease, for which the State has quarantined the individual, and
cannot then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retardation is not, however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of
a certain level of intellectual ability, 20 and the "habilitation"
9

We use the term "training" as synonymous with "habilitation," with its
"principal focus"--certainly in a case like Romeo's-being on "training and
development of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra.
20
See A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History
and Character 21-22 in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded
(Baumeister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Retarded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n. 1, supra)
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an
'
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respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for the first
time skills he does not possess, correlates more closely to
education than to medical treatment. 21 And we have never
found a right to education under the Constitution. 22
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g.,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical
treatment). When States do choose to provide services,
they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, States
need not "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Id., at 486-487.
Here, the State has committed respondent, who concedely
cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care, as well as reasonable conditions of safety and reasonable freedom from bodily
restraint.
Under these circumstances, we hesitate to find a new liberty interest in "training'' in skills unlikely to lead to a patient's release from involuntary confinement. As we noted
IQ of 8-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person.
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and increase Romeo's IQ.
21
There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills.
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any issues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills
(educational).
22
See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973).
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation available to others in Pennhurst.
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in determining that there is no general right to education in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
u. s. 1, 33--34 (1973):
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
A similar restraint is seen in this Court's cases involving
claimed "discoveries" of new "liberties" under the Due Process Clause. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we
noted that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have their origins either in state law-for puposes of
procedural due process-or in the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to the States.
Id., at 710-711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some
liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the ·
meaning of that word itself-for example, freedom from
bodily restraint by the State. But a ·right to training fits
none of these categories. Respondent is not seeking procedural due process. 23 Nor does he claim a right historically
regarded as within the meaning of the concept of "liberty."
And respondent points to no right to training either implicit
or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
23

Respondent does argue that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right entitled
to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process Clause of
the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below,
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977);
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896).
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The right respondent claims is a substantive due process
right. Only when an action of a State against an individual is
sharply at odds with our "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312,
316 (1926). 24 In deciding whether to provide individuals such
as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must make a
difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources.
We cannot say t.h at due process requires that such individuals must be given training in the development of skills that
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to commit
scarce resources on programs to attempt to train the profoundly retarded, 25 or on other social and welfare programs of
manifest merit, is a difficult one that state and federal governments must face. The Constitution does not dictate an
answer, and this is not a decision that courts are competent
to make.
24

See also Adamson v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (In order to detennine whether the defendant was
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples .
. . ."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state has
"subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it.").
25
Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).

80-1429-0PINION
YOUNGBERGv.ROMEO

13

We therefore conclude that involuntaily-committed mentally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in training per se. As noted above,
they do have constitutionally protected interests in safety
and freedom from bodily restraints, and those interests may
require some kinds of training. We turn next to consider
whether Pennsylvania may have violated these two rights.

III
A

We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
2<1 In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail. 28 I d., at 59~00.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
-n See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical respects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2.
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment basically was to provide reasonable care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an
instituion.
28
See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.
·
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jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 29 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional
judgment as to the needs of residents.
We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily committed mentally retarded are weighed against the legitimate inZ!J We do disagree with Chief Judge Seitz's view as to the existence of a
right to training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we
find no such right cognizable as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses "treatment" rather than "training.").
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terests of the State, including administrative and fiscal constraints, due process requires that (i) the State subject these
individuals only to reasonable physical constraints; (ii) it provide them reasonably safe conditions, and (iii) it afford them
such training as is necessary to achieve reasonable safety and
reasonable freedom of movement within the institution. 30
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional
burdens on States. In determining what is "reasonable,"
however, we emphasize that courts must show deference to
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 31
By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized. 32 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think
MWe have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in
somewhat different language from that used by Chief Judge Seitz.
Rather than stating that the involuntarily committed enjoy the right to
have certain decisions made by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at 178,
180-181, we hold that they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety
and reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that
once such a decision is made by a professional in the exercise of reasonable
professional judgment, courts will defer to it.
31
Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be characterized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professional exercising his
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text
at - - , supra, and in note 30, infra.
32
See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system.. . ."); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at"
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed."').
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for
damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity
would bar liability. See note 10, supra.
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
33
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.
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IV
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials
..>
of the care that the state must provide.
~ The state also has the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the institution. And it may not restrain residents except when and
to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to
assure such safety or to provide needed training. We hold, {
however, that there is no constitutional right to habilitative
training per se, though we should not be understood as holding that the state is never under any obligation to provide
training. The state is under a duty to provide respondent
with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It may well be
unreasonable not to provide training when training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of
violence.
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests. These conditions of confinement comport fully with the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. 8.715, 738 (1972);
seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state has met
its obligations in these respects, decisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a strong presumption of
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
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stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision .of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
So ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1429

DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD, CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 a ·
three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional
. rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is .. . a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness .... [T]he principal focus of
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1.
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him.

Within
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50
§4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18a.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was
2
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. N evertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no longer at Pennhurst.
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53--55.
6
Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23.
6
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
behavior-modification program was designed by staff membe\s to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. I d., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four7

Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated

in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self con-

trol, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record ~90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
'1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
'"The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla.
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. ld., at 111a. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170."
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
"compelling necessity." /d., at 159-160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.
11

40.
12

The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 16&-167 and 173. 13
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178.'4
18
Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
14
Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. /d.,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
15
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
. . ." U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
16
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.
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further decide whether artiCYlar
int9r8sts 9t:ieH6 dt2e pi seees.

iB~srfurenc8B ~R ~'Rese

A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling: a constitutional right to "habilitation," i. e., training to improve
17
Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.
18
It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penai institutions.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667-668 (1977). ;r-:--cr=~
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his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent concedes that no amount of training will make possible his release. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if he were
still at home, he would have a right to training at the expense
of the State. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, since we already have found constitutionally protected liberty interests
in freedom from restraints and safety, some training 19 may be
neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of those
rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys a constitutional right to training per se. We therefore decide only
the narrow question whether a mentally retarded person,
committed involuntarily, has a right to additional trainingother than that related to safety or the ability to function free
of restraints-when such training might improve his capacity
to function more independently within the institution, but
cannot make possible his release.
Respondent argues that, once a person has been confined,
he has "no one but the State to turn to for help in gaining additional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and
abilities" he has. Brief for Respondent 23. Respondent
concludes that the State therefore has a constitutional duty
to provide reasonable training, both to preserve existing
skills and develop new ones. In making this argument, respondent compares mental retardation to an infectious disease, for which the State has quarantined the individual, and
cannot then deny appropriate treatment. Mental retardation is not, however, a disease. Rather, it is a description of
a certain level of intellectual ability, 20 and the "habilitation"
We use the term "training" as synonymous with "habilitation," with its
"principal focus"-eertainly in a case like Romeo's-being on "training and
development of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra.
20
See A. Baumeister, The American Residential Institution: Its History
and Character 21-22 in Residential Facilities for the Mentally Retarded
(Baumeister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Retarded in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted inn. 1, supra)
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, Romeo has an
19
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respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for the first
time skills he does not possess, correlates more closely to
education than to medical treatment. 21 And we have never
found a right to education under the Constitution. 22
As a general matter, a State is under no constitutional duty
to provide services for those within its borders. See, e. g.,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded
abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical
treatment). When States do choose to provide services,
they generally are given wide latitude in doing so. See
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige
v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471, 478 (1970). Specifically, States
need not "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all." Id., at 486-487.
Here, the State has committed respondent, who concedely
cannot survive on the outside. It is willing to provide food,
shelter, clothing, and medical care, as well as reasonable conditions of safety and reasonable freedom from bodily
restraint.
Under these circumstances, we hesitate to find a new liberty interest in "training'' in skills unlikely to lead to a patient's release from involuntary confinement. As we noted
IQ of 8-10 and is therefore classified as a profoundly retarded person.
There is no known way in which to correct the chemical imbalance and increase Romeo's IQ.
21
There may be cases in which it is difficult to distinguish between claims
to medical treatment and claims to training in the development of skills.
This is not, however, such a case. Indeed, Romeo does not raise any issues related to medical care-for example, he does not complain that he
received inadequate medical treatment in the infirmary ward. And his
claims to training are either related to safety and freedom from restraints
or purely educational, i. e., training to make him less violent (related to
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in self-care skills
(educational).
zz See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 (1973).
Respondent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation available to others in Pennhurst.
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in determining that there is no general right to education in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411
u. s. 1, 33--34 (1973):
"It is not the province of this Court to create substantive
constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal
protection of the laws. . . . Rather, the answer lies in
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly
or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
A similar restraint is seen in this Court's cases involving
claimed "discoveries" of new "liberties" under the Due Process Clause. In Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693 (1976), we
noted that the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment have their origins either in state law-for puposes of
procedural due process-or in the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights that have been "incorporated" to apply to the States.
Id., at 710-711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some
liberty interests are implicit in our historic notion of the
meaning of that word itself-for example, freedom from
bodily restraint by the State. But a right to training fits
none of these categories. Respondent is not seeking procedural due process. 23 Nor does he claim a right historically
regarded as within the meaning of the concept of "liberty."
And respondent points to no right to training either implicit
or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill of Rights .. . 1 1 • ~

r.~
)
A

'

h'

to "- o. I,, 1•·r~.:t10'J\.

23
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Responden!J._~ argu!tl that he was committed for care and t eatment

under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive righ entitled
to substantive, not procedural, protection under the Due Process ause of
the Federal Constitution. But this argument is made for the first time in
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below,
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as a ground for reversing the
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977);
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896).
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The right respondent claims is a substantive due process
right. Only when an action of a State against an individual is
sharply at odds with our "fundamental principles of liberty
and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment bar the action. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S.
319, 328 (1937) (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312,
316 (1926). 24 In deciding whether to provide individuals such
as Romeo with habilitative training, the state must make a
difficult decision regarding the allocation of its resources.
We cannot say t.h at due process requires that such individuals must be given training in the development of skills that
cannot lead to freedom. The decision whether to commit
scarce resources on programs to attempt to train the profoundly retarded, 25 or on other social and welfare programs of
manifest merit, is a difficult one that state and federal governments must face. The Constitution does not dictate an
answer, and this is not a decision that courts are competent
to make.
usee also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59, 67 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (In order to determine whether the defendant was
accorded due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary
"to ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples .
. . ."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state has
"subjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our polity will not endure it.").
25
Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).
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We therefore conclude that involuntaily-committed menally retarded persons do not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in training per se. As noted above,
they do have constitutionally protected interests in safety
and freedom from bodily restraints, and those interests may
require some kinds of training. We turn next to consider
whether Pennsylvania may have violated these two right.=_)

III
A

We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute, indeed to some extent the are in
conflicU n opera mg an ms 1 ut10n sue as Pennhurst,
~re occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
'" In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.

I

,.....
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for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did.not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail. 28 ld., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
27
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
I.
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical respects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor control his vio~le~n!!;c!:.:
e .~A
WJ:.~.a~o..-..._-rr-.._
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment
was to provide reasonable care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an
mstitdion.
28
Se~ also Addtngton v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.
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adequate training required is such training as may be
reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in
safety and freedom from unreasonable
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determining what is "reasonable" - in this and in any case
presenting a claim for training by a state - we emphasize
that courts must show deference to the judgment exercised
by a qualified professional. ~

'
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terests of the State, including administrative and fisca
straints, due process requires that (i) the S
~ect these
individuals only to reason
cal constraints; (ii) it provide them reas
afe conditions, and (iii) it afford them
such t · · g as is necessary to achieve reasonable safety and
freedom of movement within the institution. 30
e recognize that this holding may impose some additional
burdens on States. In determining what is "reasonable,"
however, we emphasize that courts must show deference t
- ..w-t"'" ·udgment exercise b
lified ofes ·
-------'\ By so
· ng J 1cial review of challenges to conditions in
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized. 32 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think
'¥) We have expressed the constitutional right enjoyed by respondent in
eitz.
somewhat different language from that used by Chief J
JOY the right to
Rather than stating that the involuntarily commit
have certain decisions made by profes ·
, see 644 F. 2d, at 178,
18~181 , we hold that they ar
· ed to conditions of reasonable safety
om bodily restraints, but we go on to hold that
and reasonable fre
c1sion is made by a professional in the exercise of reasonable
once sue
o es iona 'ud
t o
will
e
31
Our olding entitles respondent to a right that also can be characterized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professional exercising his
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v.
J .R. , 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text
at - - , supra, and in note 30, infra.
32
See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed.'").
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for
damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity
would bar liability. See note 10, supra.
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
33
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.
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IV
In deciding this case, we have wei
ment interests cognizable as liberty
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
mate state interests and in lig

~
r--------~==~----~~~~;;~~~~s~a~e~I!s;u~n~e;r,~a~~u~y~o:ip~r~o~vi~e~r~e~s~p~o~n!!en~ ~;;~

t.)dul J

such · rai g as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his abil~~~
1
ity to function free from bodily restraints. It RlftY wei..W5~-e-- -- ----- \.
unreasonable not to provide training when training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of
violence.
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests . ...!:phes con 1tions of confinemenfkomport fully with the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. 8.715, 738 (1972);
seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state has met
its obligations in these respects, decisions made b the a r priate professional are entitled to a
presumption of
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
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stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

(

/

So ordered.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1429

DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD, CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983
imt three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional
rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is .. . a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness .... [T]he principal focus of
habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1.
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in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within
two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50
§4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
2
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18a.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was
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was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
7~78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no longer at Pennhurst.
• Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23.
8
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. llOa. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. I d., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four7

Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
9
1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
10
The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla.
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111a. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. Id., at 164-170.u
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
"compelling necessity." Id., at 15~160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.
40.
12
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173 n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.
11
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 and 173.'3
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 14
lB Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
14
Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amor-
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
phous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. Id.,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
15
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process oflaw .
. . ." U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
18
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests .

.
'

.
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Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at ali-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B
. . ~"'·~ndent's remaining claim is more troubling: a co stitutiona · ht to "habilitation," i. e., training to im o
17

Petitioners do not appe
tioners 27-31.
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his ability to function within Pennhurst. Respondent cone s that no amount of training will make possible his
lease. Moreover, respondent does not argue that if h ere
still at me, he would have a right to training at th7' xpense
of the Sta: e. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. And, smce we already have und constitutionally protectedt~~y interests
in freedom fro restraints and safety, some _7 a.ining 19 may be
neccesary to a oid unconstitutional infri gement of those
rights regardles of whether responden also enjoys a constitutional right to raining per se. W therefore decide only
the narrow questio whether a me ally retarded person,
committed involunta y, has a righ to additional trainingother than that related o safety or he ability to function free
of restraints-when su trainin might improve his capacity
to function more indep ndentl within the institution, but
cannot make possible his ele se.
Respondent argues tha
ce a person has been confined,
he has "no one but the Sta to turn to for help in gaining additional skills or, at least, preserving whatever skills and
abilities" he has. Brie £ Respondent 23. Respondent
concludes that the Sta th efore has a constitutional duty
to provide reasonabl trai g, both to preserve existing
skills and develop ne ones. In making this argument, respondent compares ental re rdation to an infectious disease, for which the State has qu rantined the individual, and
cannot then deny: appropriate t atment. Mental retardation is not, howe er, a disease.
ther, it is a description of
a certain level f intellectual abilit ,20 and the "habilitation"
'We use the erm "training'' as synonymous "th "habilitation," with its
being on ''training and
"principal foe "-certainly in a case like Romeo
developmen of needed skills." Seen. 1, supra.
00
See A aumeister, The American Residential stitution: Its History
and C acter 21-22 in Residential Facilities for th
entally Retarded
(Ba eister, ed. 1970); H. Best, Public Provision for he Mentally Reerican Psychided in the United States 3 (1965). See also Brief for
atric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n. 1 (quoted in n.
supra)
As a result of a congenital chemical imbalance in his brain, R eo has an
1
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'K~fr~
~

~st

respondent seeks, such as training to teach him for.
t1 ~ skills he does not possess, correlates mo
closely to
e have never
educat' n than to medical treatment. 21 An
found a · ht to education under the Con tution. 22
As a gen al matter, a State is under constitutional duty
to provide se ices for those within i borders. See, e. g.,
Harris v. Me e, 448 U. S. 297, 3 (1980) (publicly funded
abortions); Mah v. Roe, 432 U. . 464, 469 (1977) (medical
treatment). WH n States do oose to provide services,
they generally ar given wide latitude in doing so. See
Richardson v. Belc er, 404 U. . 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandrige
v. Williams, 397 U. . 471, 8 (1970). Specifically, States
need not "choose bet een tacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking t e oblem at all." I d., at 486-487.
'tted respondent, who concedely
Here, the State has co
cannot survive on the ou side. It is willing to provide food,
shelter, clothing, and m dical care, as well as reasonable conditions of safety an r~asonable freedom from bodily
restraint.
\
Under these circu stance , we hesitate to find a new liberty interest in "tr ining'' in kills unlikely to lead to a patient's release fro involunta confinement. As we noted
erefore classified
a profoundly retarded person.
ay in which to correc the chemical imbalance and increase Romeo's I .
21
There may be cases in which it is difficult distinguish between claims
to medical treat ent and claims to training in he development of skills.
This is not, ho ver, such a case. Indeed, Ro eo does not raise any issues related t /medical care-for example, he doe not complain that he
ward. And his
received inad quate medical treatment in the infirrri
claims to tr · 'ng are either related to safety and freed
from restraints
or purely e cational, i. e., training to make him less vio nt (related to
safety and freedom from restraints) and training in se are skills
(education l).
22
SeeS n Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1 9J3).
Respon ent does not argue that he is denied training or habilitation avlit~
able others in Pennhurst.
-....______;
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determining that there is no general right to education ·
San
tonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez U1
u. s. 1,
(1973):
"It is no the province of this Court to create
stantive
constituti al rights in the name of guar eeing equal
protection o the laws. . . . Rather, th answer lies in
assessing whe her there is a right~o
e cation explicitly
or implicitly gu anteed by the Con itution."
A similar restraint i seen in this C
's cases involving
claimed "discoveries" o new "libe~s" under the Due Process Clause. In Paul . Davis,,.t2~ U. S. 693 (1976), we
noted that the liberties p otecte by the Fourteenth Amendment have their origins e'the in state law-for puposes of
procedural due process--o n the guarantees of the Bill of
Rights that have been "in
orated" to apply to the States.
Id., at 710-711 and n. 5. In addition, as noted earlier, some
liberty interests are · plici in our historic notion of the
meaning of that w. rd itse
for example, freedom from
bodily restraint
the State. But a right to training fits
none of these ategories. Re ondent is not seeking procedural du rocess. 23 Nor doe he claim a right historically
r
ed as within the meanin of the concept of "liberty."
And respondent points to no rig t to training either implic·
or explicit in the guarantees of t e Bill of Ri ht
~

"']Urw- II o {: ~

~

Jr~
OE lt./Z-'f&5
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. ~Responden~arguilihat he was o
· ted for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has tate ubstantive rightfenbtled
to substantive, not procedural, protection
er th ue Process-cfause of
the Federal Constitution. But this argum
for the first time in
respondent's brief to this Court. It was not Yanced the courts below,
and was not argued to the Court of Appeals a
ground
reversing the
trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsyl
nia law a the lack of
any guidance on this issue from the lower federal
sider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.
Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200 (1927);
Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S. 261, 2
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The right respondent claims is a substantive due p cess
Only when an action of a State against an indiv,'dual is
sharp
t odds with our "fundamental principles
liberty
and justic' will the Due Process Clause of the ·ourteenth
Amendme~~ ~the action. Palko v. Connecti t, 302 U. S.
319, 328 (1937)
oting Herbert v. Louisiana 72 U. S. 312,
316 (1926). 24 In de 'ding whether to provid individuals such
as Romeo with habil tive training, the tate must make a
difficult decision regar · g the allocajion of its resources.
We cannot say t.h at due p cess re~es that such individuals must be given training 1 the Jievelopment of skill~ that
cannot lead to freedom. The e'cision whether to commit
scarce resources on program o ttempt to train the profoundly retarded, 25 or on oth social d welfare programs of
te and federal govmanifest merit, is a diffic t one that
ernments must face.
e Constitution es not dictate an
answer, and this is n
to make.
on v. California, 332 U. S. 46, 59, 67 947) (Frankfurter, J., con
· g) (In order to determine whether the de ndant was
accorded d process under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is ecessary
"to asce
n whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of de ncy and
fairne which express the notions of justice of English-speaking oples .
. . ." ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S., at 328 (Under the Due
cess
Cl se of the Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state
" bjected [an individual] to a hardship so acute and shocking that our po i y will not endure it.").
,A Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).
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III
A

We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for et ample, to protect
them as well as others from violence J~t-- Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),

z.<"

V

_ef in Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate ~overnment objectives and not tantamount to punishment ; ~ see id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did.not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entaiL1"; 1 Id., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or

?.-7

v

z.6 ...I See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
V incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical respects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2.
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitmen~ was to provide reasonable care and safety, conditions not avail~ble W him outside of an
L-:=--..J--~
in;...
st,;.,.It~ . on.
.8 ee also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431--432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.

7.-7

v
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jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B

We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exer. ~tJ .
cised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
~ ~
made.'it/ 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than
.hJ z-'1
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower
than the "compelling'' or "substantial" necessity tests the
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional
judgment as to the needs of residents .
..JHe :hald that wllen the rights of the involuntarily._commit-----G
.ted-mentally-retarded are-weighe<hlgainst-the-legitimate in- o

th~ofa 1"""
~. zJf

•we do disagree with Chief Judge SeiU's view as to
n
training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we
find no such right..cogpizable as ajiberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See-644 F: 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses ''treatment" rather ti}an-''ttaining.").
~

"'f"1'U' ...-
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\?$ 14 z? (:,. 7j..-----13y so limiting judicial review of challenges to co~ditions in

{it~.cJ,.q.;& ~
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stafe institutions,

interference by the federal judiciary with
the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized.<lfz.~ Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think

"2--'t

V

'
.
/P Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be characterized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing'' by a professional exercising his
professional judgment-a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text
at - -, supra, and in note 30, infra.
J# See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system.... "); Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U. S. 520, 539

z-7
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judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed."').
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 33 is
presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for
damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity
would bar liability. See note 10, supra.
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
f(P By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.

•
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In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials \ ( NO~~\
of the care that the state must provide. _ __:.;;.----- 7
The state also has the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all residents and personnel within the institution. And it may not restrain residents except when and
to the extent professional judgment deems=~
assure such safety or to provide needed training. ~
bawever, that Hlere is-ne-constitutional rig
·· ·
~ning-pel:- se , though- ~ve should-n&t-be-unae1 ~tood as hold----~ng that the state is never under any.-ooligaiion to provid~
r--=:l~m11~l l"he state is under a duty to provide respondent
'---------with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily restraints. It may well be
unreasonable not to provide training when training could significantly reduce the need for restraints or the likelihood of
violence.
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests.
con 1 1ons o con1wo"'-!d j
~::::..=~~------::fin
-e..:o:.m
e!ill;
-,t""' omport fully with the purpose o respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972);
seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state has met
its obligations in these respects, decisions made by the appropriate professional are entitled to a ~resumption of
~
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable in-
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stitutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
So ordered.
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DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, pAULA ROMEO

l!

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

I

[May-, 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under tbe Due Process Clause
of tbe Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights.
I

l

1

I
l

Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and Jacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, responoent lived ·with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death .of-his father
in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Withi:Q
'The American Psychiat1ic Association explains that "lt]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally- retarded because mental retardation is .. . a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
Ame1ican Psychiatric Association as Anticns Curiae, at 4, n. l.
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two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo . or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21a-22a and 28a-29a. On June 11, 1974, the
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50
§ 4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo \vas injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
2

Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Cow"t of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent- Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak- \\·ants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my hu sband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18a.
' Petitioner Duane Youngberg was th e Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supen·isory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Re spondent
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,'" .
'·
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending la'\:v suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a seeond amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The seeond
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April 1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several

:.._'

l
I

. '

'

l

j
I

l

i

not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no longer at Pennhurst.
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See B1ief for Respondents 21-23.
• Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (19&1)
(remanded for further proceedings).
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections.9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 11 Oa. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. Id., at 73a-75a. Finally, the jury was instructed
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four'Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated
in programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44- 56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48 .
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162- 166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
' 2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short pe1iods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
9
1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
wThe District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals- indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. Th e trial judge explained
that evidence of the adYantages of alternative form s of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. lOla.
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. I d., at Ilia. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157- 158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. I d., at 164--170. 11
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining wh ether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded tl1at it can be justified only by
"compelling necessity." Id., at 159- 160. A somev.·hat different standard \Yas appropriate for the failure to provide for

j

t

i

"The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treat ment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by th e mentally r etarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.
40.
12
Th e existence of a qualifi ed immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instru ction s on this rl efense, App .
76a, and it was not chall enged by r espond ent. 644 F . 2d, at 173, n. 1.
After citing P ierso11 v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and S cheuer v. R hodes,
416 U.S. 232 (1974) , th e majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instruction s should be given again on the r emand. 644 F. 2d, at 171- 172 ..
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." I d., at 166-167 and 173. 13
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
\Vas "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 14
13
Actually, the court divid ed the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that 1w treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on indiYidual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
"Judge Alclisertjoined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but \vrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,

-
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed on these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. !d.,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and \Vrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
15
ln pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See B1ief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
•• Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; B1ief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Cw·iae 8.

•.. '

~

•t'.

..
80-1429-0PINION
8

YOUNGBERGv.ROMEO

whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case.
A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingmham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed- who
may not be punished at ali- in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. ·Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Imnates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.
"Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.
)@It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667- 668 (1977).
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B
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive
due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation", used in psychiatry
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and development of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Respondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45.
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'"R espondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive 1ight to
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the
Due Process Clause of the Fed eral Constitution. But this argument is
made for the first time in respondent's b1ief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as
a ground for reversing the trial court.
Given the uncertainty of
Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the
lower fedei"al courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dotha1·d v. Ra.wlinson, 433 U . S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duig1wn v. United States, 274 U. S.
195, 200 (1927); Old JoTdan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines,
164 U . S. 261, 264--265 (1896).
"'Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally r etarded disagree
strongly on the question wh ether effective training of all severely or profoundly r etarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Id entify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Interv ention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Interv ention
in Developm ental Disabilities 53 (1981).
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In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464_, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is
institutionalized- and wholly dependent on the State-it is
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dand1'idge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all." Id., at 486-487.
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retardation, concedes that no amount of training v.rill make possible
his release. Nor does he argue that if he were still at home,
the State ·would have an obligation to provide training at its
expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals that
respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum
of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims training
related to these needs. 21 As we have r ecognized that there is
a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety and
freedom from restraint, ante at --Otraining may be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of those rights.
On the basis of the record before us, it is quite uncertain
whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In his
brief to this Court, he indicates that even the self-care programs Romeo seeks are needed to reduce his agressive behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 21-22, 50. And
in his offer of proof to the trial court, r espondent repeatedly
indicated that, if allowed to testify, his experts would show
2

'

See, e. g ., description of complaint at - - -, supra.
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that additional training programs, including self-care programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's agressive behavior.
Petition for Certiorari 98a-104a. 22 If, as seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to safety and freedom
from restraints, this case does not present the difficult uestion whether a mentally retarded person nvo untarily committed to a state institution
some g ner cons1 utwnal
right to training per se, even when no type or amount of
training would lead to freedom.
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by respondent, observed:
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, - - (Pet.
54a).
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define- beyond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint- the "minimally adequate care and treatment"
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 23 In
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of
the r ecord developed to date, we agree v,rjth his view and conclude that respondent's liberty interests r equire the State to
provide minimally adequate or r easonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint.
In view of the
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evid ence of
record, we need go no further in this case. 24

J
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"" See al so Resond ent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, at 11- 14, 20-21, and 24.
23
Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treat ment" as svnonvous with training or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 1 (pstJ:l 65:. 67a, si'IEI ef beitz::b
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~not feasible, as is evident from~e variety of language and for-
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mulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or
identify the type of training that may be r equired in every case. A court
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III
A
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute, indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 25 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "tbe demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that trainirig which is reasonable
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state.
' /
2; In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra .
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But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 26 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In PaTlwm v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that pmceduml due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entaiJ.Z' I d., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting tl1ese interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider tl1e proper standard for
determining whetl1er a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
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See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely \\ithout either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational r elation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical respects from Jackson, a procedural due process case invol ving the Yalidity
of an involunta1·y commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither ca1·e for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2.
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable
care and safety, conditions not aYailable to him outside of an in stitution.
Z7 See also Addingt.on v. Te.ra.s, 441 U. S. 418 (1979) .
In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for tommitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431--432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.
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B
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than the
deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context of
penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We
think this requirement ':vould place an undue burden on the
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional
judgment as to the needs of residents.
n this case, ~ the minimally adequate training
"l-- -....::::E=---,,..-.,
required is such training as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case presenting a claim for training
by a state-we emphasize that courts must show deference to
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional. 28 Ndit~

·----

28
(
0 r holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be characterized Js procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professinoal exercising h~~
professional judgment- a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parhmn.::v: ·
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B
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than the
deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context of
penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use
of restraints or conditions of less tl1an absolute safety. We
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also
\\'ould restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional
judgment as to the needs of residents.
In this case, we agree that the minimally adequate training
required is such training as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case presenting a claim for training
by a state--we emphasize that courts must show deference to
the juc1gment exercised by a qualified professional. 21' Ncs:it:.)
""Our holding entitles respondent to a right that also can be characterized as procedural. We hold that the involuntary committed are entitled
to an informal, non-adversarial "hearing" by a professinoal exercising hi?
professional judgment- a "procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parhanu..v_. ·
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<.-By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in ·
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized. 29 Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. See Parham v. J.R., 442
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U. S., at
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed.'").
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professional, 30 is
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J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case discussed in text
at - - , supra, and in note 30, i1~(ra.
""See Parham v. J.R ., s11pra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("l C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the climinal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommoclation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
30
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-in cludt~is ·
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I

presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards
as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment. In an action for
damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity
would bar liability. See note 10, supm.

I

~
~

IV
In deciding this case, we have' weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has
the unquestioned duty to provide reasona]Jie safety for all
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may
not restrain residents except when and to tl1e extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety ~
or to provide needed training. {In this case, therefore, the
state is under a duty to provide respondent v;rith such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not
to provide training when training could significantly reduce
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably
decisions that must be made without delay- necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are sutdect
to the supervision of qualified persons.
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non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of confinement would comport fully v.rith the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. 8.715,
738 (1972); seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by
the ·appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this type--often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents \Vith v.ridely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

So ordered.

-·
-"1

t
'j

I

l

~- L~~~~-J'
~~~~1~~4:../4--~~q~~

I,

~~ ~C./f~

~

~~ ~~ ~~~;?,~'u,u~~

~~~, kls~~~
9/ ..4:, ~ z.,~, p!Z...) ~
~
,
a_ ~ ~ ~ ~~<!' t:./~
4--

.... '
~

-

J USLH:e Dl ell nan

Justice
· Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice
Justice

~~

y.,

2.- ~ 7'2---

~ "'-,t./~S/ ~

91-

/Z.)

Jy..-j~

From:

White
Marshall
Blackmun
Rehnquist
Stevens
O'Connor

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
'

Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ ___ __

~
j

4th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1429 ·

DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, pAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[May -·- , 1982]

JuSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is wl1ether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, l1a s substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights.
I

I
·. t
l

.I

·l

Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father
in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Withi:Q

l
i

i

l

'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "(t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally- retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability
and training impairment rather than· an illness ... . · [T]h e principal focus
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Cw'iae, at 4, n. 1.
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two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21( 22t"'and 28;(29/: On June 11, 1974, the
Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable
involuntary commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50
§ 4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3 ; it alleged

V,/vt/

' Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
hu sband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent- Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak- wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
.
for him." App. 18;:--' Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Re spondent
Marguerite Conley \\'as Unit Director for the urut in which respondent was
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administraior.e;- .
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infinnary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions ·of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending la\v suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
,vjth appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are no longer at Pennhurst.
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
'Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See B1ief for Respondents 21-23.
'Pennhurst State School and Ho spital'"· Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (19~!-)
(remanded for fw-ther proceedings) .
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programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110~ The jury also was instructed that if the defendants sl1ackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this la\vsuit," his constitutional rights were p olated under the Eighth Amendment. I d., at 73(-75(.' Finally, the jury was instructed
that if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the medical and psychological needs of Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Four-
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'Prior to his transfer to Pennhw·st's hospital ward, Romeo participated
in programs dealing \\ith feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program proYiding interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44- 56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48 .
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162- 166, Rec:ord 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Recorcl 45.
'2 Record 7, 5 Rec:ord 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200- 203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for sh01't ]Jeriods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
"1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
'"The District Juclge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals- indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that eYidence of the ad\'antages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a c-onstitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert.
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teenth Amendment rights were violated. !d., at 111{. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new triaL 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170. 11
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it t:an be justified only by
"compe1ling necessity." I d., at 159-160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for

l
j

1

l
l
t

1

~.i

~

"The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accw·ate in describing
t1·eatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.
40.
12
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by r espondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173, n. 1.
After citing Pier:;on v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer Y. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F . 2d, at 171-t72 ..
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a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 and 173. 13
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178.'4
"Act.ually, the court diYided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not. discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court. considered "least
intru sive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on indi,idual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 16 ~ 166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
"Judge Aldisertjoined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Junge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected \Vith the
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182--183. And,
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed ~these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491---494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide

J
~

I

j
.!

.1
'

I

on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering. state institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. !d.,
at 184. See id., at l 83--185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and ·wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
15
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, v.rithout due process of law .
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, ~ 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
16
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
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whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case.

11
i
l

. !

j

j

I

A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. N ebmska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.
"Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.
1
e It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and
the Eighth Am endment has no direct b earing on non-penal institutions.
See Ingraham v. W7-ight, 430 U. S. 651, 667- 668 (1977).
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B
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive
due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation", used in psychiatry/
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and development of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Respondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45.
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Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is
made for the flrst time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of
Pennsy!Yannia law and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the
lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dotlta.rd v. Rawlinson, 433 U . S. 321, 323n. 1 (1977); Duig1w.n v. United States, 274 U. S.
195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines,
164 U. S. 261, 264-265 (1896).
20
Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Eoucability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).
'
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In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464J 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and
scope of its responsibilities. See Richa1·dson v. Belcher, 404
U. S. 78, 83--84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
alL" I d. , at 486-487.
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retardal
nJ '-a l
tion, concedes that no amount of training will make possible
-D..:!::..---,..---,:b:"!'I:::s O::r:::elr:::e':a:::::'se:::"'..,l~&r does htargue that if he were still at home,
t e a e \VOU 1ave an obligation to provide training at its
expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals that
respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum
of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims training
related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized that there is
a constitutionally protected liberty )interest in safety and
freedom from restraint, ante at - ..Ltraining may be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of those rights.
On the basis of the record before us, it is quite uncertain
whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In his
bne to this Court,
indicates that even the self-care pro~~mea,. seeks are needed to reduce his agressive be. havior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 21-22, 50. And
in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent repeatedly
indicated that, if allowed to testify, his experts would show
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See, e. g., description of complaint at - - - , supra.
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that additional training programs, including self-care programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's agressive behavior.
Petition for Certiorari 9¥-104, . 22 If, as seems the case, respondent seeks only traming related to safety and fre
· cult quesfrom restraints, this case does not present t
tion whether a mentally retarded pers<@-nvoluntarily com- ~
mitted to a state instituti
s some general con ~tional
r.l.ght-to-tra· mg per se, e
when no type or amount of
___-----training would lead to freedom.
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by re~pondent, observed:
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, - - (Pet.

s;:).

.

Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-beyond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint- the "minimally adequate care and treatment"
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 23 In
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of
the record developed to date, we agree ·with his view and conclude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
In view of the
safety and freedom from undue restraint.
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of
record, we need go no further in this case. 24
""See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, at 11- 14, 20-21, and 24.
23
Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as synonyous v.ith training or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at
··~

~tis not feasible,
. I

as is evident from the variety of language and formulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or
id entify the type of training that may be required in every case. A co~rt
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III
A
We have established that Romeo retains · er-ty-interests
in safety and freedom from b ·
s raint. Yet these interests are not absolu~ndeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operatin~n institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 25 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but \Yhether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause l1as been violated, it is necessary to
balance "tl1e liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the indiYidual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detain ees, not
yet convkted of the crime charged, could not be puru shed.

·4
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properly may start ·with the generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state ..-l
"' In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra .
'·
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But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 26 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Padwm v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor ·with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail. 2; I d., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded .

l

1
!
t

.I

'. t
.;

.. j

.:.:.:J

.I

2f> See also Ja ckson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; clue process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical J"espects from Jackson, a procedural clue process case involving the \'alidity
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2.
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide r easonable
care and safety, conditions not a\'ailable to him outside of an institution.
27
See also Addington v. Tc.ra.s, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for <:ominitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We r eached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.
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B
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than the
deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context of
penal institutions. See Estelle v. Ganz,ble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
4t t\\ore.ooe. t-1
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the
~ ~~~.
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We
r-.t~ f~~-~- 'S
think
this requirement would place an undue burden on the
e. ... ~i~ 1-u 4o
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also
Mitt.iw.tJ.I/1 rJ.tbf.(JJ._
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional
judgment as to the needs of residents.
t rc.. A. V\ ,·t'\ ·
~-""' In this case, wo agre;g,that the minimally adequate training
. .j
required is such training as may be reasonable in light of re.j
-------;lssn
p~onn7feP:nnt's liberty interests in safety and freedom from un-t-hA..
reasonable restraints. In determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case presenting a claim for training
/
i
ConsJ; -k.11'~
by a state--we emphasize that courts must show deference to
the judgment exercised by a qualified professional.~ Ndit~

I

j

by

.

I
I.!

... .-'

.;

80-1429-0PINION
YOUNGBERGv.ROMEO

15

<.- By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in
state institutions, interference by the federal judiciary with
the interpyl operations of these institutions should be minimized jf\'t.Moreover, there certainly is no reason to think
judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. See Pa1·ham v. J.R., 442
U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, supm, 441 U. S., at
544 (Courts should not "'second-guess the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed.'").
For these reasons, the decision, if made by a professionat~ is

!

. .J

l

I

I

J .R ., 442 0. S. 584 (1999, , a piaeeEIHral c:ltHo proce~~ ease-di'S"cussed 1~
, sup1 a, and i11 nst9 SO, in.£ra .»--~ See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system ... .");Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wo~ff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
~By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, clay-to-day decisions regarding care-including·
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presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the
decision by the professional is such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards
as to demonstrate that the person respo~.ble actually did
not base the decision on such a judgment.<7 In an action for
damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable
to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation, good-faith immunity
would bar liability. See note , supm.

In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state inst)tutions necessarily operate. We repeat tl1at the state concedes a duty to prov)de adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has
the unquest1oned duty to provide reasona"Qle safety for all
residents and personnel within the inst1tution. And it may
not restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety
or to prov1de needed train1ng. In this case, therefore, the
state is under a duty to provide respondent ·with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not
to provide training when training could significantly reduce
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in cond1tions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably

1

I

- 1

decisions that must be made without delav-necessarilv will be made in
many instances by employees without for~al training b~t who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.
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non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of confinement would comport fully \Vith the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715,
738 (1972); see n. 27, ante. In determining whether the state
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this type--often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
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So ordered .
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Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancin his liberty interests against
s ate mterests. If there is to
be any uniformity in protec mg these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-co:mtted mentally retarded.

We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 29 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than
the deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context
of penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard_i~ lowe1;~
than the "compelling'' or "substantial" necessity tesfi'~.
"
.J..
1
~ er ed fteeessary };)y the Court of Appeals o JUS 1 use o re- t.~c. LO .... ,.l o-...r
<"' straints or conditions of less than absolUte safety. We think ~ woeJ..J..
~thit U:u~ f1Pm'11a adopted by the Court ofJ\ppe~would place
r~CJ(.U,.~ o.....

c;~ 4-t,~

awe do disagree with Chief Judge Seitz's view as to the existence of a
right to training per se. He finds that such a right does exist, whereas we
find no such right cognizable as a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See 644 F. 2d, at 176 (Chief Judge Seitz uses ''treatment" rather than ''training.").
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80--1429
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC. ·, ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[May - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child. He cannot talk and lacks the most
basic self-care skills. Until he was 26, respondent lived with
his parents in Philadelphia. But after the death of his father
in May 1974, his mother was unable to care for him. Within
1
The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4, n. 1.
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two weeks of the father's death, respondent's mother sought
his temporary admission to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Rome<J was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21-22 and 28-29. On June 11, 1974, the Court of
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable involuntary
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 § 4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Respondent Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Respondent
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent was
incarcerated. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators,
not medical doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Mat2
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed- alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
thews are no longer at Pennhurst.
' Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles ," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training. " See Brief for Respondents 21-23.
6
P ennhurst State School and Hospi tal v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
' Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward , Romeo participated

----------
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behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. I d., at 7~75. Finally, the jury was instructed that
if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to the
medical
and
psychological
needs
of
Nicholas
Romeo," they might find that Romeo's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. I d., at 111. The
jury returned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgin programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200--203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
9
1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
10
The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101.

----··----
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ment was entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These. were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. !d., at 164-170. 11
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 12 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
"compelling necessity." !d., at 159-160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
"The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.
40.
12

The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173, n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.
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I d., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 and 173. 13
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 14
13
Actually; the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, ·id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
1
' Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d. ,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 15 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 16 We must decide
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case.
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
15
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
. . . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
16
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.

----------·----~
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Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by pnor decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 17 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. 18 See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B

Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive
due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty
17
Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.
18
It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners, analysis begins with the
Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and unusual punishment, and
the Eighth Amendment has no direct bearing on non-penal institutions.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 667-668 (1977).

\
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component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation", used in psychiatry,
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and development of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Respondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45.
In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432

--

Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is
made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of
Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the
lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duignan v. United States , 274 U. S.
195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines,
164 u. s. 261, 264-265 (1896).
------:"';;;;Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).

l '
\
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U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all." Id., at 486--487.
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will make possible
his release. And he does not argue that if he were still at
home, the State would have an obligation to provide training
at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals
that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims
training related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
at - - , trammg may .._s_u__--Y
safety and freedom from restraint,
be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of those
rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite uncertain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily restraints.
In his brief to this Court, Romeo indicates that even the selfcare programs he seeks are needed to reduce his agressive
behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at 21-22, 50.
And in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent repeatedly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his experts would
show that additional training programs, including self-care
programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's agressive behavior. Petition for Certiorari 98--104. 22 If, as seems the case,
2 3
See, e. g., description of complaint at ;
, supra. /
See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, at 11-14, 20-21 , and 24.
21

22

(
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respondent seeks only training related to safety and freedom
from restraints, this case does not present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has some general constitutional
right to training per se, even when no type or amount of
training would lead to freedom.
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by respondent, observed:
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, - - (Pet.
54).

Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-beyond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatment"
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 23 In
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of
the record developed to date, we agree with his view and conclude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint.
In view of the
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of
record, we need go no further in this case. 24
23
Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as synonyous with training or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 181.
" It is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and formulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or
identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state.
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients

------·--~
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A
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute; indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 25 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the
case before a court. Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the court
below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment of incremental
decisionmaking in favor of promulgation of broad standards . . . [that]
lack[] utility for the groups most affected by this decision." 644 F. 2d, at
183-184. Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the
case requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of an appropriate record ... and without the benefit of analysis, argument or briefing'' on such issues. I d., at 186.
25
In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 26 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail.27 I d., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
determining whether a State adequately has protected the
26
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical respects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2.
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable
care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an institution.
27
See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.

--

I

II
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rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B

We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. This standard is higher than the
deliberate indifference formulation applied in the context of
penal institutions. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97
(1976). Persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are
designed to punish. At the same time, this standard is lower
than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the
Court of Appeals would require a state to meet to justify use
of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We
think this requirement would place an undue burden on the
administration of institutions such as Pennhurst and also
would restrict unnecessarily the exercise of professional
judgment as to the needs of residents.
Moreover, we agree that respondent is entitled to minimally adequate training. In this case, ~the minimally adequate training required by the Constitution is such training
as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In
determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case
presenting a claim for training by a state-we emphasize that
courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the
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federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized. 28 Moreover, there certainly is no
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions. See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish,
supra, 441 U. S., at 544 (Courts should not "'second-guess
the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed.'"). For these reasons, the decision, if made by
a professional, 29 is presumptively valid; liability may be im-

---

See Parham v. J .R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system.... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell , 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
29
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.
28

II
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posed only when the decision by the professional is such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. 30 In an action for damages against a professional in his
individual capacity, however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation,
good-faith immunity would bar liability. See note 12, supra.
IV
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has
the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may
not restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety
or to provide needed training. <fin this case, therefore, the
state is under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not
to provide training when training could significantly reduce
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.
30
All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's expert
testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not included in the
questions presented for certioari, and we have no reason to disagree with
the view that the evidence was admissible. It appears relevant to
whether petitioners' decisions were a substantial departure from accepted
professional practice.

1/
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Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of confinement would comport fully with the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S.715,
738 (1972); seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

So ordered.

2

SCHMIDT
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POLLARD v. OAKLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT

(1966).

We accordingly vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
·
So ordered.
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[June - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child, with an I.Q. between 8 and 10. He
cannot talk and lacks the most basic self-care skills. Until he
was 26, respondent lived with his parents in Philadelphia.
But after the death of his father in May 1974, his mother was
The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the
mentally-retarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4, n. 1.
1
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unable to care for him. Within two weeks of the father's
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence}
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21-22 and 28-29. On June 11, 1974, the Court of
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable involuntary
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 § 4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Petitioner Richard \
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Petitioner
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent
lived. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, not medi2

I
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All clajms for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
cal doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are
no longer at Pennhurst.
' Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.
5
Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23.
6
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
7
Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated

.:
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behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior,S but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. I d., at 73-75. Finally, the jury was instructed that
only if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the serious medical [and psychological] needs" of Romeo
could they find that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights had been violated. I d., at 111-112. 11 The jury rein programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200--203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
9
1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
10
The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101.
11
The "deliberate indifference" standard was adopted by this Court in
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with prisoners'

\
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turned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was
entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. Id., at 164-170. 12
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 13 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
rights to punishment that is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
Amendment. Although the District Court did not refer to Estelle v. Gamble in charging the jury, it erroneously used the deliberate-indifference
standard articulated in that case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45, 112.
12
The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.
40.
13
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense , App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F . 2d, at 173, n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.

~
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"compelling necessity." Id., at 159-160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 166-167 and 173. 14
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 15
Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment , 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, i d.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
15
Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
14
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II

We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 16 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 17 We must decide
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries north( ' e
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "am Jrphous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d.,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
16
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .
. . ." U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
17
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
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whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case.

A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 18 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.

£ ...-----18 Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary. See Brief for Peti(U

tioners 27-31.
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due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation," used in psychiatry,
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and development of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Respondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45.
In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
19

Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is
made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of
Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any guidance on this. issue from the
lower federal courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, l3 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S.
195, 20(J (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines,
164 u. s. 261, 264-265 (1896).
""Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).
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297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State--it is
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all." ld., at 486-487.
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will make possible
his release. And he does not argue that if he were still at
home, the State would have an obligation to provide training
at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals
that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims
training related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
safety and freedom from restraint, supra, at - - , training
may be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of
those rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite
uncertain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or
training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In his brief to this Court, Romeo indicates that
even the self-care programs he seeks are needed to reduce
his agressive behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at
21-22, 50. And in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent repeatedly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his
experts would show that additional training programs, including self-care programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's
agressive behavior. Petition for Certiorari 98-104. 22 If, as
21

22

See, e. g., description of complaint at 2-3, supra.
See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for
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seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to
safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not
present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded
person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has
some general constitutional right to training per se, even
when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom.
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by respondent, observed:
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, - - (Pet.
54).

Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-beyond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatment"
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 23 In
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of
the record developed to date, we agree with his view and conclude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint.
In view of the
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of
record, we need go no further in this case. 24
the Third Circuit, at 11-14, 20-21, and 24.
23
Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as synonyous with training or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 181.
24
It is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and formulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or
identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state.
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III
A
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute; indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 25 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients
vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the
case before a court. Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the court
below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment of incremental
decisionmaking in favor of promulgation of broad standards . . . [that]
lack[] utility for the groups most affected by this decision." 644 F . 2d, at
183-184. Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the
case requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of an appropriate record . . . and without the benefit of analysis, argument or briefing'' on such issues. I d., at 186.
25
In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 26 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail. 27 I d., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the. unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical respects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2.
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable
care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an institution.
27
See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.
26

- - - - - - - - - - ----
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determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B

We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178.f(Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. Cf. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976). At the same time, this
standard is lower than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a state to
meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We think this requirement would place an undue burden on the administration of institutions such as
Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise
of professional judgment as to the needs of residents.
Moreover, we agree that respondent is entitled to minimally adequate training. In this case, the minimally adequate training required by the Constitution is such training
as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In
determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case
presenting a claim for training by a state-we emphasize that
courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the
federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institu-
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tions should be minimized. 28 Moreover, there certainly is no
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions.
See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish,
supra, 441 U. S., at 544 (Courts should not "'second-guess
the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed.'"). For these reasons, the decision, if made by
a professional, 29 is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a
28
See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U.S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C)ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emporer's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
29
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.
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substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. 30 In an action for damages against a professional in his
individual capacity, however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation,
good-faith immunity would bar liability. See note 12, supra.
IV
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has
the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may
not restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety
or to provide needed training. In this case, therefore, the
state is under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not
to provide training when training could significantly reduce
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.
30
All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's expert
testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not included in the
questions presented for certioari, and we have no reason to disagree with
the view that the evidence was admissible. It appears relevant to
whether petitioners' decisions were a substantial departure from accepted
professional practice.
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Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of confinement would comport fully with the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S.715,
738 (1972); seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the state
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal clay. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.
So ordered.
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DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
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APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training
or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child, with an I. Q. between 8 and 10. He
cannot talk and lacks the most basic self-care skills. Until he
was 26, respondent lived with his parents in Philadelphia.
But after the death of his father in May 1974, his mother was
'The American J?>ychiatric Associat}on explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' /. .. / is./ commonly vfrsed v to .,tefer vto t/'programs / forvthe
mentalli fetarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability
and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus
of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4, n. 1.

s
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unable to care for him. Within two weeks of the father's
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21-22 and 28-29. On June 11, 1974, the Court of
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable involuntary
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 § 4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him." App. 18.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility . Petitioner Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Petitioner
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent
lived. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, not medi2
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospita~,ue to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 an l 7. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amende complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
cal doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are
no longer at Pennhurst.
' Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
53-55.

• Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23.
6
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
7
Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated
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behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that pro·gram was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. I d., at 73--75. Finally, the jury was instructed that
only if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the serious medical [and psychological] needs" of Romeo
could they find that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights had been violated. I d., at 111-112. ll The jury rein programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and thex.,
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45. _j
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record 8~90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
' 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
10
The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101.
11
The "deliberate indifference" standard was adopted by this Court in
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with prisoners'
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turned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was
entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170. 12
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 13 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
rights to punishment that is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
Amendment. Although the District Court did not refer to Estelle v. Gamble in charging the jury, it erroneously used the deliberate-indifference
standard articulated in that case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45, 112.
12
The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.
40.
13
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173, n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer (\V. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172J
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"compelling necessity." Id., at 159-160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." I d., at 166-167 and 173. 14
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to ~ medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 15
"Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
" Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 16 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive lib- .
erty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See, ~
g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. 8. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 17 We must decide
facts of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d.,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
16
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process~
.. . " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
17
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 1fr-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
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whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
further decide whether they have been infringed in this cas~

7

A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 18 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (197$). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.
8
' Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary.
See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.

,,
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due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation," used in psychiatry,
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. As noted previously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and development of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Respondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45.
In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
2Q

19

Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is
made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Qourt of Appeals as
a ..t!:
d../for vfeversing vthe vtrial / court. ,/Given vthe/ uncertainty v6f
Pen s I nn· law. and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the
ow ~ Cleral courts, we decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S.
195, 200 (1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines,
164 u. s. 261, 264-265 (1896).
20
Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).
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297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is

institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all." I d. , at 486-487.
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will make possible
his release. And he does not argue that if he were still at
home, the State would have an obligation to provide training
at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals
that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims
training related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
safety and freedom from restraint, supra, at - - , training
may be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of
those rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite
uncertain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or
training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In his brief to this Court, Romeo indicates that
even the self-care programs he seeks are needed to reduce
his agressive behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at
21-22, 50. And in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent repeatedly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his
experts would show that additional training programs, including self-care programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's
agressive behavior. Petition for Certiorari 98-104. 22 If, as
" See, e. g., description of complaint at 2-3, supra.
22
See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for

-------------.
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seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to
safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not
present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded
person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has
some general constitutional right to training per se, eve!l2.. ~~
when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom. {t- J
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by re- spondent, observed:
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, --(Pet.
54).
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-beyond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatmeJlt"
that appropriately may be required for this respondent.~ '\}"In
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of
the record developed to date, we agree with his view and conclude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint. It In view of the
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of
record, we need go no further in this case. 2>€.- 2-5the Third Circuit, at 11-14, 20-21, and 24.
J;9 Chief Ju ge e1 z use the term "treatment" as synonyous with train't..~ng or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 181.
\7 )S it is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and formulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or
identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumstances of the case.
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state.

I

2.,)

v
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III
A
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute; indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence.~u.Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients
vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the
case before a c3:urt. Judge Aldisert, in his djssenting opini9n in the court
belqw V was LCritical vOf vthe V'_t'majority's ;ilbandonment vf>f Ji{cremental
djF,:isforT-ta~g in favor of pl®lulgation of broad standards . . . [that]
lack[] utility for the groups most affected by this decision. " 644 F. 2d, at
183-184. Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the
case requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of an appropriate record ... and without the benefit of analysis, argument or briefing" on such issues. I d. , at 186.
'2-- <, t<J In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
V necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment;4lt-? See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail~~ I d., at 599-600.
Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must oe determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
'111

V

.P'See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical respects from Jackson, a procedural due process case involving the validity
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor control his violence. Ante, at 2.
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable
c-l care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an institution:,]
7,- l -Psee also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979). In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing" evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate interests in confinement.

v

v?

v
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determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B
We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. Cf. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976). At the same time, this
standard is lower than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a state to
meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than~ ·
solute safety. We think this requirement would place any ndue burden on the administration of institutions sUcli as
Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise
of professional judgment as to the needs of residents.
Moreover, we agree that respondent is entitled to minimally adequate training. In this case, the minimally adequate training required by the Constitution is such training
as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In
determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case
presenting a claim for training by a state-we emphasize that
courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the
federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institu-
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minimized.'l ~,;t7'Moreover,

tions should be
there certainly is no
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions.
See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish,
supra, 441 U. S., at 544 (Courts should not "'second-guess
the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed."')'?'> For these reasons, the decision, if made by
a professional,~ 1s presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when the decision by the professional is such a

z.j

70
V

BSee Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal ~ with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes ~ v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & M tson ..TheInteraction of Law and Special Education: Observing the E or r's New
ilities 75
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental D
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
'! By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.

~0

v

;x:>

V
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substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgmen~In an action for damages against a professional in his
individual capacity, however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation,
good-faith immunity would bar liability. See note 12, supr~j

rJ

. /

V

IV
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has
the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may
not restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety
or to provide needed training. In this case, therefore, the
state is under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not
to provide training when training could significantly reduce
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.

'; l

v

l

~

t1v... r4..-r:J''s,'tt

;JAll members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's expert
testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not included in the
~ f
questions presented for certioari, and we have no reason to disagree with -.L.-~---t
_:.-+--IQ....L.
---'/
the view that the evidence was admissible. It a~ant to
whether petitioners' decisions were a substantial departure from ~WJeef'Jtiee..
~~~
~~--------~
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Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of confinement would comport fully with the purpose of respondent'~ommitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S.)p5,
738 uv72); seen. 27, ante. In determining whether the dtate
has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made by
the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption of
correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable institutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

So ordered.

~

~

G~~<!.-S ;
ll.t.w-

n.

Mt.LA

1-3

II>

To: The Chief Justice
Justice Brennan
Justice White
Justice Marshall
Justice Blackmun
Justice Rehnquist
Justice Stevens
Justice O'Connor

/~ .

2- 5.
cn-t.

~.

From:

Justice Powell

Circulated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Recirculated: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

6th DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 80-1429
DUANE YOUNGBERG, ETC., ET AL., PETITIONERS, v.
NICHOLAS ROMEO, AN INCOMPETENT, BY HIS
MOTHER AND NEXT FRIEND, PAULA ROMEO
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
[June - , 1982]

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented is whether respondent, involuntarily committed to a state institution for the mentally retarded, has substantive rights under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment .to (i) safe conditions of confinement; (ii) freedom from bodily restraints; and (iii) training or "habilitation." 1 Respondent sued under 42 U. S. C.
§ 1983 three administrators of the institution, claiming damages for the alleged breach of his constitutional rights.
I
Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded. Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an eighteen-month old child, with an I. Q. between 8 and 10. He
cannot talk and lacks the most basic self-care skills. Until he
was 26, respondent lived with his parents in Philadelphia.
But after the death of his father in May 1974, his mother was
'The American Psychiatric Association explains that "[t]he word 'habilitation,' . . . is commonly used to refer to programs for the mentallyretarded because mental retardation is ... a learning disability and training impairment rather than an illness. . . . [T]he principal focus of habilitation is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief of American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4, n. 1.
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unable to care for him. Within two weeks of the father's
death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly thereafter, she asked the Philadelphia County
Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility on
a permanent basis. Her petition to the court explained that
she was unable to care for Romeo or control his violence. 2
As part of the commitment process, Romeo was examined by
a physician and a psychologist. They both certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable to care for himself. App. 21-22 and 28r29. On June 11, 1974, the Court of
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital, pursuant to the applicable involuntary
commitment provision of the Pennsylvania Mental Health
and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 50 § 4406.
At Pennhurst, Romeo was injured on numerous occasions,
both by his own violence and by the reactions of other residents to him. Respondent's mother became concerned about
these injuries. After objecting to respondent's treatment
several times, she filed this complaint on November 4, 1976,
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania as his next friend. The complaint alleged
that "[d]uring the period July, 1974 to the present, plaintiff
has suffered injuries on at least sixty-three occasions." The
complaint originally sought damages and injunctive relief
from Pennhurst's director and two supervisors 3; it alleged
2
Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common Pleas stated: "Since my
husband's death I am unable to handle him. He becomes violent-Kicks,
punches, breaks glass; He can't speak-wants to express himself but can't.
He is [a] constant 24 hr. care. [W]ithout my husband I am unable to care
for him. " App. 18.
3
Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent of Pennhurst; he
had supervisory authority over the entire facility. Petitioner Richard
Matthews was the Director of Resident Life at Pennhurst. Petitioner
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which respondent
lived. According to respondent, petitioners are administrators, not medi-
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that these officials knew, or should have known, that Romeo
was suffering injuries and that they failed to institute appropriate preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter, in late 1976, Romeo was transferred from his
ward to the hospital for treatment of a broken arm. While in
the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he was physically restrained during portions of each day. 4 These restraints
were ordered by Dr. Gabroy, not a defendant here, to protect
Romeo and others in the hospital, some of whom were in traction or were being treated intravenously. 7 Record 40, 49,
76-78. Although respondent normally would have returned
to his ward when his arm healed, the parties to this litigation
agreed that he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law suit. 5 Record 248, 6 R. 57-58 and 137. Nevertheless, in December 1977, a second amended complaint was
filed alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine basis. The second
amended complaint also added a claim for damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to provide him
with appropriate "treatment or programs for his mental retardation." 5 All claims for injunctive relief were dropped
prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An eight-day jury trial was held in April1978. Petitioners
introduced evidence that respondent participated in several
programs teaching basic self-care skills. 7 A comprehensive
cal doctors. See Brief for Respondent 2. Youngberg and Matthews are
no longer at Pennhurst.
'Although the Court of Appeals described these restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms only, were generally used. 7 Record
5~55.
5

Respondent uses "treatment" as synonymous with "habilitation" or
"training." See Brief for Respondents 21-23.
6
Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1 (1981)
(remanded for further proceedings).
7
Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital ward, Romeo participated

..
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behavior-modification program was designed by staff members to reduce Romeo's aggressive behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because of his mother's objections. 9 Respondent introduced evidence of his injuries and
of conditions in his unit. 10
At the close of the trial, the court instructed the jury that
"if any or all of the defendants were aware of and failed to
take all reasonable steps to prevent repeated attacks upon
Nicholas Romeo," such failure deprived him of constitutional
rights. App. to Pet. for Cert. 110. The jury also was instructed that if the defendants shackled Romeo or denied him
treatment "as a punishment for filing this lawsuit," his constitutional rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment. ld., at 73-75. Finally, the jury was instructed that
only if they found the defendants "deliberately indifferent to
the serious medical [and psychological] needs" of Romeo
could they find that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights had been violated. I d., at 111-112. 11 The jury rein programs dealing with feeding, showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5 Record 44-56,
242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Some programs continued while respondent was in the hospital, 5
Record 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166, Record 32,34, 41-48, and they
reduced respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record 45.
8
2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203; Defendants' Exhibit
1, at 9. The program called for short periods of separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on plaintiffs hands for short periods of time,
i. e., 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
"1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
10
The District Judge refused to allow testimony by two of Romeo's witnesses-trained professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or different training programs. The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of treatment might be
relevant to a malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional claim
under § 1983. App. to Pet. for Cert. 101.
11
The "deliberate indifference" standard was adopted by this Court in
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976), a case dealing with prisoners'
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turned a verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was
entered.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,
reversed and remanded for a new trial. 644 F. 2d 147 (1980).
The court held that the Eighth Amendment, prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes, was not
an appropriate source for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed. Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment
and the liberty interest protected by that amendment provided the proper constitutional basis for these rights. In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the court found that the
involuntarily committed retain liberty interests in freedom of
movement and in personal security. These were "fundamental liberties" that can be limited only by an "overriding,
non-punitive" state interest. 644 F. 2d, at 157-158 (footnote
omitted). It further found that the involuntarily committed
have a liberty interest in habilitation designed to "treat"
their mental retardation. I d., at 164-170. 12
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the relevant
standard to be used in determining whether Romeo's rights
had been violated. 13 Because physical restraint "raises a
presumption of a punitive sanction," the majority of the
Court of Appeals concluded that it can be justified only by
rights to punishment that is not "cruel and unusual" under the Eighth
Amendment. Although the District Court did not refer to Estelle v. Gamble in charging the jury, it erroneously used the deliberate-indifference
standard articulated in that case. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 45, 112.
12
The Court of Appeals used "habilitation" and "treatment" as synonymous, though it regarded "habilitation" as more accurate in describing
treatment needed by the mentally retarded. See 644 F. 2d, at 165 and n.
40.
13
The existence of a qualified immunity defense was not at issue on appeal. The defendants had received instructions on this defense, App.
76a, and it was not challenged by respondent. 644 F. 2d, at 173, n. 1.
After citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U. S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v. Rhodes,
416 U. S. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of Appeals noted that such
instructions should be given again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.
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"compelling necessity." Id., at 159-160. A somewhat different standard was appropriate for the failure to provide for
a resident's safety. The majority considered that such a failure must be justified by a showing of "substantial necessity."
Id., at 164. Finally, the majority held that when treatment
has been administered, those responsible are liable only if the
treatment is not "acceptable in the light of present medical or
other scientific knowledge." Id., at 16&-167 and 173. 14
Chief Judge Seitz, concurring in the judgment, considered
the standards articulated by the majority as indistinguishable
from those applicable to medical malpractice claims. In
Chief Judge Seitz's view, the Constitution "only requires that
the courts make certain that professional judgment in fact
was exercised." 644 F. 2d, at 178. He concluded that the
appropriate standard was whether the defendants' conduct
was "such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice or standards in the care and treatment of
this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the defendants did not
base their conduct on a professional judgment." 644 F. 2d,
at 178. 15
14
Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment claim into three categories and adopted three standards, but only the standard described in
text is at issue before this Court. The Court of Appeals also stated that if
a jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may hold the institution's administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of treatment, 644 F . 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does
not discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not appear to be
relevant to the facts of this case. In addition, the court considered "least
intrusive" analysis appropriate to justify severe intrusions on individual
dignity, such as permanent physical alteration or surgical intervention, id.,
at 165-166, and 173, but respondent concedes that this issue is not present
in this case.
15
Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, but wrote separately
to emphasize the nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge. On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert thought
that the court erred in abandoning the common-law method of deciding the
case at bar rather than articulating broad principles unconnected with the
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We granted the petition for certiorari because of the importance of the question presented to the administration of
state institutions for the mentally retarded. 451 U. S. 982
(1981).
II
We consider here for the first time the substantive rights
of involuntarily-committed mentally retarded persons under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 16 In this
case, respondent has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he does not challenge the commitment.
Rather, he argues that he has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in safety, freedom of movement, and training
within the institution; and that petitioners infringed these
rights by failing to provide constitutionally required conditions of confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under
proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment. See,
e. g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491-494 (1980). Indeed,
the state concedes that respondent has a right to adequate
food, shelter, clothing, and medical care. 17 We must decide
facts of the case an,1 of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182-183. And,
on a pragmatic leve., Judge Aldisert warned that neither juries nor those
administering state institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous constitutional law tenets" articulated in the majority opinion. I d.,
at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion, and wrote separately to criticize the majority for addressing issues not raised by the facts
of this case. 644 F. 2d, at 186.
16
In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a State cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... " U. S. Const., Amend. XIV, § 1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as a direct
source of constitutional rights. See Brief for Respondent 13 n. 12.
17
Brief for Petitioners 8, 11, 12 and n. 10; Brief for Respondent 15-16.
See also Brief for Connecticut and Twenty Other States as Amici Curiae 8.
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whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement, and training. If such interests do exist, we must
further decide whether they have been infringed in this case.

A
Respondent's first two claims involve liberty interests recognized by prior decisions of this Court, interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not extinguish. 18 The
first is a claim to safe conditions. In the past, this Court has
noted that the right to personal security constitutes an "historic liberty interest" protected substantively by the Due
Process Clause. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U. S. 651, 673
(1977). And that right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for penal purposes. See Hutto v. Finney, 437
U. S. 678 (1978). If it is cruel and unusual punishment to
hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who
may not be punished at all-in unsafe conditions.
Next, respondent claims a right to freedom from bodily restraint. In other contexts, the existence of such an interest
is clear in the prior decisions of this Court. Indeed, "[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from
arbitrary governmental action." Greenholtz v. Nebraska
Penal Inmates, 442 U. S. 1, 18 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This interest survives criminal conviction and incarceration.
Similarly, it must also survive involuntary
commitment.
B
Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling. In his
words, he asserts a "constitutional right to minimally adequate habilitation." Brief, 8, 23, 45. This is a substantive
Petitioners argue that they have fully protected these interests.
8
' Petitioners do not appear to argue to the contrary.
See Brief for Petitioners 27-31.

-----··-------
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due process claim that is said to be grounded in the liberty
component of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 19 The term "habilitation," used in psychiatry,
is not defined precisely or consistently in the opinions below
or in the briefs of the parties or the amici. 20 As noted previously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and development of needed skills." Respondent emphasizes that the
right he asserts is for "minimal" training, see Brief of Respondent at 34, and he would leave the type and extent of
training to be determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of
present medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45.
In addressing the asserted right to training, we start from
established principles. As a general matter, a State is under
no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for
those within its border. See, Harris v. McRae, 448 U. S.
9
' Respondent also argues that he was committed for care and treatment
under state law, and that he therefore has a state substantive right to
habilitation entitled to substantive, not procedural, protection under the
Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. But this argument is
made for the first time in respondent's brief to this Court. It was not advanced in the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of Appeals as
a ground for reversing the trial court. Given the uncertainty of Pennsylvania law and the lack of any guidance on this issue from the lower federal
courts, w~ decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U. S. 321, 323 n. 1 (1977); Duignan v. United States, 274 U. S. 195, 200
(1927); Old Jordan Milling Co. v. Societe Anonyme des Mines, 164 U. S.
261, 264-265 (1896).
20
Professionals in the habilitation of the mentally retarded disagree
strongly on the question whether effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded individuals is even possible. See, e. g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation: How Can We
Identify Them and How Can We Change Them?, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational
Search for the Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 45 (1981); Kauffman &
Krouse, The Cult of Educability: Searching for the Substance of Things
Hoped for; The Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities 53 (1981).
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297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
U. S. 464, 469 (1977) (medical treatment). When a person is
institutionalized-and wholly dependent on the State-it is
conceded by petitioner that a duty to provide certain services
and care does exist, although even then a State necessarily
has considerable discretion in determining the nature and
scope of its responsibilities. See Richardson v. Belcher, 404
U. S. 78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S.
471, 478 (1970). Nor must a State "choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all." Id., at 486--487.
Respondent, in light of the severe character of his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will make possible
his release. And he does not argue that if he were still at
home, the State would have an obligation to provide training
at its expense. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. The record reveals
that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety and a minimum of physical restraint, and respondent clearly claims
training related to these needs. 21 As we have recognized
that there is a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
safety and freedom from restraint, supra, at - - , training
may be necessary to avoid unconsititutional infringement of
those rights. On the basis of the record before us, it is quite
uncertain whether respondent seeks any "habilitation" or
training unrelated to safety and freedom from bodily restraints. In his brief to this Court, Romeo indicates that
even the self-care programs he seeks are needed to reduce
his agressive behavior. See Reply Brief of Respondent at
21-22, 50. And in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent repeatedly indicated that, if allowed to testify, his
experts would show that additional training programs, including self-care programs, were needed to reduce Romeo's
agressive behavior. Petition for Certiorari 98-104. 22 If, as
See, e. g., description of complaint at 2-3, supra.
See also Resondent's Brief, as Appellant, to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit, at 11-14, 20-21, and 24.
21

22
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seems the case, respondent seeks only training related to
safety and freedom from restraints, this case does not
present the difficult question whether a mentally retarded
person, involuntarily committed to a state institution, has
some general constitutional right to training per se, even
when no type or amount of training would lead to freedom. 23
Chief Judge Seitz, in language apparently adopted by respondent, observed:
"I believe that the plaintiff has a constitutional right to
minimally adequate care and treatment. The existence
of a constitutional right to care and treatment is no
longer a novel legal proposition." 644 F. 2d, - - (Pet.
54).
Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-beyond the right to reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint-the "minimally adequate care and treatment"
that appropriately may be required for this respondent. 24 In
the circumstances presented by this case, and on the basis of
the record developed to date, we agree with his view and conclude that respondent's liberty interests require the State to
provide minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure
safety and freedom from undue restraint. In view of the
kinds of treatment sought by respondent and the evidence of
record, we need go no further in this case. 25
23
In the trial court, respondent asserted that "state officials at a state
mental hospital have a duty to provide residents ... with such treatment
as will afford them a reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those
life skills necessary to cope as effectively as their capacities permit." App.
to Pet. for Cert. 94-95. But this claim to a sweeping per se right was
dropped thereafter. In his brief to this Court, respondent does not repeat
it and, at oral argument, respondent's counsel explicitly disavowed any
claim that respondent is constitutionally entitled to such treatment as
would enable him "to achieve his maximum potential." Tr. of Oral Arg.
46--48.
24
Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as synonyous with training or habilitation. See 644 F. 2d, at 181.
25
It is not feasible, as is evident from the variety of language and for-
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III
A
We have established that Romeo retains liberty interests
in safety and freedom from bodily restraint. Yet these interests are not absolute; indeed to some extent they are in
conflict. In operating an institution such as Pennhurst,
there are occasions in which it is necessary for the State to
restrain the movement of residents-for example, to protect
them as well as others from violence. 26 Similar restraints
may also be appropriate in a training program. And an institution cannot protect its residents from all danger of violence
if it is to permit them to have any freedom of movement.
The question then is not simply whether a liberty interest has
been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the restraint or lack of absolute safety is such as to violate due
process.
In determining whether a substantive right protected by
mulations in the opinions below and the various briefs here, to define or
identify the type of training that may be required in every case. A court
properly may start with the generalization that there is a right to minimally adequate training. The basic requirement of adequacy, in terms
more familiar to courts, may be stated as that training which is reasonable
in light of identifiable liberty interests and the circumst~ ces of the case.
A federal court, of course, must identify a constitutional predicate for the
imposition of any affirmative duty on a state.
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded patients
vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts and circumstances of the
case before a court. Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the court
below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment of incremental decisionmaking in favor of promulgation of broad standards . . . [that] lack[] utility
for the groups most affected by this decision." 644 F. 2d, at 183-184.
Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the case requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of an
appropriate record . . . and without the benefit of analysis, argument or
briefing" on such issues. I d., at 186.
2<l In Romeo's case, there can be no question that physical restraint was
necessary at times. See n. 2, supra.
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the Due Process Clause has been violated, it is necessary to
balance "the liberty of the individual" and "the demands of an
organized society." Poe v. Ullman, 367 U. S. 497, 522, 542
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In seeking this balance in
other cases, the Court has weighed the individual's interest
in liberty against the State's asserted reasons for restraining
individual liberty. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520 (1979),
for example, we considered a challenge to pre-trial detainees'
confinement conditions. We agreed that the detainees, not
yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But we upheld those restrictions on liberty that were reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and not tantamount to punishment. 27 See id., at 539. We have taken a
similar approach in deciding procedural due-process challenges to civil commitment proceedings. In Parham v.
J.R., 442 U. S. 584 (1979), for example, we considered a challenge to state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental consent. In determining that procedural due process
did not mandate an adversarisal hearing, we weighed the liberty interest of the individual against the legitimate interests
of the State, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
additional procedures would entail. 28 I d., at 599-600.
27
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715, 738 (1972) (holding that an
incompetent pre-trial detainee cannot, after a competency hearing, be held
indefinitely without either criminal process or civil commitment; due process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the nature and
duration of commitment and its purpose). This case differs in critical respects from Jackson , a procedural due process case involving the validity
of an involuntary commitment. Here, petitioner was committed by a
court on petition of his mother who averred that in view of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor control his violence. A nte, at 2.
Thus, the purpose of petitioner's commitment was to provide reasonable
care and safety, conditions not available to him outside of an institution.
2Jl See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U. S. 418 (1979).
In that case, we
held that the state must prove the need for commitment by "clear and convincing'' evidence. See id., at 431-432. We reached this decision by
weighing the individual's liberty interest against the state's legitimate in-
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Accordingly, whether respondent's constitutional rights
have been violated must be determined by balancing his liberty interests against the relevant state interests. If there
is to be any uniformity in protecting these interests, this balancing cannot be left to the unguided discretion of a judge or
jury. We therefore turn to consider the proper standard for
determining whether a State adequately has protected the
rights of the involuntarily-committed mentally retarded.
B

We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance
between the legitimate interests of the State and the rights
of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of
safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. He would
have held that "the Constitution only requires that the courts
make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been
made." 644 F. 2d, at 178. Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment
and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to punish. Cf. Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U. S. 97, 104 (1976). At the same time, this
standard is lower than the "compelling" or "substantial" necessity tests the Court of Appeals would require a state to
meet to justify use of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety. We think this requirement would place an
undue burden on the administration of institutions such as
Pennhurst and also would restrict unnecessarily the exercise
of professional judgment as to the needs of residents.
Moreover, we agree that respondent is entitled to minimally adequate training. In this case, the minimally adequate training required by the Constitution is such training
terests in confinement.
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as may be reasonable in light of respondent's liberty interests
in safety and freedom from unreasonable restraints. In
determining what is "reasonable"-in this and in any case
presenting a claim for training by a state-we emphasize that
courts must show deference to the judgment exercised by a
qualified professional. By so limiting judicial review of challenges to conditions in state institutions, interference by the
federal judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions should be minimized. 29 Moreover, there certainly is no
reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making such decisions.
See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U. S. 584, 607 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish,
supra, 441 U. S., at 544 (Courts should not '"second-guess
the expert administrators on matters on which they are better informed.'"). For these reasons, the decision, if made by
a professional, 30 is presumptively valid; liability may be im29

See Parham v. J.R., supra, 442 U. S., at 608 n. 16 (In limiting judicial
review of medical decisions made by professionals, "it is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to deal with difficult
social problems."). See also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U. S. 337, - (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials
are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing
sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function
in the criminal justice system .... "); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U. S. 520, 539
(1979) (In context of conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees,
"courts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to them must reflect that fact rather
than a court's idea of how best to operate a detention facility."); Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U. S. 539, 556 (1974) (In considering procedural due process claim in context of prison, "there must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application."). See also Townsend & Mattson, The
Interaction of Law and Special Education: Observing the Emperor's New
Clothes, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities 75
(1981) (judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have adverse as
well as positive effects on social change).
30
By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person competent,
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posed only when the decision by the professional is such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a judgment. 3' In an action for damages against a professional in his
individual capacity, however, the professional will not be liable if he was unable to satisfy his normal professional standards because of budgetary constraints; in such a situation,
good-faith immunity would bar liability. See note 12, supra.
IV
In deciding this case, we have weighed those post-commitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against legitimate state interests and in light of the constraints under
which most state institutions necessarily operate. We repeat that the state concedes a duty to provide adequate food,
shelter, clothing and medical care. These are the essentials
of the care that the state must provide. The state also has
the unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all
residents and personnel within the institution. And it may
not restrain residents except when and to the extent professional judgment deems this necessary to assure such safety
whether by education, training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue. Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate training
in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or the care and training of
the retarded. Of course, day-to-day decisions regarding care-including
decisions that must be made without delay-necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training but who are subject
to the supervision of qualified persons.
31
All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's expert
testimony should have been admitted. This issue was not included in the
questions presented for certioari, and we have no reason to disagree with
the view that the evidence was admissible. It may be relevant to whether
petitioners' decisions were a substantial departure from the requisite professional judgment. See Part III B, supra.
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or to provide needed training. In this case, therefore, the
state is under a duty to provide respondent with such training as an appropriate professional would consider reasonable
to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function
free from bodily restraints. It may well be unreasonable not
to provide training when training could significantly reduce
the need for restraints or the likelihood of violence.
Respondent thus enjoys constitutionally protected interests in conditions of reasonable care and safety, reasonably
non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training as
may be required by these interests. Such conditions of confinement would comport fully with the purpose of respondent's commitment. Cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U. S. 715,
738 (1972); see n. 27, ante. In determining whether the
state has met its obligations in these respects, decisions made
by the appropriate professional are entitled to a presumption
of correctness. Such a presumption is necessary to enable
institutions of this type-often, unfortunately, overcrowded
and understaffed-to continue to function. A single professional may have to make decisions with respect to a number
of residents with widely varying needs and problems in the
course of a normal day. The administrators, and particularly professional personnel, should not be required to make
each decision in the shadow of an action for damages.
In this case, we conclude that the jury was erroneously instructed on the assumption that the proper standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand for
further proceedings consistent with this decision.

So ordered.
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Footnote continued on next page.
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[his] capacities permit." Appendix to
Petition for Certiorari 94a-95a.
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to instruct the jury that Romeo had a right to treatment
"under the least restrictive conditions consistent with
the purpose of the commitment." Id., at 95a.
12 The existence of a qualified immunity defense
was not at issue on appeal.
The defendants had received
an instruction on this defense, J.A. 76a, and it was not
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After
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Footnote continued on next page.
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The court's m-ajority opinion began its analysis
of this issue by stating that involuntary civil commitment
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty."
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regarding the possibility of immunity with the
caveat that the defendants' reasonable belief is
to be judged at the time their actions wre
taken.
The jury should further be charged that
the
defendants
are
not
responsible
for
unfor seeable developments in the law."
6 4 4 F.
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~
Despite the-uncontroverted evidence in this record of
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legitimate reason for Romeo's commitment,
relying on
findings in another case.
Id., n. 18 (citing Halderman v.
Pennhurst State School & HOspital, 613 F. 2d,
, 91
(19
) , subsequently reversed and remanded,
u.s.
(19--). The court t~ stated that "[t]he absence of any
dangerousness
to others only strenthens
the
state's
obligation to provide treatment to such non-threatening
individuals once the state undertakes to confine them."
Ibid.

11.

"acceptable

in

light

of

a

medical

!d., at 166-167 & 173.

scientific knowledge."
considered

present

third

treatment

standard

or

other

The court

appropriate

to

justify severe intrusions on individual dignity, such as
permanent

physical

l}n.~-~
!-

~.~
~~-~
L'.J.. ~1./.-

p-7

LJ_ _
t.v-.r-

,

appropriate

~

~~ .

~~~

here

for

the

surgical

intervention.

.1\

Judge

considered

Seitz,

the

reasons

~~demand

~h

writing

for

a

minority

standards articulated by

indistingj uishable

from

such

!d., at 165-166, & 173.

justification of shackling.

pv4 ,.pfu£~ /1

~~~

or

noted that "least restrictive analysis" would be

~
""""" I"W#

alteration

medical

of

four,

the majority as

malpractice

in

many

respects.

In Judge Seitz' view, the Constitutiton "only

requires

that the courts make certain that professional

judgment

in

fact was exercised."

appropriate standard was whether
was

"such

professional

a

substantial

judgment,

He concluded that the
the defendents'

departure

from

conduct
accepted

practice or standards in the care

and treatment of this plaintiff as to demonstrate that the
defendants did

not

base

their conduct on a professional

judgment."
We granted the petition for certiorari because of

12.

the

importance

of

the

question

presented

to

the

admin 'tration of state institutions for the involuntarily
committed.

J

We now reverse.

;::~
~

II

,~

We consider here for the first time the substantive

rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth
Amendment 14 to the Constitution. 15
respondent

has

been

committed

In the case at bar,

pursuant

to

the

laws of

~~u c lZt., ;,.,....,f-.

Pennsylvania,

and

he

does

not

c~ti-t at ttma lrty of tl:lese pt ucedt:J: r-es.

th.a.t ·

Penn5ilyl~

necessar:¥.

whether,

The

under

-er..r ~...
n...._.-f. i. J.un
. ......d;i~

~I\

question

challenge

Nor aoes l:l e-oa::argue
l:li ._

res:t'It#ent

the Due Process Clause,

the

-eofMT!"i'tment
present~

is

petitioners have

14 under that A mendment, a state cannot deprive
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law .... "

U.S. Canst., Amend. XIV, §1.

~

f

13.

infringed a post-commitment liberty interest by failing to
provide

constitutionally

conditions

adequate

of

confinement.

A

Respondent's

commitment

proceeding

did

~

not

deprivef him of all liberty interest.

See, e.g., Vitek v.

Jones,

And the conditions

445 U.S.

480,

491-494

(1980).

under which respondent is confined in a state institution
implicate the entirety of his remaining liberty interest.
The

question

determine

whether

infringe
should

therefore

that

becomes ~y what

conditions

residuum

of

at

standard

Pennhurst

liberty

of

do we

inpermissibly

which

respondent

~

be deprived.

~r

1

~

Due process represents the balance wMeh we, as a
nation, have sruck between "the liberty of the individual"
and "the demands of an organized society."
367
In

u.s.

497,

seeking

Court

has

522,

this

542

balance

weighed

the

(1961)
in

Poe v. Ullman,

(Harlan, J.,

somewhat

individual's

similar
interest

dissenting).
cases,
in

the

liberty

14.

against

the

Wolfish,

restraints

u.s.

441

considered

on

520,

not

yet

punished.

J1.w/-

w~h

objectives

upheld

reasonably
not

incompetent

competency

for

Bell

v.

example,

we

pre-trial

of .c at'l7'

those

related

detainees'

u.s.

be

~ ~ ;.tt..ul

~

to

)

crime -4 could

restrictions
to

tantamount

pre-trial

hearing,

In

We agreed that the detainees,

Jackson v. Indiana, 406
an

(1979),

to

convicted

we

and

action.

~

~

But

were

539

challenge

a

confinement conditions.
~

state

not

on

legitimate

be

liberty

government

punishment.

And

in

713, 738 (1972), we held that
detainee

held ~

could

,~ "" r·~tt

fer ever

not,

after

'1.

without

a

either

criminal process or civil commitment . ~ca1o1ee .:que process
requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the
nature

and

duration

of

commitment

tA...

~

and

purpose

~

\

coouni Llfteftt.

(1979)

(in

commitment,

See

also Addington

determining

burden

v.

Texas,
of

441

proof

u.s.
in

418

civil

individual's liberty interest weighed against

legitimate state interests in confinement).
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), provides
specific

guidance.

There

we

considered

a

more

challenge

to

state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental

15.

consent.

In determining that

I~, f
16
not mandate an adver sari sal hearing,
we ~ eee e&e Court

~ j;

has

1:::1tM~Irt'~~"'t! ~~

state procedures are
1.

n teres t

~

fal8l'e9PB~ in

~ ~k.GI--6--

adequate ~ ORQQ

hfh_*~c:-~~i1 ' ol"t-,. . !.;lofl'l-~1"1 1. . . _~-t"'i c" •.,.nC1 1f1
'CI. ....

.....

-,;:.l <:: ~

~ <:: .IT\..

determining whether

I:' .L C'U

a

Bro~t- ah J..e

liberty

••

"'First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the
risk
of
an erroneous
deprivation of
such
interest through the procedures used, and the
probable
value,
if
any,
of
additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and fin ally,
the
Government's
interest,
including
the
function
involved
and
the
fiscal
and
administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.'
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976),
quoted
in Smith v.
Organization of Foster
Families, 431 u.s. 816, 848-849 (1977) ." !d., at
599-600.
--

factors

are determinative in cases identifying the

scope of procedural protection to be afforded a liberty or
property

interest

Fourteenth

under

Amendme~~17 ~

the

Due

Process

Clause

of

the

In the case at bar, the question

16 under the Georgia statute, the proceeding began
with an application for admission signed by the parent.
The super in tend en t of a hospital was then authorized to
admit a minor for "observation and diagnosis." If, after
observation, the superintendent found "evidence of mental
illness" and that the child was "suitable for treatment"
in the hospital, the child could be admitted "for such
period and under such conditions as may be authorized by
law."
442 u.s., at 588 n. 5.
In Parham, the Court
sustained the statute.

· s ..__..the . _precis.e

extent

of

substantive

protection

accorded in the context of a state institution.
conclude

that

the

balance

to

be

achieved

in

\ situations _is not dissimilar.
The
Mathews

v.

Parham

factors

Eldridge,

initially

applied

in

a-~~~
u.s. 3{9: - 33S (1976) '1\ --w ~~

424

..---.---

were

-

..

de~-wrr~~~~rocedural due process had been

'
by the failure to provide an adjud•catory
hearing
the cessation of certain social security payments under a
program administered by both state and federal
The Court began by noting that, as in the case at bar,
agreed

that

the

plaintiff

protected by due process.

had

asserted

an

The dispute was over the

of procedural due process protection appropriate.

In the

/

case at bar, ,Romeo also has asserted a protected interest
.1'
/

tho~~

dispute is over the degree of substantive du

process protection apprfrpriate.

state's procedures properly balance the liberty interest

{\

\}

_M_o_n_t_r_y_m_,--4-4-3-~

(1979).

_..6

individual against the legitimate interests of the

~

~eJal ~present
ubstantive

protection

interest

wh~n

)

to

in .an

the

the question is the degree of
be

accorded

institutional

state's

fiscal

I~ 1n
· d'1v1·d ua 1' s
an
In

settinf.

and

both

administrative

constraints must be balanced against the interests of the
individual.
state,

.-(

The imposition of additional burdens on the

whether

substantive

or

procedural,

should

be

justified by the incremental benefit to the individual.
In

determining

the

degree

of

protection

accorded respondent's liberty interestJ m

~ t9 il-<l ,

medical

provide,
programs,

the

interest
care,

in decent,

which

incremental

training,

or

the

adequate food,
state

agrees

of

activities,

additional

and

the

the

shelter,

it

~
~e

be

~=t:iteP!""aHde 'fr""

we therefore consider the following • ~ :

individual's
and

to

should

comforts,

government's

legitimate fiscal and administrative concerns.
In considering these factors, it must be remembered

does not extend a federal constitutional right

~-1'~~vP~ LA.-a-~~ ~
t:..~, AA- ;,._ J2~.

~
18.

is in a state institution turn medical malpractice
into a constitutional violation.

u.s.

97'

Constitution

106
for

(1976).

A

See Estelle v. Gamble,

the

appropriate

need

to

issues

reserve

the

especially

is

compelling in the context of a challenge to conditions at
a facility such as Pennhurst.
cannot

direct

day-to-day

Constitutional principles

administration

of

H.- ~ ~~
institution operating within • filted" bu~.

a

large

~ ~···ilei/;
~/L

~'*'d ...... tfa••.l

~- ...$
18 See , e • g ., Parham v • J • R • , 4 4 2 U • S • 58 4 , 6 0 8 n • 16
(1979) (In limiting judicial review of medical decisions
made by professionals:
"it is incumbent on courts to
design procedures that protect the rights of individuals
without unduly burdening the legitimate efforts to the
states to deal with difficult soc\16 problems); Bell v.
Wolfish,
441 U.S.
520,
539
(1979)
(In context of
conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees:
"Courts
must
be
mindful
that
these
inquiries
spring
from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to
them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of
how best to operate a detention facility); Wolf v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974)
(in considering
procedural due process claim in context of prison: "there
must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution of
general application"); Procunier v. Marttinez, 416 u.s.
396, 404-405,406 (1974) (" [T]he problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the
point, they are not readily susceptible to resolution by
degree.
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning,
and the commitment of resources, all of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive branches of the government.")

' ~-' :kls ~~~

19.

~ ~ ~4v ~ Plu.c.,~-P'~I- ,g,

J.;..~~r~~~~~
~~~~-~~

(_?

B
(

Respondent has a strong interest in conditions at
Pennhurst.

He

is

totally dependent on

the

institution,

a~ s treatment of him will determine the quality of his
life.

Respondent

would,

of

course,

prefer

optimal

conditions, including, not only decent housing, food, and
medical care -- all of which the state agress should be
provided

but

rewarding
adequate

also

training,

recreational
food,

and

activities.

shelter,

and

medical

interesting
His

care

and

interest
and

in

treatment

decisions made by professionals is certainly strong.
interests

in

additional

activities

or

training,

His

though

strong, is less compelling.
The
allocate

state
among

has

limited

competing,

resources
worthwhile,

which

it

must

programs

and

institutions.

Respondent does not argue that the state is

obligated

accept

to

respondent concedes
him at a11. 19

responsibility
that

the

for

Romeo's

life;

state need not provide for

The state has a strong fiscal interest in
--~

Footnote (s)C::

wil~

appear on following pages.

20.

being
where

able
they

promising
would

to

can

individuals

survive

in

them optimal care

receive

standard

afford

is

at

private

imposed

responsibility for

on

such as

humane

Romeo a

conditions

and treatment,
institutions.

the

state

place

without

such as they
If

whenever

too-high
it

a

assumes

someone unable to survive on his own,

many states will be unwilling or unable to provide for all
those needing such care. 20
If

respondent

were

in

a

private

institution,

he

would be entitled to recover from respondents in a medical
malpractice action

if

~ ~7/f.C-41(,... ,flf!&.-,~••""<
fa:i~a to exercise reasonable

~~¥

/\

care in accordance with sound hospital practice to protect
the health and safety of their patients.
be entitled to

treatment

Respondent would

and conditions at the standard

generally considered appropriate by other administrators
of institutions for

the retarded.

See, e.g., Darling v.

19 Transcript of Oral Argument, at 33.
20 In the context of equal-protection challenges to
welfare classifications, we have recognzed that that the
Equal Protection Clause "does not requ'\re that a State
must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or
not attacking the problem at all....
It is enough that
the State's action be rationally based and free from
indivious discrimination."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397
u.s. 471, 486-487 (1970). See also Richardson v. Belcher,
404 u.s. 78, 83-84 (1971).

..-(..

21.

Charleston

Community Memorial

(1965), cert. denied 383
which would

use

Hospital,

u.s.

246

33

(1966).

Ill.

2d

This standard,

the Constitution to protect patients in

state institutions from ordinary torts, we reject
high:

it

326

would

interefere

administration

of

allocation

of

scarce

respondent

would

preference

cannot

state

the

with

institutions

resources

naturally
easily

by

prefer
be

and

states.
this

1

both

the

with

the

Although

standard,

distinguished

interests of others in a wide variety

as too

from

his
the

state services

and subsidies, not all of which can be provided.
We
Court,
low.

also

i.e.

reject

the

standard used by the District

the standard applicable to prisoners, as too

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u. S.

(1976), we held that

the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners are not infringed
unless there is deliberate indifference to serious medical
needness.

Prisoners

are,

of

course,

punished

by

being

confined under conditions which deprive them of much that
makes life worth while.

Provided that it is not "cruel

and unusual punishment," such confinement is not, however,
unconsitutional.

The

deliberate-indifference

standard

22.

identifies "cruel and unusual punishment"
of

a

medical-treatment

confinement

conditions

decision. 21

varied

with

cures were regar d e d as poss1. bl e. 22

in the context
In

the

the

extent

past,

to which

Today, at a minimum,

the incompetent should be treated humanely -- the state,
after committing these individuals without their consent,
cannot

be

indifferent

to

their

need

bare

byond

subsistence.
We think that the standard adopted by Judge Seitz
in his concurring opinion reflects a sensitive balance of

21 In a footnote, 429 u.s., at 96 n. 10, the court
cited four lower court decisions illustrating cruel and
unusual punishment. in the context of medical care:
"Williams v. Vincent, 508 F. ed 541 (CA2 1974) '
(doctor's
choosing
the
'easier
and
less
efficacious treatment' of throwing away the
prisoner's ear and stitching the stump may be
attributable to 'deliberate indifference
rather
than
an
exercise
of
professional
judgment')~ Thomas v. Pate, 493 F. 2d 151, 158
(CA7), cert. denied sub. nom. Thomas v. Cannon,
419 U.S. 879 (1974)
(injection of penicillin
with knowledge that prisoner was allergic, and
refusal of a doctor of treat allergic reaction)~
Jones v. Lockhart, 484 F. 2d 1192 (CA8 1973)
(refusal of paramedic to provide treatment) ~
Martinex v. Mancusi, 443 F. 2d 921 (CA2 1970)
(prison physician refuses to administer the
prescribed pain killer and renders leg surgery
unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand
despite contrary instructions of surgeon)."
22 see relevant history, comparing 18th,
centuries. To be filled in next week.

19th,

20th

23.

the

interests

of

the

involuntarily

committed

and

the

interests of Pennhurst and of the state of Pennsylvania.
Judge

Seitz

held

that,

to

those

accord

has

it

involuntarily committed substantive due process, the state
must place the involuntarily committed under the care of
professionals.
violated only

An

individual's constitutioal rights are

if professional

judgment is not,

in fact,

exercised in making a decision about his treatment or his
living conditions, including the need for constrahts.
the

fact

that

decision

a

departs

professional conduct--the malpractice

from

But

accepted

standard--will

~

uswally indicate a denial of constitutional rights.

not
Only

"\

if

the departure

is so substantial that

it demonstrates

that the challenged conduct was not actually based on a
professional

7.

?

violation.

judgment,
Although

will

there

~

mucR --b~fi.9r

be
than

a

constitutional

the

standard

of

malpractice, this standard is no more than that demanded
by

our

concept

of

"humane"

in

the

context

of

an

institution for the incompetent. 23

23 Brief note on how "living tradition" as limit on
substantive due process, quoting Harlan; citing Moore v.
Footnote continued on next page.

24.

This

standard should not be unduly burdensome on

institutions.

judg~ments

Professional

guessed by either courts or
not

provide

all

the

appears

to

commit

professionals, 24

juries and institutions need

treatment

institution would offer.

and

activities

a

private

As a general matter, Pennhurst

its

treatment
do

as

will not be second-

most,

and

care

decisions

if

not

all,

to

modern

institutions for the incomptent.
III

A

The state argues that, when a person is committed
to a state institution for care, by which it means decent
food,

shelter,

attention,
provided."
maintains
provide

clothing,

"it

is

sufficient

safety,

that

and medical
care

[such]

Brief of Petitioners at 12 & n. 10.
that

"both

there
care

City of Eastlake,
attitudes.

(

reasonable

is

and

and

no

additional

treatment

discussing

24 Footnote on expert
v. Chapman, etc.

testimony,

or

The state

obligation

forego

current

be

to

commitment.

standards

discretion,

and

Rhodes

)

entirely,

leaving

the

devices."

Id., at 12.

mentally

Although professionals

retarded

persons

process

is

committed

~··<-

~ ee~iiAQ.S

ffi

J\

when

individuals

.

that due

involuntarily

. 4A..,. ..'I'-JA 1

are ~~

institutions

AA-4 ....

own

all severely or profoundly

~

state

..~~

their

is possible, 25 we cannot hold

satisfied

to

to

in this field do not agree

~

that effective treatment of

disabled

alive,.

kept

~.......,- A -~l A.+« ..:¢«," .f
tha:n AI=IHlaR-e. We do

1-...&....t.- .,...A•• --t

e-~refl~-khat

ar-e.

;b€(!!S

.

+

no~w@ sugge;;;, that

the state has

arj obli;,tion

to

~~

provide optimal treatment and conditions 9 = it is sufficient
if

a

professional

~~

1\ treatment

Q£

makes

a-GHvity:
standar

a

judgment

~

....

should

w1ll

be

"

~k~
weet~er
a ce~ain
be

provided.

satisfied

7

u,rlo

~

~ ~

~.

25 Brief

illustration of

7

r#llf,.)' ·J: .

~~~~

variety

of

approaches

in

26.

the

Court

of

Appeals'

That

standard.

court

held

that

restraints can be justified only by "compelling necessity"
and if the "least restrictive" method of dealing with a
patient.

644

standard

proscribing

See

Brief

of

respondent
between

F.

2d,

"unnecessary

indicated

unnecessary

a

that

less

a

shackling."

oral

little

argument
difference

restraints

restrictive

would

alternative

be
were

Transcript of Oral Argument 55-56.

that

would

obtain

"Least restrictive means"

and

concepts

in

developed

infringing

classifications
freedoms.

is

prefers

at

But,

there

This standard appears
standard

custodial

18-21.

formulations;

if

R~ondent

160-161.

Respondent

these

available.

at

We

see

no

reason

appropriate standards for

to be even higher
in

a

than the

malpractice

action.

"compelling necessity" are
reviewing
express
to

legislative

First

assume

that

Amendment
they

are

judging decisions regarding the

proper care and treatment of the profoundly retarded in a
state institution.
The

Court

of

Appeals

also

held

that

for

severe

intrusions on personal liberty, such as permanent physical

27.

alterations
restrictive
would

by
means"

surgical
and

be appropriate.

intervention,

"compelling
In

their

the

necessity"

brief,

"least
standards

respondents

note

that this standard is not presented by the case at bar and
need not be addressed.

Brief of Respondent at 10-11.

We

agree.
Respondent
treatment

standard

does

support,

adopted

by

however,

the

general

the Court of Appeals:

the

involuntarily committed are entitled to treatment that is
"acceptable

of

scientic

644

present
F.

2d,

medical
at

173.

or

other

This

precisely the standard of medical malpractice; under
malpractice

would

become

a

constitutional

is
it,

violation

whenever the patient was is in a state institution for the
involuntarily committed.

For

the

reasons given earlier,

we consider such a standard too high.

26 The court also held that a failure to provide any
treatment requires a ·"compelling explanation." 644 F. 2d,
at 173.
Respondents do not appear to have addressed this
precise
standard
in
their
brief.
(Add
additional
information about their arguing that he received no
treatment and clarify this footnote - respondents assert
no separate standard for non-treatment situation.)

28.

c

Finally,
state

law,

respondent

argues

he was committed for

that,

as

a

matter

of

"care and treatment." 27

From this, he maintains that he has a state substantive
right entitled to substantive, not procedural, due process
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution.
created

To support the proposition that his state-

liberty interest

process protection,
U.S.

480,

488-89

539, 557-58

is entitled to substantive due

respondent cites Vitek v. Jones,

(1980)

and Wolf v. McDonnell,

445

418 U.S.

(1974), but these cases afford procedural due

process protection to state-created liberty interests.

27 Respondent did not raise state law as relevant
to this proceeding in any way prior to his brief to this
Court.
In his appellate brief, for example, he cited
neither any state statute nor any state case, even as
relevant to his federal rights under the Due Process
Clause.
See Respondent's Brief to the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. Moreover, state law is by no means
as clear as respondent suggests.
The statute itself is
ambiguous.
It provides that a judge may order commitment
"for care and treatment" after finding that the person is
"in need of care."
Pa. Stat. Annot. tit. 50, §4406 (b).
But such an order is apparently appropriate for any
individual in need of "care or treatment."
Pa. Stat.
Annot. tit. 50, §4406(a). The addition of "treatment" to
"care" in the description of the commitment order itself
may simply indicate that no additional procedure is
necessary prior to the provision of treatment as well as
care.

29.

Respondent
process.

When

has

a person

received
is

federal

procedural

due

involuntarily committed,

due

process requires a hearing to determine whether the facts,
as

shown

by clear

and

deprivation of liberty.
{1979).

Under

convincing

evidence,

warrant

the

Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418

Addington,

a

state

can

constitutionally

commit to provide necessary care or to protect others. 28

28 In Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418 {1979), the
Court considered the question of the appropriate standard
of proof and adopted the clear-and-convincing standard: it
did not expressly hold that only care or protection {not
treatment) would justify commitment.
But in
reaching
just the need for conclusion on the burden of proof, the
Court considered discussed the legitimate, conflicting
interests of the state and the individual whose commitment
is sought.
The commitment statute provided for commitment for an
individual's own "welfare and protection or the protection
of others."
Id., at 420 {quoting Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann.,
Art. -ss47-51
{Vernon
1958)).
The
state's
psychiatrists,
testifiying
as
experts,
stated
that
Addington needed hospitalization in order
to obtain
treatment
for
his mental
illness because he would
otherwise refuse treatment.
Addington contested neither
his mental illness nor his need for hospitalization to
secure treatment.
Instead, he attempted to show that
there was no substantial basis for concluding that he was
dangerous to himself or others. Id., at 421.
In considering the interestsrelevant to determining
the appropriate burden of proof, the Court recognized only
two state interests as legitimate: as parens patriae, the
state has a legitimate interest "in providing care to its
citizens who are unable •.. to care for themselves:" and,
in the exercise of police power, the state can "protect
the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who
are mentally ill." Although the Court did not explicitly
reject treatment as a
justification for
involuntary
commitment,
its remand for
further
proceedings when
Addington had conceded his illness and his need for
treatment in the state hospital suggests that the need for
treatment alone cannot justify involuntary commitment in
the absence of a finding that the individual is either
unable to care for himself or is dangerous to others.

30.

As

a

rna t ter

commitment
of

liberty

of

federal

procedual

due

process,

Romeo 1 s

itself did not deprive him unconstitutionally
because

his

commitment

was

justified,

as

respondent himself concedes, by his own need for care and
to protect others. 2 9
Whether
substantive

or

right

not

respondent

under

the

Due

has

a

post-cornrni trnent

Process

Clause

of

the

Fourteenth Amendment is a matter of federal constitutional
law

and

entirely

of

the

reasons

that may have motivated Pennsylvania during

the

earlier

cornrni trnent proceedings. 30

respondent
(1972}.
at

relies

distinct

on

from

Jackson

v.

and

independent

In arguing otherwise,
Indiana,

406

u.s.

715

There the Court stated that due process requires,

a minimum,

terms

and

conditions of

confinement

that

bear a rational relation to the purposes of confinement.

29 Add footnote on CA 1 s crazy finding of no danger
based on record in another case.
30 In the past,
this Court has indicated that
whether there is a federal substantive due process right
at all is an entirely different question from whether
there is a liberty interest for procedural due process
purposes.
See Srni th v. Org ani za tion of Foster Families,
431 u.s. 816, 842 n. 48 (1977} (recognition of a liberty
interest in foster families for purposes of procedural due
process would not necessarily require that such families
be
treated
as
biological families
for
purposes of
substantive due process under cases such as Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 u.s. 493 (1977}}.

31.

In Jackson,
need
that

for

however,

the Court was only considering the

a relationship between the one and only reason

justified

procedural

due

confinement
process

confinement.

procedural

due

Romeo
process,

those in his community.
of

course,

under

confined

for

a

matter

(temporary

competency to stand trial)
of

as

of

federal

confinement

pending

and the "terms and conditions"

could,
be

as

a

matter

of

federal

confined

solely

to

protect

See n. 1, supra.
care,

and

Respondent was,

possibly treatment, 31

the relevant Pennsylvania statute.

But respondent

is not asking for another procedure, in which Pennsylvania
would commit him solely because he is dangerous to others.

31 state law is not entirely clear.
Respondent's
argument
is
that
the
commitment
provision,
§4406,
authorizes commitment only for both care and treatment.
And under Jackson, continues respondent, he is therefore
entitled to treatment as well as care (conditions of
confinement must be reasonably related to purposes) •
It
is true that in In re Schmidt, 429 A. 2d 631 (Pa. 19801),
the court found a right to treatment under the Mental
Health and Retardation Act of 1966, tit. 50. § 4101, et
~·
But §4406, the involuntary commitment provision, was
not the source of this right.
Instead, the court relied
on other, more specific, statutory provisions and even
more detailed regulations implementing them. Id., at 632637
(section 4406 is mentioned only in the opening
paragraph in reporting an argument made by one of the
parties).
Of the other two cases cited by respondent,
neither addresses the meaning of §44406. The first, In re
Joyce Z., 4 Pa. D&C. 3rd 596. (Pa. Com. Pl. Ct. Allegheny
County 1969), deals with the rights of a child in a foster
home and the other, In re Guzman, 405 A. 2d 1036, 1038
(Commonwealth ct. 1979) appears to have reached its result
as
a matter
of
federal
constitutional
law without
construing §4406.

32.

And if he were given such a procedure, respondent would
not then argue that due process requires no more than that
he be kept behind high walls, since he was confined only
to

protect

Pennsylvania,

those

outside

Pennhurst.

Yet,

had

as a matter of state law, committed petr

solely to protect others, respondent's reading of Jackson
v.

Indiana would

federal

require

substantive

due

that

As

result.

process,

there

a matter of

is

no

reason

someone involuntarily committed to protect others should
receive

less

treatment

and

inferior

conditions

than

a

person committed only for his own care.
IV

p

-cONCLtJSION
r'

In'-""voluntary commitment nei ti fr
constitutionally-protected

libery

extinguishes all

nor

entitles

the

committed to the optimal care and conditions they would
receive in private institutions.
Clause

balances

committed

the

against

we

Instead, the Due Process

interests

of

legitimate

state

conclude

that

the

involuntarily

interests

the

and

the

involuntarily

33.

committed are entitled, at a minimum, to humane treatment:
adequate food, decent living conditions, and medical and

~

/treatment decisons made by professionals.

lfp/ss 03/27/82

Rider A, p. 18 (Romeo)

ROME018 SALLY-POW
Note to Mary:

I suggest moving the definition of

professionals (now n. 24, p. 22) to be keyed to the word
"professionals" in the "holding" sentence on page 18.
Also, what do you think of revising your draft of the note
to read along the following lines:

"By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a
person competent, whether by education, training or
experience, to make the particular decision at issue.
Long term treatment decisions normally should be made by
persons with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with
appropriate training in areas such as psychology, physical
therapy, or the care and training of the retarded.

Of

course, the day-to-day care - including immediate
decisions - necessarily will be made in many instances by
employees without formal training but who are subject to
the supervision of qualified persons."

£ .1-: tF.

meb 03/19/82

Draft No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo

The question presented
retarded

adult

is whether

respondent,

committed

to

involuntarily

a

a

state

institution, has a claim for damages against petitioners,
the

director

Respondent

and

two

brings

suit

supervisors
under

42

of

U.S.C.

the

institution.

§1983,

claiming

that the conditions of his confinement violate his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

I

Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded.
Although 33 years old, he has the mental capacity of an
eighteen-month old child.
most basic self-care skills.
lived

with

his

parents

in

He cannot talk and lacks

the

Until he was 26, respondent
Philadelphia.

But

after

the

death of his father in May of 1974, his mother was unable

2.

to control his violence.

Within two weeks of the father's

death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly

thereafter,

she

asked

the

Philadelphia

Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility
on a permanent basis.

Her petition to

that

to

she

was

. 1 ence. 1
v1o

examined

by

unable

care

for

the~urt

Romeo

or

explained

control

his

As part of the commitment process, Romeo was
a

physician

and

a

psychologist.

They

both

certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable
to care for himself.
29a.

Joint Appendix (J.A.} 2la-22a & 28a-

The

physician

destructive

behavior. 2

also

described

On July

11,

1974,

Romeo's
the

self-

Court of

Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State

1 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to
handle him.
He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't.
He is constant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable
to care for him." Joint Appendix (J.A. 18a}.
2

J. A. at 22A:

"Physican and mental findings at time of
examination:
Pt.
[patient]
is
nonverbalrestrained
in bed.
Recognizes examiner by
rolling his eyes and banging his head against
bedrail."

3.

School

Hospital,

pursuant

commitment

provision

to
of

applicable

the
the

Pennsylvania

Mental He lth and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann.

Pennhurst,

Romeo

was

injured

on

numerous

occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions
of other

i

to

him.

about these injuries.
treatment
best friend,
the

least

allegin~

present,

damages

director

became

concerned

After objecting about respondent's

and

that "[d]uring the period July, 1974

plaintiff

sixty-three

sought

Romeo

eral~e~:~~;:raint~

~r

to

Mrs.

has

occasions."

and
two

officials

knew,

or

suffering

injuries

suffered
The

injunctive

should
and

it

have

failed

complaint

relief

supervisors 3 ~

to

injuries

from

alleged

known,

that

institute

on

at

originally
Pennhurst's
that

these

Romeo

was

appropriate

preventive procedures, thus violating his rights under the

3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent
of Pennhurst~ he had supervisory authority over the entire
facility.
Respondent Richard Matthews was the Director of
Resident Life at Pennhurst.
Respondent Marguerite Conley
was Unit Director for the unit in which repondent was
incarcerated. Petitioners are administrators, not medical
doctors or psychologists.
Youngberg and Matthews are no
longer at Pennhurst.

4.

Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Thereafter,

in

late

1976,

from his ward to the hospital for
arm.
was

Romeo was

transfered

treatment of a broken

While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he
physically

These

restrained 4 during portions of each day.

restraints

defendant

here,

hospital,

some

treated

were
to

of

ordered

protect

whom were

intravenously.

7

R.

by

a

Romeo
in

Dr.
and

Gabroy,
others

traction or

40,

49,

76-78.

not
in

were

a
the

being

Although

respondent normally would have returned to his ward when

?

k~~~
his arm healed, the parties agreed that he should remain

"'

in the hospital due to the pending litigation.

5 R. 248,

6 R. 57-58 & 137.

Nevertheless, in December of 1977, a second amended
complaint - was

filed

alleging

that

the

defendants

were

restraining respondent for prolonged periods on a routine
basis. 5

The

second amended complaint added a claim for

4Although the Court of Appeals described these
restraints ~s "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms
only, were generally used. 7 Record -(R.) 53-55, 59. ~1-

5~

h e first amended complaint was fi fed in
January 1977, after respondent's hospitalization,}it ~
~
addd a.R¥~restraint-related
allegations.
Compare
jlfr iginal ~omplaint ,116 and /irst _)(mended _96mplaint ,[16
Footnote continued on next page.

'

5.

damages to compensate Romeo for the defendants' failure to
provide him with appropriate treatment throughout his stay
at

The

Pennhurst.

claims

for

injunctive

relief

were

dropped prior to trial because respondent is a member of
the class seeking such relief in another action. 6
An
1978.

eight-day

Petitioners

jury

trial

introduced

was

held

evidence

in

that

April

of

respondent

participated in several programs teaching basic self-care
skills. 7 A comprehensive behavior-modification program was
designed

by

staff

members

to

reduce

his

aggressive

behavior 8 , but that program was never implemented because
of his mother's objections. 9

(change related to safety claim, not use of restraints) •
6 Pennhurst
Halderman,
proceedings)--.

State

u.s.

School
(1981)

and
Hospital
v.
(remandedror further

7 Prior to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital
ward, Romeo participated in programs dealing with feeding,
showering, drying, dressing, attention, self control and
toilet training. Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 R. 69-70, 5 R.
44-56, 242-250, 6 R. 162-166; 7 R. 41-48.
Programming continued while respondent was in the
hospital, 5 R. 227, 248, 256; 6 R. 50, 162, R. 32,34, 4148, and this programming reduced respondent's aggressive
1
behavior, 7 R. 45.
Llo~~~
8 2 R. 7, 5 R. 88-90; 6 R. 88, 200-203; Defendants'
Exhibit 1, at 9~e program called for short periods of
separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on
plaintiff's hands for short periods of time (i.e., 15
minutes), to prevent him from ~ himself and
other1.
~
Footnote(s) 9 will appear on following pages.

~

,. Respondent

introduced

evidence

of

his

injuries

~~

and of conditions in his "unit," though the jna§e refused
to

allow

testimony of

two

experts

proffered . 10

he

The

trial judge explained that evidence of the advantages of
alternative

forms

of

treatment

might

be

relevant

to

a

malpractice suit, but was not relevant to a constitutional
claim under §1983.

Petn. App. 94a-95a.

~r-

At the close of the trial, the jndge instructed
the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware
of

and

failed

repeated
deprived
73a.

to

attacks
him

of

take
upon
his

all

reasonable

Nicholas

steps

Romeo,"

constitutional

rights.

to

such

prevent
failure

Petn.

App.

The jury also was instructed that if the defendants

shackled Romeo other than in a good faith effort to treat
him,

his

rights had been violated.

Ibid.

Finally,

the

9 1 R. 53; 4 R. 25; 6 R. 204.
"

c7

psycholog~

10 The first of these experts was a
Ct" --spo.oia-lcy
i-n. in treating the mentally retarded.
He
would have testified that Romeo could have been more
effectively treated under other programs and that the lack
of programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive
behavior.
Respondent's other expert was a physician with
a specialty in neurological pediatrics and the director of
a private institution for the mentally retarded. He would
have testified that residents at his private institution
as severely retarded as Romeo did not have similar
problems of aggression or injury.

7.

jury was instructed that if Romeo was denied treatment "as
a

punishment

were

for

filing

"deliberately

this lawsuit," or
to

indifferent

the

if defendants
medical

and

psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his constitutional
rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment.

Id., at

73a-75a.
The
on which
Appeals

jury returned a verdict for

judgment was entered.
for

the defendants,

On appeal,

the Third Circuit, sitting en bane,

the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
(1980).

vacated

644 F. 2d 147

All of the judges agreed that respondent's expert

testimony should have been admitted.
They

the Court of

also agreed

that

Id., at 164 & 173.

the Eighth Amendment,

prohibiting

cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes,
was

not

an

constitutional
Rather,
was

rights

respondent's

implicated

confined.

~
r~fereRCe

appropriate

by

of

the

Fourteenth
the

determining

involuntarily
Amendment

conditions

Id., at 156-59,

for

& 173.

under

the

committed.

liberty
which

he

right
was

The en bane court did

not, however, agree on the relevant standard to be used in
determining whether Romeo's

8.

violated.

11

The court's majority opinion began its analysis
of this issue by stating that involuntary civil commitment
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty."
(quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405

u.s.

Id., at 157

504, 509 (1972)).

a consequence )c. n6-ted the court' involuntary commitment

~~~~4AM'~~
c·

;tourt

·

·

~d

due

'\.

process

..

p.~<eteot

ion.

Ibid.

As

i.s-pThe

that commitment does not extinguish all

aspects of an individual's liberty interest; the power of
locomotion
security

without
and

restraint

freedom

from

and

the

punishment

right

to personal

are

fundamental

liberties that can be limited only by an overriding, nonpunitive state interest.
In

light

of

Romeo's three claims:
restraints;
(iii)

the

( i i)
right

644 F. 2d, at 157-159.

these

views,

the

court considered

(i) the right to be free of physical

the right to safety and protect ion;
to

treatment.

Id.,

at

159.

and

Because

11 The existence of a qualified immunity defense
was not at issue on appeal.
The defendants had received
instructions on this defense, J .A. 76a, and it was not
challenged by respondent.
644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l.
After
citing Pierson v. Rhodes, 386 u.s. 547 (1967) and Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), the majortiy of the Court
of :Kppeals noted that such instructions should be given
again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.

9.

physical

restraint

"raises

can

be

a

sanction,"

it

necessity.

Id., at 159-160.

presumption

justified

of

only

by

a

punitive

compelling

And the failure to provide

for a patient's safety must be justified by a showing of
substantial necessity.
The

court

three categories.
been

Id., at 160.
divided

If a

administered,

the

treatment

claim

into

jury finds that no treatment has
may

it

hold

the

institution's

administrators liable unless they can provide a compelling
explanation for the lack of treatment.
173.

If

some

treatment
~ ~

responsible

in

light

scientific knowledge."
considered

a

third

justify severe
permanent
noting

administered,

those

if

the

present

treatment
medical

Id., at 166-167 & 173.
treatment

standard

or

is

not

other

The court

appropriate

to

intrusions on individual dignity, such as

physical

that

appropriate.

of

been

.t..c.-

are'\ l i a b l e y

"acceptable

1

has

644 F. 2d at 165,

alteration

"least

or

surgical

restrictive

intervention,

analysis"

would

be

Id., at 165-166, & 173.

Chief Judge Seitz, writing for a minority of four,
considered

the

standards articulated

by

the majority as

l

• ,f/1.,(_ "'0

'7
~

10.

indistinguishable

from

~~/.<)
medical

malpractice

maO¥

1
~requires

In Judge Seitz' view, the Constitutiton "only
that the courts make certain that professional

judgment in fact was exercised."
concluded

644 F. 2d, at

He

that the appropriate standard was whether

the

defendents' conduct was "such a substantial departure from
accepted professional judgment, practice or standards in
the care and treatment of this plaintiff as to demonstrate
that

the

defendants

did

professional judgment."

not

base

their

conduct

on

a

644 F. 2d, at 178.

We granted the petition for certiorari because of
the

importance

of

the

question

presented

to

the

administration of state institutions for the involuntarily
committed.

u.s.

(198__).

We now reverse.

II

We consider here for the first time the substantive
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth
Amendment 12 to the Constitution. 13

In the case at bar,

Footnote(s) 12,13 will appear on following pages.

11.

respondent

has

Pennsylvania,
The

broad

Process

been

committed

and he does

question
Clause,

not challenge

presented

is

petitioners

liberty

commitment

pursuant

by

the

laws

of

the commitment.

whether,

have

interest

to

under

infringed
failing

the
a

to

Due

postprovide

constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement.
Respondent's commitment proceeding did not deprive
him

of

all

substantive

Fourteenth Amendment.
480'

491-494

respondent

becomes

by

conditions
residuum

of

the

See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445

u.s.

And

confined

liberty

remaining

under

(1980).

is

what
at

the

standard

of

interest

conditions

implicate

interest.

Pennhurst

liberty

liberty

the

The
do

which

entirety of
~

G,· Az~-· 1 SA

1i\

we

under

question

determine

inpermissibly

his

'

t'herefore
whether

infringe

that

which

Amendment
cannot deprive
"any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law •••. " U.S. Const., Amend. XIV, §1.
13 The respondent no longer relies on the Eighth
Amendment as a direct source of constitutional rights,
Brief of Respondent 13 n.l2 ("the Eighth Amendment applies
only in cases concerning punishment of persons convicted
of crimes").

12.

~--

Due process represents the balance wh>:io.h
"the

between
individual"

and

"the

demands

of

liberty

an

Court

has

against

weighed

the

individual's

restraints

441

considered

a

the

society."

(Harlan, J.,

In seeking this balance in other cases, the

the

Wolfish,

of

organized

Poe v. Ullman, 367 u.s. 497, 522, 542 (1961)
dissenting).

.W..e..,.___jLS

U.S.

on

520,

539

challenge

a

confinement conditions.

state

interest

action.

(1979),

to

in
In

for

liberty
Bell

v.

example,

we

pre-trial

detainees'

We agreed that the detainees, not

yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But

we

upheld

those

restrictions

on

liberty

that

were

reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and
not tantamount to punishment.

And in Jackson v. Indiana,

406 u.s. 713, 738 (1972), we held that an incompetent pretrial detainee could not, after a competency hearing, be
held indefinitely without either criminal process or civil
commitment;
rational

due

relation

process

requires,

between

commitment and its purpose.
4 41

u.S.

418

(1979)

the

at

nature

a
and

minimum,

some

duration

of

See also Addington v. Texas,

(in determining

burden of proof

in

13.

civil

commitment,

individual's

liberty

interest

weighed '

against legitimate state interests in confinement}.
Parham v. J.R., 442 u.s. 584 (1979}, provides

more

~k J.t-l-~~~
specific

guidance/\

There

we

considered

a

challenge

to

state procedures for commitment of a minor with parental
consent.
does

14

not

In

determining

mandate

an

that

adversarisal

e

hearing,

we

again

identified the factors 15 that this Court has considered in
determining

whether

state

procedures

are

adequate

to

protect a liberty interest:
"'First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action; second, the
risk
of
an
erroneous
deprivation of
such
interest through the procedures used, and the
probable
value,
if
any,
of
additional
or
substitute procedural safeguards, and finally,
the
Government's
interest,
including
the
function
involved
and
the
fiscal
and
administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute
procedural
requirement
would
entail.'" Id., at 599-600 (quoting Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976} (additional
c1tat1on omitted}.

14 under the Georgia statute, the proceeding began
with an application for admission signed by the parent.
The superintendent of a hospital was then authorized to
admit a minor for "observation and diagnosis."
If, after
observation, the superintendent found "evidence of mental
illness" and that the child was "suitable for treatment"
in the hospital, the child could be admitted "for such
period and under such conditions as may be authorized by
1a w• "
4 4 2 U • S . , at 5 8 8 n • 5 .
In Parham , the Co u r t
sustained the statute.
15 These factors were initially articulated in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 u.s. 319, 335 (1976}, a procedural due
process case.

< ~

14.

In this case,

the question is whether respondent's

substantive liberty interests are

~qu~telf} protected)(in

Pennhur st State School and Hospital.

~

the

factors

state's procedures

considered

also are relevant

federal

law,

~
fel
ie-ve")- hc;mover,

determining

t.~:>·t:.~k...

~;:t(~tt;'""""f ~.a...

Pf-GPO.r...l.¥-~alag,c~ ---tl:;}e--..l.;ib~C-rty

of-t'argo~ t'ae
~

in

We

_jnte.rest

legj timal:e4-ntereoto 91' Hto

in determining,

as a matter of

the constitutional adequacy of the state's

substantive protection of federal liberty interests. 16

16Respondent
also
argues
that
the
commitment statute provides a state-law basis for hi
·~ federal substantive right.
He maintains thaca:,~~~~~~::t;:r/..~~
e was commmitted for care and treatmen
~ · and he there o~e has a state substantive right entitled to
~
substantive, not just prqcedural, protection under the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. Initially, we
note that this argument is made for the first time
----respondent ' s br i e f to this Cou r t ; (R:Q::::a:i:G:::l:i:Gl~~:t=s:e:==-@fa~-l '-/- ~
l~~~~~~~~~~Y'~~~~~~~~~~~~

~

Respondent relies primarily on Jackson v. Indiana, 406
_ J . _
,
u.s. 715 (1972). There, the Court stated that due process ~
requires,
at
a
minimum,
terms
and
conditions of
confinement that bear some rational relation to the
purposes of confinement.
In Jackson, however, the Court
was considering only the need for a relationship between
the single reason justifying confinement as a matter of
federal law--temporary confinement pending competency to
stand
trial--and
the
"terms
and
conditions"
of
confinement. Romeo could, as a matter of federal law, be
confined to protect others. See text and notes at n. 1 &
n. 2, supra; Addington v Texas, 441 U.S. 418, ___ (1979);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 u.s. 563, 573 (1975). Although
respondent may have been confined for care and treatment
under the relevant Pennsylvania statute, he is not seeking
another state procedure, one which would commit him solely
because he is violent.
~~
As a matter of fed ral substantive due process, there
is no reason a men ally retarded person involuntarily
~
committed to protect others should receive less treatment
~
inferior conditions than one involuntarily commi tted..r;
"
care and treatment.
Cf. Smith v. Organization of_ 1....._ /r7.J #. ~
Footnote continued on next page.
-~

15.

the

determining

degree

"-

of

substantive

to be accorded respondent's liberty interest,
we

therefore

interest

consider

in decent,

the

following:

adequate food,

the

individual's

shelter,

and medical

pt....cf
care, wi:H:-ch the state agrees
.1\

incremental

importance

of

fiscal

In considering these factors,
~

~

the need to reserve the Constitution for appropriate
1\

issues

i~

QB~~e~a±ry

eompe±±ift§

in

the

context

of

a

challenge to conditions at a facility such as Pennhurst.
Constitutional

principles

cannot

direct

day-to-day

administration of a large institution operating within the
inevitable

constraints

of

finite

human

and

fiscal

Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 842 n. 48 (1977) (whether
tfiere is federal substantive due process right is distinct
question from whether there is federal procedural due
process right).
If
respondent were
arguing
that
his
state-law
substantive rights entitled him to certain procedural
protections, state law would then be relevant. See, e.g.,
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Wolf v. McDonnell,
418 u.s. 539, 557,-558 (1974).
This argument 1s not,
however, presented by respondent.

?
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Rider, Romeo

ROME03 SALLY-POW
III.
The parties agree that the state must provide
adequate food, shelter and medical care. 19

The remaining

questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to
additional training for his disability, less restrictive
treatment, and safer conditions.

In a sense, each of

these claims relates to an element of the care that a
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily
committed to a mental institution.

We think the standard

articulated by Chief Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance
of the Matthews factors.

He would have held that "the

Constitution only requires that the courts make certain
that professional judgment in fact was exercised.

It is

2.

not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several
professionally acceptable choices should have been made."
644 F.2d, at 178.
This standard avoids both of the extremes for
which the parties have contended.

It is higher than the

standard applied when prison conditions are challenged,
and may be viewed as lower than the standard applicable
under state law in a tort suit for medical malpractice.

lfp/ss 03/20/82

Rider A, p. 16 (Romeo)

ROME016 SALLY-POW
We reject, of course, standards at inappropriate
extremes.

The standard of medical malpractice, imposing

liability for any unjustified departure from established
norms of medical practice, 18 is not applicable in this
institutional setting.
97, 106 (1976).

See Estelle v. Gamble, 429

u.s.

Nor is the standard applicable to prison

conditions appropriate, as in penal institutions punitive
conditions are permissible unless cruel and unusual.
Persons detained involuntarily in a state institution
because of mental retardation are not committed for any
crime or fault on their part and cannot be punished at
all.

lfp/ss 03/20/82

Rider A, p. 22 (Romeo)

ROME022 SALLY-POW
Mary, we use the term "professional" in the standard
without qualification or definition.

This leaves quite a

wide range of persons authorized to make judgments:

from

nurses (practical and graduate), physical therapists (like
E. J. Shegonee downstairs), interns, resident physicians,
psychologists and the entire spectrum of medical
specialists.

I appreciate the hazard of getting into

definitions, but what do you think of something along the
following lines as a footnote on page 22:

"We undertake no definition of the term
'professional', and recognize that it may encompass a

2.

range of persons who by their training and experience
fairly may be viewed as possessing the requisite
professional skill for the decisions they make for the
welfare of patients and the treatment prescribed.
Normally, a state determines the qualifications of and
licenses various categories of professionals.

In view of

the spectrum of specialization in medicine and in the care
of patients, we do not suggest that a state institution
must be staffed with every category of specialists as few
if any state institutions could afford this level of
staffing.

It is reasonable to expect, however, that where

a state undertakes the care and involuntarily commits a
mentally retarded person, its duty includes the reasonable
staffing of the institution."

4 \;.t.,

'

'

3.

Mary:

It is evident that all sorts of problems arise from

the foregoing type of definition.
the briefs.

I have not looked at

Do we get any help at all from them or the

opinions below?

lfp/ss 03/20/82
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ROME024 SALLY-POW
In view of the facts of this case, the need for
physical restraint of respondent cannot be denied.

Mrs.

Romeo's petition for commitment described respondent's
propensity for violence (J.A. 18a), and his complaint
alleged during a specified period that respondent had
suffered injuries on at least 63 occasions.

It therefore

is clear that the state, in discharging its duty to
respondent himself as well as to other patients and staff
personnel, that he be appropriately restrained at times
when violence was evident or reasonably could be expected.
We do not think that either a "least restrictive"* or a
"compelling necessity" type of analysis is appropriate to
the types of decisions that must be made in an institution

4

2.

like Pennhurst - frequently and often with little or no
warning - to restraint violence that may endanger the
patient or others.

All that the Constitution requires is

that these decisions be made by a professional reasonably
competent to make them.

* There is professional judgment to the effect that "least
restrictive treatment is not always preferable from a
medical standpoint. See Amicus Curiae brief of the
American Psychiatric Association, 20.

'.

,,

Rider A, p. 26 (Romeo)
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ROME026 SALLY-POW

IV
Involuntary commitment neither extinguishes all
constitutionally protected liberty interests nor entitled
those committed to optimal care and conditions.

The

substantial interests of the involuntarilly committed must
be weighed against letigimate state interests and the
constraints under which most state institutions
necessarily operate.

The state concedes a duty to provide

adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care.

Nor

does the state dispute that it has a duty to provide
reasonable safety for all patients and personnel within
the institution.

As indicated above, we hold that the

state also has the duty to provide reasonable training for

..

~

2.

a patient such as respondent.

The decisions made by the

appropriate professional, whether on the staff or
retained, are entitled to a strong presumption of
correctness.

Without such a presumption, it is difficult

to see how institutions of this kind - unfortunately often
overcrowded and understaffed - can function.

Multiple

decisions with respect to patients with widely varying
needs and problems may be made in the course of a normal
day.

The administrators, and particularly the physicians

and specialists should not be required to make these
decisions in the shadow of damage suit liability.

This is

not to say, of course, that the liberty interests
identified above are not to be protected or that judicial
review is not to be available in appropriate cases.

3.

In this case, we conclude that the jury was
improperly instructed on the assumption that the proper
standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.

I
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(Romeo)

ROME024 SALLY-POW
In view of the facts of this case, the need for
physical restraint of respondent cannot be denied.

Mrs.

Romeo's petition for commitment described respondent's
propensity for violence (J.A. 18a), and his complaint

~

alleged~during

a specified

period~

respondent had

suffered injuries on at least 63 occasions.

It therefore

is clear that the state, in discharging its duty to
respondent himself as well as to other patients and staff

~~-~~~

personnel ')tha-t be..

\3Q...~~e:t.Ql:-";

~

when

violence~

re-s-treil"':e6 at times
~

evident or

reasonably~~

be expected.

We do not think that either a "least restrictive"* or a

(Ac..~
"compelling necessity" type of analysis is

appropriate!\,~

the types of decisions that must be made in an institution

2.

like Pennhurst - frequently and often with little or no
warning - to restraint violence that may endanger the
patient or others.

All that the Constitution requires is

that these decisions be made by a professional reasonably
competent to make them.

* There is professional judgment to the effect that "least
restrictive treatmentL\is not always preferable from a
medical standpoint. See Amicus Curiae brief of the
American Psychiatric Association, 20.

,..

24.

/\

,/

~~r

A-

analysis

restrictive"
decision
great

such

an

Indeed,

as

in

the

with

context

"least

for

of

treatment

a

Such analysis would

this one.

interference

the

argument

respondent's

reject

We

professional

be

too

decisionmaking.

"least restrictive" treatment might not even

preferable

from

a

medical

standpoint.

See

Amicus

Curiae Brief of the American Paychiatric Association 20.
~

It

is

clear

that

the

State

owes

other

;;£c_, ,....,___,.,
patients ..-1

protection from respondent's violence, and the

~--~-~
St~e owes

respondent

own

destructive

himself

protection
When

behavior.

a

from

his

professional

1

self-

makes

a

~,.,...

reasonable

decision

that

restraints

are

appropriate

for

is no constitutional violation.

We

A

these reasons,

there

therefore accept the State's argument that restraints may
be

a

reasonable

and

permissible

way

of

dealing

with

a

patient, though we require that the decision be made by a

profess~

{

c

Finally, respondent and the Court of Appeals would

25.

impose

liability

absence

of

for

any

injury

"substantial

to

respondent

necessity"

or

in

the

"sustantial

explanations" based on the State's interest in providing
care and treatment as well as ensuring the institutional
order needed to provide that care and treatment.
2d 1

at

163-164

644 F.

&

Petitioner argues that the proper standard was articulated
in

the

jury

instructions:

there

is

no

constitutional

violation in the absence of "deliberate indifference" to
safet~

respondent's
7 3a

(jury

See

B£~

~

of J2@titiGRere

instruction cited by petitioner) . 26

~

State would adept the

"deliberate

indifference"

~

Thus,

J .A.
the

standard

"
of

Estelle

v.

liability for
determining

Gamble,

427

U.S.

97

(1976)

(standard of

prison doctors in treating prisoners), for

whether

the

failure

to

ensure

respondent's

26 speci fically, petitioner cites the instruction on
accidental injury. The trial judge, referring to the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, instructed the jury that "if any or all of the
defendants were aware of and failed to take all reasonable
steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo,"
such failure deprived him of constitutional rights. J.A.
73a. Although this instruction was requested by respondent
himself,
see Petn.
App.
93a,
the trial judge also
emphasized that there could be no liablity in the absence
of "deliberate indifference" to Romeo's needs under the
standard of Estelle v Gamble,
429 u.s.
97
(1976),
regardless of whether alternative methods of treatment
could have prevented injury.

.,

.~

·-
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IV
Involuntary commitment neither extinguishes all
constitutionally protected liberty interests nor entitled
those committed to optimal care and conditions.

The

substantial interests of the involuntarilly committed must
be weighed against letigimate state interests and the
constraints under which most state institutions
necessarily operate.

~he

state concedes a duty to provide

adequate food, shelter, clothing and medical care.

Nor

does the state dispute that it has a duty to provide
reasonable safety for all patients and personnel within
the institution.

As indicated above, we hold that the

state also has the duty to provide reasonable training for

2.

a patient such as respondent.

The decisions made by the

appropriate professional, whether on the staff or
retained, are entitled to a strong presumption of
correctness.

Without such a presumption, it is difficult

to see how institutions of this kind - unfortunately often
overcrowded and understaffed - can function.

Multiple

decisions with respect to patients with widely varying
needs and problems may be made in the course of a normal
day.

The administrators, and particularly the physicians

and specialists)should not be required to make
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

decisioni in the shadow of damage suit liability.

r

.

'c4.

This is

not to say, of course, that the liberty interests
identified above are not to be protected or that judicial
review is not to be available in appropriate

a •

'.

)

•'

J~·

..

3.

In this case, we conclude that the jury was

~ructed
'\

on the assumption that the proper

standard of liability was that of the Eighth Amendment.
Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.
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safety v i olated the Constitution.
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(1976).
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private

the

institutions.

interests

legitimate

of

state

the

Instead,
involuntarily

interests

and

the

~

~it~n

which state institutions operate.

\
I

""
arily committed )
I

The State concedes that the involu

I

I

entitled

to

adequate
In

care.

food,

addition,

sh

w

ter,

hold

clothing,

that

ana

the

p tients are entitled to hav

/
professional.

Although

the State need not

or safety conditions which
in a
th se

it

has

appropriate

private

involuntarily
by

a

institution,
committed

professional.

the

Because

was instructed that the proper standard was that of
Eighth Amendment,

we

remand

for

not inconsistent with this decision.

further

proceedings

L
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Alternative for the riders previously dictated on p. 16
and 17, et seq.
lfp/ss 03/22/82
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ROM17A SALLY-POW
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we
reject standards at the extremes.

The standard of medical

malpractice, imposing liability for any unjustified
departure from established norms of medical practice, 18 is
not applicable in this institutional setting.
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976}.

See Estelle

Nor is the standard

applicable to prison conditions appropriate, as

punitive

conditions are permissible in penal institutions unless
they are cruel and unusual.

Persons detained

2.

involuntarily in a state institution because of mental
retardation are not committed for any crime or fault on
their part and certainly cannot be punished at all.
III.
We think the standard articulated by Chief
Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance of the Matthews
factors.

He would have held that "the Constitution only

requires that the courts make certain that professional
judgment in fact was exercised.

It is not appropriate for

the courts to specify which of several professionally
acceptable choices should have been made." 644 F.2d, at
178.

This standard avoids both of the extremes for
which the parties have contended.

It is higher than the

standard applied when prison conditions are challenged,

3.

and may be viewed as less demanding

than the standard

applicable under state law in a tort suit for medical
malpractice.

Moreover, this standard strikes the proper

balance between the relevant interests.

Persons

involuntarily committed must depend entirely upon the
state. 20

In effect such persons, for no fault of their

own, have become incarcerated.

They therefore are

entitled to considerate treatment and to conditions of
confinement more reflective of their status and needs than
those imprisoned for a criminal offense.

We therefore

hold that the state cannot commit involuntarily and detain
the mentally retarded without providing the treatment,
training, physical constraints, and safety considered
appropriate by professionals exercising their judgment.
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional

4.

burdens on states.

We make clear, however, that judicial

review by courts is limited primarily to insuring that
decisions with respect to these matters are presumptively
valid when duly made by a qualified profesiona1. 21
Liability may be imposed only when these decisions are not
delegated to professionals within or retained by the
institution, or if the decision is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or
standards as to demonstrate that the responsible persons
did not base their decisions on such a judgment. 22

...
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16.

resources. 17
~
F-.i:-tia~ur

~eu---eo.
extremes.
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twQfoapprop ·ate

person

a

state

429 u.s.

I

I
standard

of

medical

malpractice, ~ ·
established
~

J/kW

17 See , e • g • , Parham v • J • R. , 4 4 2 U • S •
n • 16
(1979) (In limiting ]Ud1c1al review of medical decisions
made by professionals:
"it is incumbent on courts to
design procedures that protect the rights of 'ndividuals
without unduly burdening the legitimate effo ts ....M the
states to deal with difficult soci.,;yrproblemsf"; Bell v.
Wolfish,
441
U.S.
520,
539
(1979)
(In context of
conditions of confinement of pre-trial detainees:
"Courts
must
be
mindful
that
these
inquiries
spring
from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to
them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of
how best to operate a detention facility); Wolf v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974)
(in considering
procedural due process claim in context of prison: "there
must be mutual accommodation between institutional needs
and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution of
general application"); Procunier v. Marttinez, 416 u.s.
396, 404-405,406 (1974)
(" [T]he problems of prisons in
America are complex and intractable, and, more to the
point, they are not readily susceptible to resolution by
degree.
Most require expertise, comprehensive planning,
and the commitment of resources, all of which are
peculiarly within the province of the legislative and
executive
branches of
the
government.").
See
also
Townsend & Mattson, The Interaction of Law and Special
Education, 1 Analysis and intervention in Developmental
disabilities 75 (1981) (judicial resolution of rights of
the handicapped can have adverse as well as positive
effects on social change).
18 see, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 (1971).
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19 Brief of Petitioners 8, 11, 12
Respondent
15-16.
See
also Amici
Connecticut and Twenty Other States 8.
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We hold that the state cannot commit involuntarily

l.
( the mentally retarded without providing the education and
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those committed must depend entirely upon the state. 20

If

,.
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the

retarded

without

deleggting

decisions regarding their treatment and the conditions of
their confinement to the judgment of professionals, it has
deprived a group of persons known to have special needs of
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freedom without crimina! process,
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their own, and with apparent indifference to whether their
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20 see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97, 103-104 (1976) •
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ROM20 SALLY-POW
The parties agree that the state must provide
c~'l>)
adequate food, shelter and medical care.l9 The remaining
questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to
additional training for his disability, less restrictive
treatment, and safer conditions.

In a sense, each of

these claims relates to an element of the care that a
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily
committed to a mental institution.

.

' "

20.

. st.1tu t.1ons
1n

s h ou ld

. . . d . 21
m1n1m1ze

be

As

federal CQnstitutional law, liability will

a

matter

exis~ ~y

of
when

/

these decisions are not delegated to pr fessionals within
the

institution or

if

the decision

is,

in

the words of

'
Chief

Judge

Seitz,

sucn

a

substantial

departure

from

.,.
accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards
\ as to dem
,
/

o

defendands did not base

uct on a professional judgment." 22

---

~~
We

turn

now

to

644 F.2, a-t'-

~

consider

~~fly

respondent's

specific claims in light of this standard.

A

21 Indeed,
although
respondent
has
claimed
substantive, not procedural, rights, our holding entitles
respondent
to
something
that
can
as
easily
be
characterized as a procedural, rather than a substantive,
right.
We hold
that
the
involuntary committed are
entitled to an informal, non-adver sar ial "hearing" by a
professional
exercising
his
professional
judgment--a
"procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case d1scussed
in text and notes at n.
& n. ___ , supra.
22 All

members of the Court of Appeals agreed that
respondent's expert testimony should have been admitted.
This issue was not included in the questions presented in
the petition for certiorari, and we have no reason to
disagree with the view that the evidence was admissible.
It appears relevant to whether petitioners' decisions were
such a substantial departure from accepted professional
practice
as
to
implicate
respondent's constitutional
rights.

21.

Respondent claims the right to training and education
to improve his ability to function given his handicap, and
argues

that

general

such

standard

treatment

treatment
adopted

"acceptable

knowledge."

should be provided under

644 F.

•••

by

the

Court

of

the

Appeals 23 :

in light of present scientific

2d, at 173.

The State maintains that

when it commits an individual such as Romeo for care, it
need not "assume a constitutional duty to provide him with
additional
training

services
and

such

as

education

developmental potential."

treatment

necessary

[in
to

the

form

maximize

of]
his

lk-!!~e4:i:-ene:fs ~

a •. ~ ~r~~

We

'ft::Ot

p~ ~

ag<e;t;:':'tther argument. As Rated by
standard urged by respondent and adopted

~k~~J:;<...e~
by the Third Circuit

1\

·

·

·

Pennsylvannia' s

~I

·'kh

medical

malpractice

standard.

CAA-t-

<J·~J
~
~

~

~AA-~~~·
-

...

,,-2~

tJ'

~.! _

~~

;r

~r~v~~~

~'-1~-~

23 of the three treatment standards adopted by the
Court of Appeals, respondent supports only this one. The
Court of Appeals court 1also held that a fai,lure to provide
any treatment requires a "compelling explanation," 644 F.
2d, at 173, but respondent does not address this precise
standard in his brief.
In addition, the Court of Appeals held that severe
intrusions on individual dignity, i.e., permanent physical
alteration or surgical intervent1on, would be reviewed
under the least-restrictive standard.
644 F. 2d, at 265266, & 173. Respondent merely notes that this standard is
not presented by the facts of this case.
See Brief of
Respondent 10-11.

22.

And,

although

effective

professionals

training

profoundly

or-

retarded

are

far

edttea:timt•

persons

is

from

of

agreeing

all

even

that

severely

or

possible, 24

we

~'J.Ufcertainly ea.-nnGt hold that due process is satisfied when
~

individuals involuntarily committed to state institutions
are simply kept alive.

When treatment or training might

ameliorate a patient's suffering or improve his condition,
such

care

exercising

should
his

obligation

Normally,

it

cons ide red

professional

treatment decision.
an

be

to
is

by

judgment

a

professional

in

making

the

We do not suggest that the State has
provide

optimal

sufficient

if

a

-s.a..re

OP

treatment.

~- .-.. ·-:Z..c 414 ~ <2~~

f!:u:A<8se ieRa:l:

makes

a

B

24 see,
e.g.,
Favell,
Risley,
Wolfe,
Riddle,
&
Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 Analysis and
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981):
Bailey, Wanted:
A Rational Search for
the Limiting
Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981):
Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: Searching for
the Substance of Things Hoped for: The Evidence of Things
Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental
Disabilities, 37 (1981).

23.

~ ~espondent
the

use

Court

of

restraints.
Appeals

of

~gree ~a~ing

and the State
1\
Respondent

maintains,

held,

Cil"OI.lit

fo.r

and

the
that

restraints can be justified only by "compelling necessity"
and as the "least restrictive" method of dealing with a
patient.

644

holding

was

restraints

F.

2d,

the

are

confinement

at

~O\H't

"not

160-161. 25
-GE

--AppeaJ

normally

contemplated

in

~tl:ial

is no

profoundly

retarde~S

basis

the

habilitative

basis for

~~

The
this

often}.. violent

~-·

for

sr perception

within

644 F. 2d, at 160 (footnote omitted).
that there

The

this
that

conditions

of

institutions."

State[!~ ~
~~

conclusion;r~

restrainty~

and

~Tt:e

s?

a~~-t:~ttere-e-s;-...-.-t..t;+l:lh:aHt-:-......liHt::--...:.J.J~e:r-"""e~tl+:~tt:-::tt-''-t~l:l,-,eea.d--6-bQO...,,...J;.T.~a:tc:Q. steps ,

~~

i~ 1.1-S(i.---

of

restrel-4.nte..,

~~

interest

in~the

te

protectj its

~·

welfare and safety of all)the residents in

-Bf:.l&:n4~..+&'6-• ......
its institutions. a-Kef ~ 2-8-.

~

\j

legitimate

-t..&....;

a

6

1

1

~

~ht YU.t_~~~ ~~

~-~- .n.c..., UA-L

25 In his br i f, repondent urges adoption of a standard
.!lo7 ~~
proscribing "u ecessary custodial shackling." See Brief
of Responden
18-21.
But, at oral argument respondent's ~~-- ~ _ 1
/;'/-~A i
·
there is little difference between thes-e -1-- --__.~
formulations
i:-n-- re.sp~FI.GeRt' s view, r9.Straifits w~e
ullfteC'es-e'8:ry
if
~
les.s
restrictive
alternative ~
available. Transcript of Oral Argument 55-56.
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Rider 17a (Romeo)

Alternative for the riders previously dictated on p. 16
and 17, et seq.
lfp/ss 03/22/82

Rider A, p. 16 (Romeo)

ROM17A SALLY-POW
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we
reject standards at the extremes.

The standard of medical

malpractice, imposing liability for any unjustified
departure from established norms of medical practice, 18 is
not applicable in this institutional setting.
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

See Estelle

Nor is the standard

applicable to prison conditions appropriate, as

punitive

conditions are permissible in penal institutions unless
they are cruel and unusual.

Persons detained

>.'

I

of'•

I

..
l

2.

involuntarily in a state institution because of mental
retardation are not committed for any crime or fault on
their part and certainly cannot be punished at all.
III.
We think the standard articulated by Chief
Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance of the Matthews
factors.

He would have held that "the Constitution only

requires that the courts make certain that professional
judgment in fact was exercised.

It is not appropriate for

the courts to specify which of several professionally
acceptable choices should have been made." 644 F.2d, at
178.

This standard avoids both of the extremes for
which the parties have contended.

It is higher than the

standard applied when prison conditions are challenged,

•,

•

'c

3.

and may be viewed as less demanding

than the standard

applicable under state law in a tort suit for medical
malpractice.

Moreover, this standard strikes the proper

balance between the relevant interests.

Persons

involuntarily committed must depend entirely upon the
state. 20

In effect such persons, for no fault of their

own, have become incarcerated.

They therefore are

entitled to considerate treatment and to conditions of
confinement more reflective of their status and needs than
those imprisoned for a criminal offense.

We therefore

hold that the state cannot commit involuntarily and detain
the mentally retarded without providing the treatment,
training, physical constraints, and safety considered
appropriate by professionals exercising their judgment.
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional

...'

.

>'

4.

burdens on states.

We make clear, however, that judicial

review by courts is limited primarily to insuring that
decisions with respect to these matters are presumptively
valid when duly made by a qualified profesiona1. 21
Liability may be imposed only when these decisions are not
delegated to professionals within or retained by the
institution, or if the decision is such a substantial
departure from accepted professional judgment, practice or
standards as to demonstrate that the responsible persons
did not base their decisions on such a judgment. 22

~-

..

lfp/ss 03/22/82

RiderA, p. 17, Romeo

ROME03 SALLY-POW
III.
The parties agree that the state must provide
adequate food, shelter and medical care. 19

The remaining

questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to
additional training for his disability, less restrictive
treatment, and safer conditions.

In a sense, each of

these claims relates to an element of the care that a
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily
committed to a mental institution.

We think the standard

articulated by Chief Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance
of the Matthews factors.

He would have held that "the

Constitution only requires that the courts make certain
that professional judgment in fact was exercised.

It is

2.

not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several
professionally acceptable choices should have been made."
644 F.2d, at 178.
This standard avoids both of the extremes for
which the parties have contended.

It is higher than the

standard applied when prison conditions are challenged,
and may be viewed as lower than the standard applicable
under state law in a tort suit for medical malpractice.
Moreover, this standard strikes the proper balance between
the relevant interests.

Persons involuntarily committed

must depend entirely upon the state. 20

In effect such

persons, for no fault of their own, have become
incarcerated.

They therefore are entitled to treatment

and to conditions of confinement more reflective of their
status and needs than those imprisoned for a criminal

.,

3.

violation of the law.

We therefore hold that the state

cannot commit involuntarily and detain the mentally
retarded without providing the education and training,
constraints or other conditions of treatment, and safety
considered appropriate by professional exercising their
judgment.
We recognize that our holding that persons
involuntarily committed to mental institutions have
constitutional rights to confinement conditions superior
to those given persons imprisoned for criminal offenses
may impose some additional financial burdens on states, we
make clear that judicial review by courts is limited
primarily to insuring that the decisions with respect to
the training, treatment, and conditions of detention of
persons involuntarily committed are presumptively valid

...
·''

4.

when duly made by a qualified profesiona1. 21

As a matter

of federal constitional law, liability will exist only
when these decisions are not delegated to professionals
within the institutions or if the decision is, in the
words of Chief Judge Seitz, such a substantial departure
from accepted professional judgment, practice or standards
as to demonstrate that the responsible presons did not
base their decisions on an accepted professional
judgment. 22

lfp/ss 03/22/82

Rider A, p. 20 (Romeo)

ROM20 SALLY-POW
The parties agree that the state must provide
adequate food, shelter and medical care.l9

The remaining

questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to
additional training for his disability, less restrictive
treatment, and safer conditions.

In a sense, each of

these claims relates to an element of the care that a
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily
committed to a mental institution.

/
lfp/ss 03/26/82

Rider A, p. 13 (Romeo)

YOUNG13 SALLY-POW
Although the foregoing cases have involved
procedural due process, essentially the same type of
analysis is appropriate in considering whether
respondent's substantive liberty interests are protected
adequately in the Pennhurst State School and Hospital:

it

is necessary to strike a balance - as Justice Harlan said
in Poe v. Ullman - between the liberty interests at issue
and the practicalities of operating an institution such as
Pennhurst.

We also must be mindful of a need to reserve

the Constitution for appropriate issues, as there are
limitations upon the extent to which constitutional
principles may be relied upon in considering the adequacy
of the care provided at a large institution operating

2.

within the inevitable constraints of finite human and
physical resources. 19

..

..
·'

·.
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Rider 17a (Romeo)
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Alternative for the riders previously dictated on p. 16
and 17, et seq.
lfp/ss 03/22/82

Rider A, p. 16 (Romeo)

ROM17A SALLY-POW
With the foregoing considerations in mind, we
reject standards at the extremes.

The ' standard of medical

malpractice, imposing liability for any unjustified
departure from established norms of medical practice,lB is
not applicable in this institutional setting.
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).

See Estelle

Nor is the standard

applicable to prison conditions appropriate, as

punitive

conditions are permissible in penal institutions unless
they are cruel and unusual.

.

'

Persons detained

2.

involuntarily in a state institution because of mental
retardation are not committed for any crime or fault on
their part and certainly cannot be punished at all.
III.
The parties agree that the state must provide
adequate food, shelter and medical care. 19

The remaining

questions concern respondent's claims to entitlement to
additional training for his disability, less restrictive
treatment, and safer conditions.

In a sense, each of

these claims relates to an element of the care that a
state must exercise with respect to persons involuntarily
committed to a mental institution.

We think the standard

articulated by Chief Judge Seitz reflects a proper balance
of the Matthews factors.

He would have held that "the

Constitution only requires that the courts make certain

3.

that professional judgment in fact was exercised.

It is

not appropriate for the courts to specify which of several
professionally acceptable choices should have been made."
644 F.2d, at 178.
This standard avoids both of the extremes for
which the parties have contended.

It is higher than the

standard applied when prison conditions are challenged,
and may be viewed as less demanding

than the standard

applicable under state law in a tort suit for medical
malpractice.

Moreover, this standard strikes the proper

balance between the relevant interests.

Persons

involuntarily committed must depend entirely upon the
state. 20

In effect such persons, for no fault of their

own, have become incarcerated.

They therefore are

entitled to considerate treatment and to conditions of

4.

confinement more reflective of their status and needs than
those imprisoned for a criminal offense.

We therefore

hold that the state cannot commit involuntarily and detain
the mentally retarded without providing the treatment,
training, physical constraints, and safety considered
appropriate by professionals exercising their judgment.
We recognize that this holding may impose some additional
burdens on states.

We make clear, however, that judicial

review by courts is limited primarily to insuring that
decisions with respect to these matters are presumptively
valid when duly made by a qualified profesiona1. 21
Liability may be imposed only when these decisions are not
delegated to professionals within the institution or if
the decision is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice or standards as to

5•

demonstrate that the responsible persons did not base
their decisions on such a judgment. 22
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Draft No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo

The question presented
retarded

adult

is whether

respondent,

committed

to

involuntarily

a

a

state

institution, has a claim for damages against petitioners,
the

director

Respondent

and

two

brings

suit

supervisors
under

42

of

the

u.s.c.

institution.

§1983,

cla ~
iminnr-

'
that the conditions of his confinement violate his rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

I

Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded.
Although

33 years old,

eighteen-month old

he has

child.

most basic self-care skills.
lived

with

his

parents

death of his father

in

He

the mental capacity of an
cannot talk and lacks

the

Until he was 26, respondent
Philadelphia.

But

after

the

in May of 1974, his mother was unable

~-_./

__,.,

2.

to control his violence.

Within two weeks of the father's

death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly

thereafter,

she

asked

the

Philadelphia

Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility
on a permanent basis.

Her petition to the court explained

that

to

she

was

violence. 1
examined

by

unable

care

for

Romeo

or

control

his

As part of the commitment process, Romeo was
a

physician

and

a

psychologist.

They

both

certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable
to care for himself.
29a.

Joint Appendix (J.A.) 2la-22a & 28a-

The

physician

destructive

behavior. 2

also

described

On July

11,

1974,

Romeo's
the

self-

Court of

Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State

1 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to
handle him.
He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't.
He is constant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable
to care for him." Joint Appendix (J.A. 18a).
2

J. A. at 22A:

"Physican and mental findings at time of
examination:
Pt.
[patient]
is
nonverbalrestrained
in bed.
Recognizes examiner by
rolling his eyes and banging his head against
bedrail."

3.

School

Hospital,

pursuant

commitment

provision

and

involuntary

to

applicable

the

of

the

Pennsylvania

Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 50 §4406.
At

Pennhurst,

Romeo

was

injured

on

numerous

occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions
of

other

inmates

to

him.

Mrs.

Romeo

became

concerned

+o

about these injuries.

After objecting ab&Qt respondent's

treatment several times, she filed this complaint in the
United States District Court for
Pennsylvania
that

as his

"[d]uring

plaintiff

has

occasions."
injunctive

the

next

friend.

period

suffered

July,

the Eastern District of
The complaint alleged
1974

injuries on at

to

the

least

present,

sixty-three

The complaint originally sought damages and
relief

supervisors 3 ;

it

from
alleged

Pennhurst's
that

these

director
officials

and
knew,

two
or

should have known, that Romeo was suffering injuries and

3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent
of Pennhurst; he had supervisory authority over the entire
facility.
Respondent Richard Matthews was the Director of
Resident Life at Pennhurst.
Respondent Marguerite Conley
was Unit Director for the unit in which repondent was
incarcerated. Petitioners are administrators, not medical
doctors or psychologists.
Youngberg and Matthews are no
longer at Pennhurst.

4.

failed

to

institute

appropriate

preventive

procedures,

thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Thereafter,

in

late

1976,

from his ward to the hospital for
arm.
was

Romeo

was

transfered

treatment of a broken

While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he
physically restrained 4 during portions of each day.

These

restraints

defendant

here,

hospital,

some

treated

were
to

of

ordered

protect

whom

Romeo

were

intravenously.

7

byf
in

R.

Dr.
and

Gabroy,
others

traction or

40,

49,

not
in

were

76-78.

a

the
being

Although

respondent normally would have returned to his ward when
his arm healed, the parties to this litigation agreed that
he

/wr

should

remain

in

the

hospital

due

to

the

pending

~WAi.

~

December

of

5 R. 248, 6 R. 57-58 & 137.
1977,

a

second

amended

Nevertheless, in

complaint was

filed

alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent
for

prolonged

periods on

a

routine

bas is. 5

The

second

4Although the Court of Appeals described these
restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms
only, were generally used. 7 Record (R.) 53-55, 59.
Footnote(s) 5 will appear on following pages.

/

5.

amended

complaint

compensate
him

with

Romeo

also
for

a

claim

the defendants'

appropriate

Pennhurst.

added

treatment

All claims for

-

for

damages

failure

throughout

to

to provide

his

stay

at

injunctive relief were dropped

prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An
1978.

eight-day

Petitioners

jury

trial

introduced

was

held

evidence

in

that

April

of

respondent

participated in several programs teaching basic self-care
skills. 7 A comprehensive behavior-modification program was
designed

by

staff

members

to

reduce

his

aggressive

behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because

5 The first amended complaint was filed in January
1977, after respondent's hospitalization, but it added no
restraint-related allegations. Compare original complaint
,116 and first amended complaint ,[16 (change related to
safety claim, not use of restraints).
6 Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
U.S.
(1981) (remanded for further proceedings).

--

7Prior
to his transfer
to Pennhurst's hospital
ward, Romeo participated in programs dealing with feeding,
showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet
training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members.
Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 R. 69-70, 5 R.
44-56, 242-250, 6 R. 162-166; 7 R. 41-48.
Programming continued while respondent was in the
hospital, 5 R. 227, 248, 256; 6 R. 50, 162, R. 32,34, 4148, and this programming reduced respondent's aggressive
behavior to some extent, 7 R. 45.
8 2 R. 7, 5 R. 88-90; 6 R. 88, 200-203; Defendants'
Exhibit 1, at 9. The program called for short periods of
separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on
Footnote continued on next page.

6.

of

his

mother's

objections. 9

Respondent

introduced

evidence of his injuries and of conditions in his "unit,"
though
two

the District Court refused to allow testimony of

experts

proffered . 10

he

that evidence of

The

trial

judge

explained

the advantages of alternative forms of

treatment might be relevant to a malpractice suit, but was
not relevant to a constitutional claim under §1983.

Petn.

App. 94a-95a.
At the close of the trial, the court instructed
the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware
of

and

repeated
deprived
73a.

failed

to

attacks
him

of

take
upon
his

all

reasonable

Nicholas

steps

Romeo,"

constitutional

rights.

to prevent

such

failure

Petn.

App.

The jury also was instructed that if the defendants

plaintiff's hands for short periods of time, i.e., 15
minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.

9 1 R. 53,. 4 R. 2 5; 6 R. 2 0 4 •
10 The first of these experts was a psychologist,
specializing in treating the mentally retarded. He would
have testified that Romeo could have been more effectively
treated under other programs and that the lack of
programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive
behavior.
Respondent's other expert was a physician with
a specialty in neurological pediatrics and the director of
a private institution for the mentally retarded. He would
have testified that residents at his private institution
as severely retarded as Romeo did not have similar
problems of aggression or injury.

7.

shackled Romeo other than in a good faith effort to treat
him,

his

rights had been violated.

Ibid.

Finally,

the

jury was instructed that if Romeo was denied treatment "as
a

punishment

were

for

filing

"deliberately

this lawsuit," or

indifferent

to

if defendants

the

medical

and

psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his constitutional
rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment.

Id., at

73a-75a.
The
on which
Appeals

jury returned a verdict for

judgment was entered.
for

the Third Circuit,

the defendants,

On appeal,

sitting en bane,

the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
(1980).

vacated

644 F. 2d 147

All of the judges agreed that respondent's expert
Id., at 164 & 173.

testimony should have been admitted.
They

the Court of

also agreed

that

the Eighth Amendment,

prohibiting

cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes,
was not an appropriate source for determining the rights
of

the

involuntarily

committed.

Rather,

respondent's

Fourteenth Amendment liberty right was implicatP.d by the
conditions under which he was confined.
173.

The en bane court did not,

Id., at 156-59, &

however,

agree on the

8.

relevant

standard

to

be

used

in

determining

whether

Romeo's rights had been violated. 11
The court's majority opinion began its analysis
of this issue by stating that involuntary civil commitment
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty."

Id., at 157

(quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972)).
a consequence

involuntary commitment may be ordered only

pursuant to due process.

Ibid.

that

extinguish

commitment

individual's

As

does

liberty

not

interest;

The court further

the

all
power

aspects
of

held
of

an

locomotion

without restraint and the right to personal security and
freedom from punishment are fundamental liberties that can
be

limited

interest.

only

by

an

overriding,

non-punitive

state

644 F. 2d, at 157-159.
In

light

of

Romeo's three claims:
restraints;

( i i)

these

views,

the

court considered

(i) the right to be free of physical

the right to safety and protection;

and

11 The existence of a qualified immunity · defense
was not at issue on appeal.
The defendants had received
instructions on this defense, J.A. 76a, and it was not
challenged by respondent.
644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l.
After
citing Pierson v. Rhodes, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) and Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 41~ u.s. 232 (1974), the majortiy of the Court
of Appeals noted that such instructions should be given
again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.

9.

(iii}

the

physical

right

to

restraint

treatment.
•iraises

can

be

a

sanction,"

it

necessity.

Id., at 159-160.

Id.,

at

presumption

justified

only

159.
of

Because

a

by

punitive

compelling

And the failure to provide

for a patient's safety must be justified by a showing of
substantial necessity.
held

that

when

Id., at 160.

treatment

has

responsible

are

liable

only

"acceptable

in

light

of

scientific knowledge."

Finally, the court
a~ministered,

been
if

the

present

treatment
medical

those
is

or

not
other

Id., at 166-167 & 173. 12

Chief Judge Seitz, writing for a minority of four,
considered

the standards articulated by the majority as

indistinguishable
malpractice

from

claims.

those
In

applicabble

Judge

Seitz's

to

medical

view,

the

12 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment
claim into three categories and adopted three standards,
but only the standard described in text is at issue before
this Court.
The Court of Appeals also stated that if a
jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may
hold the insti tut1on' s administrators liable unless they
can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of
treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does not
discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not
appear to be relevant to the facts of this case.
In
addition,
the
court
considered
"least
restrictive
analysis" appropriate to justify severe intrusions on
individual dignity, such as permanent physical alteration
or surgical intervention, id., at 165-166, & 173, but
respondent concedes that this-issue is not present in this
case.

10.

Constitutiton "only requires

that the courts make certain

that professional judgment in fact was exercised."
2d,
was

at

644 F.

He concluded that the appropriate standard

whether

the

defendents'

conduct

was

"such

a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards in the care and treatment of this
plaintiff as
base

their

to demonstrate

that the defendants did not

conduct on a professional

judgment."

644 F.

2d, at 178. 13
We granted the petition for certiorari because of
the

importance

of

the

question

presented

to

the

administration of state institutions for the involuntarily
committed.

v
J

u.s.

(198__).

We now reverse.

13 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion,
but wrote separately to emphasize the nature of the
difference between the majority opinion and that of the
Chief Judge.
On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert
criticized the majority for abandoning the common-law
method
of
deciding
the
case
at
bar
rather
than
articulating broad principles unconnected with the facts
~
of th~ case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at
\~ And, on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned
tli'at
neither
juries
nor
those
administering
state
institutions would receive ...z:tt:41Y" JRe'8.~JiR-9fYl guidance from
the "amorphous constitutional law tenets" articulated by
the majority. Id., at
•
~
Judge Garth--also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion~
~ aut alse-. wrote separately to criticize the majority for
addressing issues not raised by the facts of this case.
644 F. 2d, at

~-'~J.d.''
'-1..-- ~

pv~~-

11.

II

We consider here for the first time the substantive
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth

JLI

Amendment 14 to

the Constitution. 15

~

;(

In -eh e case at ba F ,
)

respondent

has · been

Pennsylvania,
The

broad

Process

and he does

question
Clause,

commitment

committed

to

not challenge

presented

is

petitioners

liberty

pursuant

interest

by

laws

of

the commitment.

whether,

have

the

under

infringed
failing

the
a

to

Due

postprovide

2~

~

constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement.

Respondent's commitment proceeding did not deprive
him

of

all

substantive

Fourteenth Amendment.
4801

491-494

respondent

is

(1980)

liberty

interest

under

the

See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S.

o

confined

And

the

conditions

implicate

the

under

entirety

which
of

his

14 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a
state cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .•.. " U.S. Const.,
Amend. XIV, §1.
15 The respondent no longer relies on the Eighth
Amendment as a direct source of constitutional rights,
Brief of Respondent 13 n.l2 ("the Eighth Amendment applies
only in cases concerning punishment of persons convicted
of crimes").

12.

liberty

remaining

The

interest.

question

initial

therefore becomes by what standard do we determine whether
H..,_.~
ooAaitiefts
at

residuum

of

inpermissibly

Pennhurst

liberty

of

which

infringe

-respondent

should

that
not

be

deprived.

Due process

is a balance between "the liberty of

the individual" and "the demands of an organized society."
Poe v. Ullman, 367
dissenting).
Court

has

against

u.s.

497, 522, 542 (1961)

(Harlan, J.,

In seeking this balance in other cases, the

weighed

the

individual's

interest

in

liberty

~~~~~

the

~

Wolfish,

restraints

441

considered

U.S.
a

on

520,

539

challenge

confinement conditions.

state

aeeion.

(1979),

to

for

In

Bell

v.

example,

we

pre-trial

detainees'

We agreed that the d~tainees, not

yet convicted of the crime charged, could not be punished.
But

we

upheld

those

restrictions

on

liberty

that

were

reasonably related to legitimate government objectives and
~

not tantamount to punishment.

And in Jackson v. Indiana,

406 U.S. 713, 738 (1972), we held that an incompetent pretrial detainee could not, after a competency hearing, be
held indefinitely without either criminal process or civil

(

lfp/ss 03/26/82

Rider A, p. 13 (Romeo)

YOUNG13 SALLY-POW
'
Although [the foregoing cases have involved
;

procedural due process, (Mary: is this accurate?)
essentiall-¥ the same type of analysis is appropriate in

(c-_

considering whether respondent's substantive liberty
interests are protected adequately in the Pennhurst State
School and Hospital:

it is necessary to strike a balance

· - as Justice Harlan said in Poe v. Ullman - between the
liberty interests at issue and the practicalities of
operating an institution such as Pennhurst.

We also must

be mindful of a need to reserve the Constitution for
appropriate issues, as there are limitations upon the
extent to which constitutional principles may be relied
upon in considering the adequacy of the day-to-day care

2.

provided in

a large institution operating within the

inevitable constraints of finite human and physical
resources. 19

,•

13.

commitment;
rational

due

process

relation

requires,

between

the

commitment and its purpose.
441

u.s.

civil

418

(1979)

commitment,

at

nature

a

minimum,

and

some

duration

of

See also Addington v. Texas,

(in determining

~
individual's

burden of proof

liberty

interest

in

~
weighed

1\
against legitimate state interests in confinement) .
•

~~

~~
I

('

Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979), provides

' specific guidance as to the appropriate standard.

we

considered

commitment

of

a

challenge

a

minor

to

with

more
There

state

procedures

for

parental

consent. 16

In

determining that procedural due process does not mandate
( 31/)
an adversarisal hearing, we again identified the factors 17
that
state

this

Court

procedures

has
are

considered

in

adequate

to

determining
protect

a

whether
liberty

interest:
1..

16 under the Georgia statute, the proceeding began
with an application for admission signed by the parent.
The superintendent of a hospital was then authorized to
admit a minor for "observation and diagnosis." If, after
observation, the superintendent found "evidence of mental
illness" and that the child was "suitable for treatment"
in the hospital, the child could be admitted "for such
period and under such conditions as may be authorized by
1 a w• "
4 4 2 U• S . , at 58 8 n . 5 .
In Parham , the Co u r t
sustained the statute.
17 These factors were initially articulated in Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 u.s. 319, 335 (1976), a procedural due
process case.

14.

"'First, the private interest that will be
affected by the official action: second, the
risk
of
an erroneous deprivation of
such
interest through the procedures used, and the
probable
value,
if
any,
of
additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and finally,
the
Government's
interest,
including
the
function
involved
and
the
fiscal
and
administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute
procedural
requirement
would
entail.'" Id., at 599-600 (quoting Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (additional
c1tat1on omitted).

)
~

~

In

this case,

the question

is whether

respondent's

'
v,

.,

i
)'
j ....
~
.,

i

1

..

~

f.

i~

substantive liberty interests are protected adequately in
Pennhurst

State

School

and

Hospital.

But

we

find

the

factors relevant in determining the adequacy of a state's
procedures also relevant in determining the constitutional
adequacy of the state's substantive protection of federal
liberty interests. 18 ( ""}Sl

J
18 Respondent
also
argues
that
the
Pennsylvania
commitment statute provides a state-law basis for his
federal substantive right.
He maintains that he was
commmitted for care and treatment under state law, and he
therefore has a state substantive right entitled to
substantive, not just procedural, protection under the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. Initially, we
note that this argument is made for the first time in
respondent's brief to this Court: it was not advanced in
the courts below.
Respondent relies primarily on Jackson v. Indiana, 406
U.S. 715 (1972). There, the Court stated that due process
requires,
at
a
minimum,
terms
and
conditions
of
confinement that bear some rational relation to the
purposes of confinement. Thus, respondent argues that the
wording of the relevant Pennsylvania commitment statute
and the purposes for which he was committed--care and
treatment--create a
state-created right to treatment
entitled to federal protection under Jackson because due
process requires some relationship between the conditions
of confinement and its purposes. In Jackson, however, the
Footnote continued on nexE page •

\

\

15.

In considering these factors, we are mindful of the
special need to reserve the Constitution for appropriate
issues

in the context of a challenge to conditions at a

facility
cannot

such
direct

as

Pennhurst.

day-to-day

ro

(
Constitutional

administration

of

f
.)

principles
a

large /
l

institution operating within the inevitable constraints of
finite human and fiscal resources. 19

(f~)

Court was considering only the need for a relationship
between the single reason justifying confinement as a
matter of
federal law--temporary confinement pending
competency to stand trial--and the "terms and conditions"
of confinement.
Romeo could, as a matter of federal law,
be confined to protect others. See text and notes at n. 1
& n. 2, supra; Addington v Texas, 441 u~s. 418,
(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975)':""
Although respondent may have been confined for care and
., 1 J_,
treatment under the relevant Pennsylvania statute, ~ ~
not seeking another state procedure, one w84eh~ would
commit him solely because he is violent.
Moreover, we see no reason why a federal substantive
right to treatment should vary with the wording of the
relevant state commitment statute or with the precise
reason given for commitment. For example, as a matter of
federal law, why should a mentally retarded person
involuntarily committed to protect himself and others
receive less treatment or inferior conditions than one
involuntarily committed only because he is unable to care
for himself?
It is true that state substantive rights
implicate federal procedural due process. And it is also
true that we have never
y · he
that state
substantive rights cannot
b~
for
federA l
~
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause. ~, ~ n
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 u.s. 816,
942 n. 49 (1977), we indicated that even when a federal
procedural right exists, the existence of a related
federal substantive right is not automatic, but is an
entirely distinct question.
If
respondent
were
arguing
that
his
state-law
substantive right entitled him to certain procedural
protections, Pennsylvania law would be relevant.
See,
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Wolf v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-558 (1974). This argument is
no€, however, presented by respondent.
Footnote(s) 19 will appear on following pages.

With

the

foregoing

considerations

reject standards at the extremes.

1\

t~

~\~

malpractice,

imposing

in

mind,

we

?~~

The standard of medical

liability

"

for

any

unjustified

departure from established norms of medical practice, 20 is
not applicable in this institutional setting.
v. Gamble,

429 U.S.

97, 106

(1976) •

See Estelle

Nor is the standard

19 See, e.g . , Rhodes v. Chapman, __ u.S. __, __ n.
14 (198l) [f"[A] prison's internal security is peculiarly a ~
matter
normally
left
to
the
discretion
of
prison )
administrators.
id., at __ (" [C]ourts cannot assume
that
state
legislatures
and
prison
officials
are
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to
the perplexing sociological problems of how best to
achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal
justice system •••• ") ~ Parham v. J .R., 442 U.S. 584, 608
n. 16 (1979)
(In limiting judicial review of medical
decisions made by professionals: "[I]t is incumbent on
courts to design procedures that protect the rights of
individuals
without
unduly
burdening
the
legitimate
efforts of the states to deal
with difficult social
problems.")~
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 539 (1979)
(In context or conditions of confinement of pre-trial
detainees: "[C]ourts must be mindful that these inquiries
spring from constitutional requirements and that judicial
answers to them must reflect that fact rather than a
court's
idea
of
how
best
to operate
a
detention
facility.")~ Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974)
(In considering procedural due process claim in context of
prison: "[T]here must be mutual accommodation between
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution of general application.") ~ Procunier v.
Marttinez,
416 U.S.
396,
404-405,406
(1974)
(" [T]he
problems
of
prisons
in
America
are
complex
and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily
susceptible
to
resolution
by degree.
Most
require
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province
of
the
legislative
and
executive
branches
of
the
government.").
See
also
Townsend
& Mattson,
The
Interaction of Law and Special Education, 1 Analysis and
intervention
in Developmental disabili 't ies 75
(1981)
(judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have
adverse as well as positive effects on social change).

"J1

t
~ J~
~ l1 l
1 l'l

e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 (1971).

17.

applicable

to

prison

conditions

Although

appropriate.

punitive conditions are permissible in penal institutions
~·

unless/cruel and unusual, persons committed involuntarily

r

to a state institution because of mental retardation are
not

detained

for

any crime

or

fault

on

their

part

and

certainly cannot be punished at all.

III.

We

think

the

standard articulated by Chief Judge

Seitz reflects a proper balance of the Mathews factors.
He would have held

that

"the Constitution only requires

that the courts make certain that professional judgment in
fact was exercised.
to

specify

which

It is not appropriate for the courts
of

several

professionally

acceptable

choices should have been made." 644 F.2d, at 178.
This standard avoids both of the extremes for which
the

parties

have

standard

applied

and

be

may

applicable

contended.

is

higher

when prison conditions

viewed as
under

It

state

less demanding
law

in

a

tort

are

than
suit

than

the

challenged,
the standard
for

medical

18.

malpractice.

Moreover,

this standard strikes the proper

balance between the relevant interests.
or

patients,

entirely

the

upon

i.~

dependent1 sbte..
therefore

state 21 ;

the

in

involuntarily

'9

involuntarily

civil

Whether prisoners

committed
yet

must

those

committed

J..;fz:_~, ff),J_. a.~..
are .A_6s.g pE--:;:;i; R t:bd s

proceedings

through no fault of their own.

entitled

to

more

depend

considerate

They are

treatment

and

conditions of confinement more responsive to their status
and

needs

rights
are

of

than
the

balanced

are

prisoners.

involuntarily
against

the

We

hold

committed

legitimate

that

when

mentally

the

retarded

restraints on

state

action, due process requires that the state provide these
individuals

with

constraints,

and

appropriate

by

the
other

treatment,
safety

professionals

training,
conditions

exercising

their

physical
considered
judgment.

We recognize that this holding may impose some additional
burdens on states.

We make clear, however, that judicial

review is limited to ensuring that decisions with respect
to

these

matters

are

duly

made

by

a

qualified

21 see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97, 103-104 {1976).

y

19.

profesiona1. 22

The decision,

is presumptively
the

decision

within

or

decision

valid~

has

is

professional

such

liability may be imposed only when

not

retained

been

by

a

if made by a professional,

the

delegated

institution,

substantial

judgment,

to

departure

practice

or

professionals
or

when

from

standards

the

accepted
as

to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not
base the decision on such a judgment. 23
We

turn

specific claims

now
in

to

consider

briefly

respondent's

light of this standard.

The parties

agree that the state must provide adequate food,
and

medical

care. 24

The

remaining

questions

shelter
concern

22 Indeed,
although
respondent
has
claimed
substantive, not procedural, rights, our holding entitles
responaent to a right that can be characterized as
procedural.
We hold that the involuntary committed are
entitled to an informal, non-adver sar ial "hearing" by a
professional
exercising
his
professional
judgment--a
"procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. J.R., 442
u.s. 584 (1979), a procedural due process case aiscussed
in text and notes at n.
& n. ___ , supra.
23 All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that
respondent's expert testimony should have been admitted.
This issue was not included in the questions presented in
the petition for certiorari, and we have no reason to
disagree with the view that the evidence was admissible.
It appears relevant to whether petitioners' decisions were
a
substantial
departure
from
accepted
professional
practice.
24 Brief of Petitioners 8, 11, 12
Respondent
15-16.
See
also Arnie i
Connecticut and Twenty Other States 8.

&

n. 10~ Brief of
Curiae Brief of

20.

respondent's claims to entitlement to additional training
for his disability, less restrictive treatment, and safer
conditions.

In a sense, each of these claims relates to

an element of
respect

to

the care

persons

that a

state must exercise with

involuntarily

committed

to

mental

institutions.
A

Respondent claims the right to training and education
to improve his ability to function given his handicap, and
argues

that

general

such

treatment

standard

adopted

treatment "acceptable
knowledge."

644 F.

should be provided under
by

the

Court

of

the

Appeals:

in light of present scientific

2d, at 173.

The State maintains that

when it commits an individual such as Romeo for care, it
need not "assume a constitutional duty to provide him with
additional
training

services
and

such

education

developmental potential."

as

treatment

necessary

[in
to

the

form of]

maximize

his

Brief of Petitioners 8.

We are not persuaded by either argument. As noted
by

both Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Aldersert

in

their

21.

separate opinions,
adopted

by

the standard urged by respondent and

the Third Circuit

medical malpractice standard.
And,

although

is

no different

644 F.

professionals are

far

from

2d, at

the

&

from agreeing

that

effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded
persons is even possible, 25 we certainly would not hold
that due process is satisfied when

innocent individuals

involuntarily committed to state institutions are simply
kept alive.

When treatment or training might ameliorate a

patient's suffering or
should

be

considered

professional
we do not

judgment

suggest

improve his condition,
by

a

professional

in making

that

the

such care

exercising

his

treatment decision.

the State has an obligation to

provide optimal treatment.

Normally, it is sufficient if

the treatment chosen to improve the patient's condition is

v

that prescribed by the iesponsible professional. (fn on who

4J...e..

~
~

25 see,
e.g.,
Favell,
Risley,
Wolfe,
Riddle,
&
Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 Analysis and
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981);
Bailey, Wanted: A Rational Search for the Limiting
Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981);
Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: Searching for
the Substance of Things Hoped for; The Evidence of Things
Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental
Disabilities, 37 (1981).

~

/U-IJ/..t

22.

is professional?).

B

Respondent and
use of restraints.
Appeals

held,

"compelling

the State also disagree as to the

Respondent maintains, and the Court of

that

restraints

necessity"

and

can

as

be

the

justified only

"least

by

restrictive"

method of dealing with a patient. 644 F. 2d, at 160-161. 26
The

basis

for

this

holding

restraints

are

"not

normally

confinement
644 F.

contemplated

2d, at 160

that there

in

was

the

within

perception

is no basis for

profoundly

retarded

restraints

are

habilitative

often

The

of

institutions."

The State asserts

this conclusion,

patients

~necessary.

condi~ions

the

(footnote omitted).

that

noting

that

violent

and

emphasizes

its

are

State

legitimate interest in protecting the welfare and safety

26 rn
brief,
respondent
urges adoption of a
standar
proscribing "unnecessary custodial shackling"
rather the "least restrictive means" standard adopted by
the Court of Appeals.
But at oral argument respondent's
counsel conceded that there is little practical difference
between these formulations:
respondent would consider
restraints unnecessary if a less restrictive alter'n ative
were available. Transcript of Oral Argument 55-56.

23.

of all of the residents in its institutions.
In view of

the

facts

of

this case,

the need

-

physical restraint of respondent cannot be denied. 27
Romeo's

petition

propensity
alleged

for

that

for

commitment

violence,

during

a

J.A.

described
18a,

specified

and

period

the

state,

in

discharging

its

Mrs.

respondent's
his

complaint

respondent

suffered injuries on at least 63 occasions.
that

for

duty

I t[ s

to

had

clear

respondent

himself as well as to other patients and staff personnel,
must restrain respondent at times when violence is evident
or

reasonably f expected.

"least

restrictive"

or

We

do

not

"compelling

think

that

either

necessity" analysis 28

(!.
27 It is true that the majority of the Cour wf of
Appeals adopted a finding that there was an "absen{ e of
any dangerouness to others" among residents at Pennn urst.
644 F. 2d, at
n. 18.
This finding was not, however,
based on the record in this case ,__but on J£!fe l.f inding in
another case, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
Hospital,
612 F.
2d
, 92 . (19
),
reversed and
remanded, Pennhurst State-lfchool & Hos-Ttal v. Halderman,
U.S. Z
See
F.
, at
n. 1 •
MOr"'eover, the finding is inconsistent with t~Court of
Appeals' own description of the facts of this case: "It is
not contested that, while confined at Pennhurst, Romeo was
injured on over seventy occaisions.
These injuries were
both self-inflicted and the result of attacks by other
residents, some in retaliation against Romeo's aggressive
behavior." 644 F. 2d, at
~
28 In the judgment of at least one professional group,
the least restrictive standard "is not always best from a
clinical standpoint," and, "as a practical matter, it may
not
be
possible
to
identify
the
least
restrictive
alternative at all."
Brief of the American Psychiatric
Association, at 20.

24.

is appropriate in reviewing

that must be made in

~ -:;.fr equently~ such

an institution like Pennhurs

decisions

,.

must be made quickly, with little or no warning, in order
to restraint violence that would endanger the patient or
others.

The

Constitution

requires

only

that

these

decisions be made by a professional reasonably competent
to make them.

c

Finally, respondent and the Court of Appeals would
impose

liability

absence

of

for

any

injury

"substantial

to

necessity"

respondent
or

in

the

"sustantial

explanations" based on the State's interest in providing
care and treatment as well as ensuring the institutional
order needed to provide that care and treatment.
2d, at 163-164 & 173.

Petitioner argues that the proper

standard was articulated
is

no

constitutional

"deliberate
J.A. 73a

644 F.

in the jury instructions:
violation

indifference"

to

in

the

respondent's

there

absence
safety.

(jury instruction cited by petitioner) • 29

of
See

Thus,

Footnote(s) 29 will appear on following pages.

25.

~~
the

State { culd

standard
(standard

of

Estelle

of

prisoners),

apply

the

v.

liability

"deliberate

Gamble,
for

427

prison

indifference"

u.s.

doctors

97
in

(1976)
treating

in determining whether the failure to ensure

respondent•s safety violated the Constitution.
It

hardly

need

be

said

that

the

State

owes

respondent a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure his
physical safety.

But we find no basis for holding that

the Constitution requires adoption of the standard urged
by respondent:

liability in the absence of "substantial

necessity" or a "substantial explanation."

We also reject

petitioners•

view

fulfills

constitutional

obligation by

committed

though

as

constitutional

that

the

they

violation

in

State

treating
were
the

the

involuntarily

prisoners,
absence

its

of

i.e.,

no

"deliberate

29 specifically, petitioner cites the instruction on
accidental injury. The trial judge, referring to the
Eighth Amendment•s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, instructed the jury that "if any or all of the
defendants were aware of and failed to take all reasonable
steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo,"
such failure deprived him of constitutional rights. J.A.
73a. Although this instruction was requested by respondent
himself, see Petn. App. 93a, the trial judge also
emphasized that there could be no liablity in the absence
of "deliberate indifference" to Romeo•s needs under the
standard of Estelle v Gamble, 429 u.s. 97 (1976),
regardless of whether alternative methods of treatment
could have prevented injury.

26.

:

indifference" to patients' needs, see Estelle v. Gamble,
427 U.S. 97

(1976).

Again, we think that an institution

such as Pennhurst discharges its duty when decisions with
respect to assuring the the safety of inmates are made by
the appropriate professionals.

IV

Involuntary

commitment

neither

extinguishes

all

constitutionally protected liberty interests nor entitles
those

committed

to

optimal

care

and

conditions.

The

substantial interests of the involuntarilly committed must
be

weighed

against

constraints

under

legitimate
which

necessarily operate.
adequate

food,

state

most

interests

state

and

the

institutions

The state concedes a duty to provide

shelter, clothing and medical care.

And

the state does not dispute that it has a duty to provide
reasonable safety for
the

institution.

As

all patients and personnel within
indicated above,

we hold

that the

1

'
al
state also has the duty to provide reasonable training for
r

-..,

/3tJa

patient

such

as

respondent. A~ecisions

made

by

the

27.

appropriate
retained,

are

entitled

institutions

a

strong

the

staff

or

presumption

of

a presumption is necessary to

correctness ~ how t:~ ·

enable

on

professional,

of

type--often,

unfortunately,

overcrowded and understaffed -to continue to function.
single professional may make

decisions

wi~h

A

respect

ying needs and problems in
the

course

of

a

normal

and

required to make each decision in the shadow of an action
for damages.
interests

We do not, of course, imply that the liberty

identified

above

are

not

td.~
protected

by

the

"'

Constitution or that judicial review is not available in
appropriate cases.
In

this

case,

we

conclude

that

the

jury

was

erroreously

instructed on the assumption that the proper

standard of

liability was

\I

that of the Eighth Amendment.
/

Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.

:1

I~

1'1

meb 03/26/82

;g

11
22.,

Draft No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo

z1

The question presented
retarded

adult

i~

whether respondent,

committed

involuntarily

to

a

a

state

institution, has a claim for damages against petitiofers,

'l._
the

director

Respondent

and

two

brings

suit

supervisors
under

42

of

U.S.C.

the

institution.

§1983,

claiming

that the conditions of his confinement violate his

~ts

under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.

I

Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded.
Although 33 years old, he has
eighteen-month old child.
most basic self-care skills.
lived

with

his

parents

in

He

/

the mental capacity of an
cannot talk and lacks

the

Until he was 26, respondent
Philadelphia.

But after

the

death of his father in May of 1974, his mother was unable

;,

··-

2.

to control his violence.

Within two weeks of the father's

death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly

thereafter,

she

asked

the

Philadelphia

Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state facility
on a permanent basis.

Her petition to the court explained

that

to

she

was

violence. 1
examined

by

unable

care

for

Romeo

or

control

his

As part of the commitment process, Romeo was
a

physician and

a

psychologist.

They

both

certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable
to care for himself.

Joint Appendix (J.A.} 2la-22a & 28a-

29a.

The

physician

destructive

behavior. 2

also

described

On July

11,

1974,

Romeo's

self-

the Court of

...,,
Common Pleas committed respondent to the Pennhurst State

1 Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to
handle him.
He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't.
He is constant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable
to care for him." Joint Appendix (J.A. 18a}.
2

J. A. at 2 2A:

"Physican and mental findings at time of
examination:
Pt.
[patient]
is
nonverbalrestrained
in bed.
Recognizes examiner by
rolling his eyes and banging his head against
bedrail."

·.

3

School

and

involuntary

Hospital,

pursuant

commitment

provision

the

to
of

the

0

applicable
Pennsylvania

Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 50 §4406.
At

Pennhurst,

Romeo

was

injured

on

numerous

occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions
of

other

about

inmates

these

to

him.

injuries.

Mrs.

After

Romeo

objecting

treatment several times, she filed
United States District Court for
Pennsylvania
that

as his next

"[d]uring

plaintiff

has

occasions."
injunctive

...

the

friend.

period

suffered

July,

became
to

concerned

respondent's

this complaint in the

the Eastern District of
The complaint alleged
1974

to

the

present,

injuries on at least sixty-three

The complaint originally sought damages and
relief

supervisor s 3 ;

it

from
alleged

Pennhurst's
that

these

director
officials

and
knew,

two
or

should have known, that Romeo was suffering injuries and

3 Petitioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent
of Pennhurst; he had supervisory authority over the entire
facility.
Respondent Richard Matthews was the Director of
Resident Life at Pennhurst.
Respandent Marguerite Conley
was Unit Director for the unit in which repondent was
incarcerated. Petitioners are administrators, not medical
doctors or psychologists.
Youngberg and Matthews are no
longer at Pennhurst.

4.

failed

to

institute

appropriate

preventive

procedures,

thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Thereafter,
from his ward
arm.
was

late

1976,

to the hospital

Romeo

for

was

transfered

treatment of a broken

While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he
restrained 4 during

physically

These
·'

in

restraints

defendant

here,

hospital,

some

treated

were
to

of

ordered

protect

whom were

intravenously.

7

by

Dr.

Gabroy,

Romeo

and

others

in

R.

portions of each day.

traction or

40,

49,

76-78.

not
in

were

a
the

being

Although

respondent normally would have returned to his ward when
his arm healed, the parties to this litigation agreed that
he should remain
suit.

5

R.

in the hospital due to the pending law

248,

6

R.

57-58

1977,

a

second

&

137.

of

alleging

that the defendants were restraining respondent

prolonged

periods

on

a

routine

complaint was

in

December

for

amended

Nevertheless,

basis. 5

The

filed

second

4Although the Court of Appeals described these
restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms
only, were generally used.
7 Record (R.) 53-55, 59.
Footnote(s)

5 will appear on following pages.

5.

amended

complaint

compensate
him

with

Romeo

also
for

a

claim

the defendants'

appropriate

Pennhurst.

added

treatment

All claims for

for

damages

failure

throughout

to

to provide

his

stay

at

injunctive relief were dropped

prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 6
An
1978.

eight-day

Petitioners

jury

trial

introduced

was

held

evidence

in

that

April

of

respondent

participated in several programs teaching basic self-care
skills. 7 A comprehensive behavior~modification program was
designed

by

staff

members

to

reduce

his

aggressive

behavior, 8 but that program was never implemented because

'"'
5 The first amended complaint was fileCi
in January
1977, after respondent's hospitalization, but it added no
restraint-related allegations. Compare original complaint
,!16 and first amended complaint ,!16 (change related to
safety claim, not use of restraints) •

6

Pennhurst

tj_Sl_u. S.

l

State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
(remanded for further proceedings) .

(19 81)

7 Prior
to his
transfer
to Pennhurst's hospital
ward, Romeo participated in programs dealing with feeding,
showering, drying, - dressing, self control, and toilet
training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members.
Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 R. 69-70, 5 R.
44-56, 242-250, 6 R. 162-166; 7 R. 41-48.
Programming continued while respondent was in the
hospital, 5 R. 227, 248, 256; 6 R. 50, 162, R. 32,34, 4148, and this programming reduced respondent's aggressive
behavior to some extent, 7 R. 45.
8

2 R. 7 , 5 R. 8 8- 9 0 ; 6 R. 8 8 , 2 0 0-2 0 3 ; Defendants '
Exhibit 1, at 9. The program called for short periods of
separation from other residents and for use of "muffs" on
Footnote continued on next page.
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1

of

his

mother's

objections. 9

Respondent

introduced

evidence of his injuries and of conditions in his "unit,"
though
two

the District Court refused to allow testimony of

experts

proffered. 10

he

that evidence of

The

trial

judge explained

the advantages of alternative forms of

treatment might be relevant to a malpractice suit, but was
not relevant to a constitutional claim under §1983.

Petn.

App. 94a-95a.
At the close of the trial,

the court instructed

the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware
of

and

failed

to

take

all

reasonable

steps

to prevent

...
repeated
deprived
73a.

attacks
him of

upon
his

Nicholas

Romeo,"

constitutional

rights.

such

failure

Petn.

App.

The jury also was instructed that if the defendants

I

I
, I

'1

plaintiff's hands for short periods of time, i.e., 15
minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or others.
9

1 R. 53; 4 R. 25; 6 R. 204.

10 The first of these experts was a psychologist,
specializing in treating the mentally retarded. He would
have testified that Romeo could have been more effectively
treated under other programs and that the lack of
programming in Romeo's ward was the cause of aggressive
behavior.
Respondent's other expert was a physician with
a specialty in neurological pediatrics and the director of
a private institution for the mentally retarded. He would
have testified that residents at his private institution
as severely retarded as Romeo did not have similar
problems of aggression or injury.

7.

shackled Romeo other than in a good faith effort to treat
him,

his

rights had

been violated.

Ibid.

Finally,

the

jury was instructed that if Romeo was denied treatment "as
a

punishment

were

for

filing

"deliberately

this lawsuit," or
to

indifferent

if defendants

the

medical

and

psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," his coristitutional
rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment.

Id., at

73a-75a.
The
on which
Appeals

jury returned a verdict for

On appeal,

judgment was entered.
for

the Third Circuit,

the defendants,
the Court of

sitting en bane,

the judgment and remanded for a new trial.
(1980}.

vacated

..

644 F. 2d 147

All of the judges agreed that respondent's expert

,,

""

Id.~

testimony should have been admitted.
They

also agreed

that

the

at 164 & 173.

Eighth Amendment,

prohibiting

cruel and unusual punishment of those convicted of crimes,
was not an appropriate source for determining the rights
of

the

involuntarily

committed.

Rather,

respondent's

Fourteenth Amendment liberty right was implicated by the
conditions under which he was confined.
173.

The

en bane court did

not,

Id., at 156-59, &

however,

agree on the

·

8.

relevant
~

]

standard

to

be

used

in

determining

whether

Romeo's rights had been violated. 11

~

The court's majority opinion began its analysis

l

of this issue by stating that involuntary civil commitment

1
1
l

.J

entails a "massive curtailment of liberty."
(quoting Humphrey v. Cady, 405
1
I

u.s.

504, 509 (1972)).

l

a

l

pursuant to due process.

Ibid.

that

extinguish

l

Id., at 157
As

consequence involuntary commitment may be ordered only

commitment

does

not

The court further held
all

aspects

of

an

'
.j
I

·l

individual's

liberty

interest;

the

power

of

locomotion

I
l

'

without restraint and the right to personal security and
freedom from punishment are fundamental liberties that can

j
I

t

be

limited

interest.

only

by

an

overriding,

non-punitive

state

644 F. 2d, at 157-159.
In

light

of

Romeo's three claims:
restraints;

( i i)

these

views,

the

court considered

(i) the right to be free of physical

the right to safety and protect ion;

and

11 The existence of a qualified immunity defense
was not at issue on appeal.
The defendants had received
instructions on this defense, J.A. 76a, and it was not
challenged by respondent.
644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l. After
citing Pierson v. Rhodes, 386 u.s. 547 (1967) and Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), the majortiy of the Court
of Appeals noted that such instructions should be given
again on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.

...

9.

(iii)

the

physical

right

to

restraint

treatment.
"raises

a

sanction,"

it

necessity.

Id., at 159-160.

can

be

Id.,

at

presumption

justified

only

159.
of

Because

a

by

punitive

compelling

And the failure to provide

for a patient's safety must be justified by a showing of
substantial necessity.
held

..''

that

when

Id.,

treatment

at 160.

has

responsible

are

liable

only

"acceptable

in

light

of

scientific knowledge."

been
if

the

present

Finally, the court
administered,
treatment
I

medical

those
is

or

not

other

Id., at 166-167 & 173. 12

Chief Judge Seitz, writing for a minority of four,

·

....

considered

j

I
j

the standards articulated by

indistinguishable
malpractice

from

claims.

those
In

the majority as

applicabble

Judge

to

medical

view,

the

1

.I

. 1'

12 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment
claim into three categories and adopted three standards,
but only the standard described in text is at issue before
this Court.
The Court of Appeals also stated that if a
jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may
hold the institut1on's administrators liable unless they
can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of
treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does not
discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not
appear to be relevant to the facts of this case.
In
addition,
the
court
considered
"least
restrictive ·
analysis" appropriate to justify severe intrusions on
individual dignity, such as permanent physical alteration
or surgical intervention, id., at 165-166, & 173, but
respondent concedes that this-issue is not present in this
case.

10.

Constitutiton "only requires

that the courts make certain

that ~rofessional judgment in fact was exercised."
2d,
was

at

/7(

644 F.

He concluded that . the appropriate standard

whether

the

defendents'

conduct

was

"such

a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or
plaintiff
base

their

standards

as

in the care and

to demonstrate

that

treatment of this

the defendants did not

conduct on a professional

judgment."

644 F.

2d, at 178. 13
We granted the petition for certiorari because of

I

the

importance

of

the

question

presented

to

the

..!

·..,
administration of state institutions for the involuntarily
committed.

t/)1 u.s. Cjgz.,.

(198_i_).

We now reverse.

13 Judge Aldisert joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion,
but wrote separately to emphasize the nature of the
difference between the majority opinion and that of the
Chief Judge.
On a conceptual level, Judge Aldisert
criticized the majority for abandoning the common-law
method
of
deciding
the
case
at
bar
rather
than
articulating broad principles unconnected with the facts
of the case and of uncertain meaning.
644 F. 2d, at /'(~
.J1.i. And, on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned
that
neither
juries
nor
those
administering
state
institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous
constitutional law tenets" articulated by the majority.
Id., at 1'63 -; /t'('('"
- - Judge-Garth also joined Chief Judge Seitz's opinion,
and wrote separately to criticize the majority for
addressing issu~ s not raised by the facts of this case.
6 4 4 F. 2d, at .!_!1:_.

~

11.

II

We consider here for the first time the substantive
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth
Amendment 14

I

respondent

to
has

the
been

Consti tution. 15
commit ted

this

In

pursuant

to

the

case,
laws

of

lI

,
j
!

Pennsylvania,
The

broad

Process

and he does not challenge the commitment.

question

Clause,

commitment

presented

is whether,

petitioners . have

liberty

interest

by

under

infringed
failing

to

the
a

Due

postprovide

constitutionally adequate conditions of confinement. 16
•..,.

14 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a
state cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ..•. ".u.s. Const.,
Amend. XIV, §1.

' ..

15 The respondent no longer relies on the Eighth
Amendment as a direct source of constitutional rights,
Brief of Respondent 13 n.l2 ("the Eighth Amendment applies
only in cases concerning punishment of persons convicted
of crimes").
16 Respondent
also
argues
that
the
Pennsylvania
commitment statute provides a state-law basis for his
federal substantive right.
He maintains that he was
commmitted for car .e and treatment under state law, and he
therefore has a state substantive right entitled to
substantive, not just procedural, protection under the Due
Process Clause of the Federal Constitution. Initially, we
note that this argument is made for the first time in
respondent's brief to this Court; it was not advanced in
the courts below.
Respondent relies primarily on Jackson v. Indiana, 406
u.s. 715 (1972). There, the Court stated that due process
requires,
at
a
minimum,
terms
and
conditions
of
confinement that bear some rational relation to the
purposes of confinement. Thus, respondent argues that the
Footnote continued on next page.
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Respondent's commitment proceeding did not deprive

..

him

of

all

substantive

liberty

interest

under

the

See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445

u.s.

·1

~

·I
I
·j

Fourteenth Amendment.
480,

491-494

respondent

is

{1980).

And

confined

the

conditions

implicate

the

under

entirety

which
of

his

I

'l\

.. ;

·~

l

'l

j

l

I
I

l

. I

I

.j

l

l
l
j

t

~

1

.i

1

1
. i

l

.. ,I
I

.

i
:j

<

j

wording of the relevant Pennsylvania commitment statute
and the purposes for which he was committed--care and
treatment--create a
state-created right to treatment
entitled to federal protect ion under Jackson because due
process requires some relationship between the conditions
of confinement and its purposes.
In Jackson, however, the
Court was considering only the need for a relationship
between the single reason justifying confinement as a
matter
of
federal
law--temporary confinement pending
competency to stand trial--and the "terms and conditions"
of confinement.
Romeo could, as a matter of federal law,
be confined to protect others. See text and notes at n! 1
&
n. 2, supra; Addington v Texas, 441 U.S. 418, t/z...!.
(1979); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975):""
Although respondent may have been confined for care and
treatment under the relevant Pennsylvania statute, he is
not seeking another state procedure, one that would commit
him solely because he is violent.
Moreover, we see no reason why a federal substantive
right to treatment should vary with the wording of the
relevant state commitment statute or with the precise
reason given for commitment. For example, as a matter of
federal
law,
why should a mentally retarded person
involuntarily commi t .ted to protect himself' aoo others
receive less treatment or inferior conditions than one
involuntarily committed only because he is unable to care
for himself?
It is true that state substantive rights
implicate federal procedural due process. And i t is also
true that we have never held explicitly that state
substantive
rights cannot be the basis for federal
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause.
In
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
842 n. 48 (1977), we indicated that even when a federal
procedural right exists, the existence of a related
federal substantive right is not automatic, oot is an
entirely distinct question.
If
respondent
were
arguing
that
his state-law
substantive right entitled him to certain pEocedural
protections, Pennsylvania law would be relevant.
See,
e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 u.s. 480 (1980); Wolf v.
McDonnell, 418 u.s. 539, 557-558 (1974). This arqument is
not, however, presented by respondent.
I

j

l
-1

1

l

'

I

..•.

13.

remaining

liberty

The

interest.

initial

question

therefore becomes by what standard do we determine whether

$

the care at Pennhurst inpermissibly infringe that residuum
'\
of liberty of which respondent should not be deprived.
Due

process

is a

balance between "the liberty of

the individual" and "the demands of an organized society."
Poe v. Ullman, 367
dissenting).

.-:. ...

.....

Court

has

against

u.s.

weighed

the

for

the

state's

detainees,

individual's
asserted

interest

reasons

for

we

cons ide red

a

liberty

restraining

challenge

confinement conditions.
not

in

In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539

example,

trial detainees'
the

(Harlan, J.,

In seeking this balance in other cases, the

individual liberty.
(1979) ,

497, 522, 542 (1961)

yet convicted

could not be punished.

of

to pre-

We agreed that

"'
the · ct'ime charged,

But we upheld those restrictions

'J

on

liberty

government
And
held

that

objectives

in Jackson v.
that

were

an

reasonably
and

Indiana,

incompetent

not

related

tantamount

406 U.S.
pre-trial

to

legitimate

to punishment.

713, 738
detainee

(1972), we
could

not,

after a competency hearing, be held indefinitely without
either criminal process or civil commitment: due process

14.

requires, at a minimum, some rational relation between the
nature and duration of commitment and its purpose.
We

have

procedural

taken

due-process

proceedings.

a

similar

approach

challenges

to

in

civil

deciding
commitment

In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418

(1979),

for

example, we held that the state must prove the need

for

commitment

by

"clear

and

convincing

evidence."

We

reached this decision by weighing the individual's liberty
interest

against

the

state's

legitimate

interests

in

j

I

confinement.

And in Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979),

. I

j

we

considered

commitment

of

a

challenge

a

minor

to

with

state

procedures

for

consent.

In

parental

determining that procedural due process did not mandate an
adversarisal hearing, we balanced the liberty interest of
the

individual

state,

against

including

the

the

legitimate

fiscal

and

additional procedures would entail.
Although
addressing

the

foregoing

procedural,

as

interests

administrative

the

burdens

Id., at 599-600.

discussion
well

of

as

includes

substantive,

cases
due

rr·
~

~~'/]./&:
process, the same basic analysis has been usee in either

"
~tenqe.

In considering whether respondent's substantive

15.

liberty

interests

are

adequately

protected

in

the

Pennhurst State School and Hospital, it is again necessary
to strike the balance referred to by Justice Harlan in Poe
v.
I

_,I

Ullman,

against

weighing

the

individual 1 s

the

legitimate

interests

of

liberty
the

interests

state

and

the

restraints within which the state must operate, including
the practical problems of operating an institution such as
Pennhurst.
the

need

issues;

In seeking this balance, we must be mindful of
to

reserve

there

constitutional

are

the

Constitution

limitations

principles

upon

may

for

the

be

appropriate

extent
relied

to

which

upon

in

·..
considering the adequacy of the day-to-day care provided
in

a

large

institution

operating

within

the

inevitable

....

'

constraints of finite human and physical reso~rces.l 7

reject

standards

at

the

extremes.

The

Pennsylvania

J
-l

standard

of

medical malpractice,

imposing

1 iabili ty

for

I
I

any

unjustified

medical

j

.
18
pract1ce,

institutional

.,

is

setting- ~S@-e

~

'l

departure

from

established

norms

not

applicable

in

Estelle

v.

Gamb l e,

Nor is the standard applicable to prison

conditions appropriate.

Although punitive conditions are

permissible

institutions

unusual,

in

penal

persons

committed

unless

involuntarily

cruel
to

a

and
state

1

-·

·......

institution because of mental retardation are not detained

·.,
for any crime or fault on their part and certainly cannot
be punished at all.

I

l

..
facility."); Wolf v. McDonnell, 418 u.s. 539, 556 (1974)
(In considering procedural due process claim in context of
prison: "[T]here must be mutual accommodation between
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution of general application."); Procunier v.
Marttinez,
416 u.s.
396,
404-405,406
(1974)
("[T]he
problems
of
prisons
in
America
are
complex
and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily
susceptible
to
resolution
by
degree.
Most require
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
r e sources, all of which are peculiarly within the province
of
the
legislative
and
executive
branches of
the
government.").
See
also
Townsend
& Mattson,
The
Interaction of Law and Special Education, 1 Analysis and
intervention
in Developmental disabilities 75
(1981)
(judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have
adverse as well as positive effects on social change).

18 see, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263 (1971).

.,

··-

17.

III.

''j
We
Seitz

think

reflects

the
a

standard articulated by Chief Judge

proper

He would have held

balance , Gf

that

fa-e-tor~.f

Mathews

t:be

"the Constitution only requires

that the courts make certain that professional judgment in
It is not appropriate for the courts

fact was exercised.
to

specify

which

of

several

professionally

acceptable

choices should have been made." 644 F.2d, at 178.
This standard avoids both of the extremes for which
the

parties

have

standard applied
and

may

be

applicable

contended.

malpractice.

is

less demanding

state

law

Moreover,

in

a

tort

patients,

entirely

the

upon

involuntarily

involuntarily
the

in

are

than

the

challenged,

than the standard
.... .

",

suit

for

medical

this standard strikes the proper

balance between the relevant interests.
or

higher

when prison conditions

viewed as
under

It

state 19 ;

civil

Whether prisoners

committed
yet

proceedings

must

those
are

depend

committed

detained

as

19 see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 u.s. 97, 103-104 (1976).

#

18.

dependents of the state,

through no

fault of their own.

They are therefore entitled to more considerate treatment
and

l

·l

conditions

status

of

and needs

confinement

more

responsive

than are prisoners.

to

their

We hold

that when

committed

me tally

l
I

the

rights

of

'~h

the

involuntarily

&--:j <12-u., 4~ 1 ,·11 ~ ~·se.Ja-J

]
l

.l

safety

conditions

considered

*"o(J. ~i
appropriate

by

professionals

exercising

their

judgment.

We recognize that this holding may impose some additional
burdens on states.

We make clear, however, that judicial

review is limited to ensuring that decisions with respect
to

these

matters

profesiona1. 20

are

duly

The decision,

made

by.

a

qualified

if made by a professional,

is presumptively valid; liability may be imposed only when

20 rndeed,

although
respondent
has
claimed
substantive, not procedural, rights, our holding entitles
respondent to a right that can be characterized as
procedural.
We hold that the involuntary committed are
entitled to an informal, non-adver sar ial "hearing" by a
professional
exercising
his
professional
judgment--a
"procedure" not unlike that upheld in Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S~
. 584 (1979) , a procedural due process case discussed
in .
and net:es
11. - supra.

eo

5

-x-

~-

J

&
.:6 __,

.

~1~r-~

fWL~~

h~~1~

"'

··-

i

I

wi't.hic .......O.J:

'(- Q8eision

retained

is

such

professional
demonstrate

a

b_y

i ns..t itution,

substantial

judgment,
that

the

departure

practice

or

or

·,ihen

the

from accepted

standards

as

to

the person responsible actually did _not

base the decision on such a judgment. 21
We

..

1'
I

turn

specific claims

now

to

consider

briefly

respondent's

in light of this standard.

The parties

<

'i

~I

agree that the state must provide adequate food,

)
I

and

.

\

care. 22

medical

The

remaining

questions

shelter
concern

respondent's claims to entitlement to additional training
for his disability, leis restrictive treatment, and safer
conditions.

In a sense, each of these claims relates to

,,

~

an element of
respect

to

the care

persons

that a

state must exercise with

involuntarily

committed

to

mental

21 All members of the Court of Appeals agreed that
respondent's expert testimony should have been admitted.
This issue was not included in the questions presented in
the petition for certiorari, and we have no reason to
disagree with the view that the evidence was admissible.
It appears relevant to whether petitioners' decisions were
a
substantial
departure
from
accepted
professional
practice.
22B r1e
. f of Petitioners 8, 11, 12
Respondent
15-16.
See
also Amici
Connecticut and Twenty Other States 8.

&

n. 10; Brief of
Curiae Brief of

20.
•.

institutions •

.·
A

Respondent claims the right to training and education
to improve his ability to function given his handicap, and
argues

that

general

treatment

standard

treatment

644 F.

State

supports

jury,

instructions

should be provided under

adopted

by

the

2d, at 173.

the

Court

of

the

Appeals:

in light of present scientific

"acceptable

knowledge."

l

such

District

As a general matter, the

Court's

instructionsto

the

!

·J

I

u.s.
of

97

(1976)

care: ·only

based

on

the

Estelle

v.

Gamble,

(medical treatment of prisoners)
deliberate

indifference

to

429

standard

medical

needs

.... .

. ',
breaches

care

required

by

the

Constitution.

More

.
I

particularly, the State maintains that when it commits an
individual such as Romeo for care, it need not "assume a
constitutional

duty

to

provide

him

services such as treatment

[in the

education

maximize

potential."

necessary

to

with

additional

form of] training and
his

developmental

Brief of Petitioners 8.

We are not persuaded by either argument. As noted

21.

by

both

Chief

Judge

separate opinions,
adopted

by

the

Seitz and Judge Aldersert

the

Third

standard urged
Circuit

medical malpractice standard •

is

no

in their

by respondent and
different

644 F.

2d,

from

at (!_]_

&

the

/rt3 .

.I
And,

although

professionals

are

far

from

agreeing

that

effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded

I

persons
that

even possible, 23 we certainly would not hold

is

due

process

is

satisfied when

involuntarily committed to state

l

kept alive.

innocent

individuals

institutions are simply

When treatment or training might ameliorate a

. .I
·j

I

patient's
should

be

suffering or
considered

professional

judgment

improve his
by

a

condition,

professional

in making

the

such care

exercising

his

treatment decision.
~

We

do

not

suggest

that

the

provide optimal treatment.
•

has

Normally,

an

"

obligation

to

it is sufficient if

J

_,.,_,'

~--·

State

the treatment chosen to improve the patient's condition is

i

23 see,
e.g.,
Favell,
Risley,
Wolfe,
Riddle,
&
Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1 Analysis and
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981):
Bailey, Wanted:
A Rational Search
for the Limiting
Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1 Analysis and
Intervention in Developmental Disabilities, 37 {1981):
Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability: Searching for
the Substance of Things Hoped for: The Evidence of Things
Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention in Developmental
Disabilities, 37 (1981).

22.

that prescribed by the responsible professiona1. 24

I

I,

B

I

I
I
I

l

Respondent and
use of restraints.
Appeals

held,

"compelling
•'

·•

the

State also disagree as to the

Respondent maintains, and the Court of

that

restraints

necessity"

and

as

can

be

the

justified only

"least

by

restrictive"

method of dealing with a patient. 644 F. 2d, at 160-161. 25
The

basis

for

this

holding

restraints

are

"not

normally

confinement
644 F.

contemplated

2d, at 160

in

was

the

within

perception

the

habilitative

(footnote omitted}.

that

conditions

of

...

institutions."

The State asserts

~;~

::1

24 By "professional d cisionm ker", we mean a pe son
reasonably competent, whet er by training or experie ce,
to make the particular dec ion at issue.
Although we
would expect long-term treatm
decisions to be made by
persons with medical degrees or
~raining in a eas
such as psychology, physical ther py, or ~he training and
education of the retarded, other i~po~~aflt decisions ill
be made by nurses or by employees without any formal
training.
25 rn his
brief,
respondent
urges
adoption of a
standard proscribing "unnecessary custodial shackling"
rather than the "least restrictive means" standard adopted
by
the
Court
of
Appeals.
But
at
oral
argument
respondent's
counsel
conceded
that
there
is
little
practical
difference
between
these
formulations:
respondent would consider restraints unnecessary if a less
restrictive alternative were available.
Transcript of
Oral Argument 55-56.

...

23.

that there

is no basis for

profoundly

retarded

restraints

are

this conclusion, noting that

patients

necessary.

often

The

are

State

violent

and

emphasizes

its

legitimate interest in protecting the welfare and safety
of all of the residents in its institutions.
In view of the

facts of

this case,

the need for

physical restraint of respondent cannot be denied. 26
Romeo's

petition

propensity
alleged

for

that

for

commitment

violence,

during

a

J.A.

described
18a,

specified

and

period

respondent's
his

that

the

state,

in

discharging

its

duty

complaint

respondent

suffered injuries on at least 63 occasions.
.!

Mrs.

had

It is clear
to

respondent

1

himself as well as to other patients and staff personnel,

.
'

I

I

must restrain respondent at times when violence is evident

l

l

•

l

.:

..
'

.j

II

26 It is true that the majority of the Court of
Appeals adopted a finding that there was an "absence of
any dangerouness to others" among residents at Pennhurst •
644 F. 2d, at
n. 18. This finding was not, however,
based on the record in this case, but on a finding in
another case, Halderman v. Pennhurst State School &
Hospital,
612 F.
2d <; ?' !
92
(19j f), reversed and
remanded, Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
u.s. .z..- (1981).
See 644 F. 2d, at l f ~ n. 18.
Moreover,
he finding is · inconsistent with f e Court of
Appeals' own description of the facts of this case: "It is
not contested that, while confined at Pennhurst, Romeo . was
injured on over seventy occaisions.
These injuries were
both self-inflicted and the result of attacks by other
residents, some in retaliation against Romeo's aggressive
behavior." 644 F. 2d, at /~·

...

24.

or

reasonably

"least

expected.

restrictive" or

We

do

not

"compelling

think

that

either

necessity" analysis 27

is appropriate in reviewing decisions that must be made in
an institution like Pennhurst.

Frequently such decisions

must be made quickly, with little or no warning, in order
to restraint violence that would endanger the patient or
others.

The

Constitution

requires

only

that

these

decisions be made by a professional reasonably competent
to make them.

c

Finally, respondent and the Court of Appeals would

...,,.
impose

liability

for

any

injury

to

respOndent

in

the

...
'·

absence

of

"substantial

necessity"

or

"sustantial

explanations" based on the State's interest in providing
care and treatment as well as ensuring the institutional

27 rn the judgment of at least one professional group,
the least restrictive standard "is not always best from a
clinical standpoint," and, "as a practical matter, it may
not
be
possible
to
identify
the
least restrictive
alternative at all."
Brief of the American Psychiatric
Association, at 20.

· ·-

25.

order needed to provide that care and treatment.
2d,

at 163-164 & 173.

Petitioner argues that the proper

standard was articulated
is

no

constitutional

"deliberate
J .A.

73a

644 F.

in the

jury instruct ions:

violation

indifference"

to

in

the

respondent's

there

absence
safety.

(jury instruction cited by petitioner). 28

of
See

Thus,

the State would again apply the "deliberate indifference"

l
,-

standard

Estelle

of

(standard

of

Gamble,

v.

liability

for

prison

427

u.s.

(1976)

97

doctors

in

treating

'I
prisoners),

in determining whether the failure to ensure

.,'

. respondent's safety violated the Constitution.
It

hardly

need

be

said

that

the

State

owes

l

I

J

l

respondent a duty to take reasonable steps to ensure his
physical safety.

But we

find

. "'' ,

no basis for

holding that

the Constitution requires adoption of the standard urged

JI

28 specifically, petitioner cites the instruction on
accidental injury. The trial judge, referring to the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment, instructed the jury that "if any or all of the
defendants were aware of and failed to take all reasonable
steps to prevent repeated attacks upon Nicholas Romeo,"
such failure deprived him of constitutional rights. J.A.
73a. Although this instruction was requested by respondent
himself,
see Petn.
App.
93a,
the trial judge also
emphasized that there could be no liablity in the absence
of "deliberate indifference" to Romeo's needs under the
standard of Estelle v Gamble,
429 U.S.
97
(1976),
regardless of whether alternative methods of treatment
could have prevented injury.

_.

26.

by

respondent:

liability

in

the

absence of

"substantial

necessity" or a "substantial explanation."

We also reject

petitioners'

view

fulfills

constitutional

obligation

committed

though

as

that

violation

indifference"

to patients'

97

(1976).

by

they

constitutional

427 U.S.

the

State

treating
were

in

the

the

involuntarily

prisoners,
absence

its

of

i.e. ,

no

"deliberate

needs, see Estelle v.

Gamble,

Again, we think that an institution

such as Pennhurst discharges its duty when decisions with
respect to assuring the the. safety of inmates are made by
the appropriate professionals.

IV

Involuntary

commitment

neither

extinguishes

all

constitutionally protected liberty interests nor entitles
those

committed

to

optimal

care

and

conditions.

The

substantial interests of the involuntari;;fy committed must
be

weighed

against

constraints

under

necessarily operate.

legitimate
which

state

most

interests

state

and

the

institutions

The state concedes a duty to provide

~

··-

27.

adequate

food,

shelter,

clothing and medical care.

And

the state does not dispute that it has a duty to provide
reasonable
the

safety

institution.

for
As

all patients and personnel within
indicated

above,

we hold

that

the

state also has the duty to provide reasonable training for
a patient such as respondent.
appropriate
retained,

professional,
are

correctness.

entitled
Such a

But decisions made by the

whether
to

a

on

strong

presumption

staff

or

presumption

of

the

is necessary to enable

J

I

.j
·I

institutions

of

this

type--often,

unfortunately,

overcrowded and understaffed--to continue to function.

J

A

·,I

single professional may make

a,.~~
to
the

~

~

decisions with respect

~

patients with widely varying needs and problems in

"

course

of

a

normal

day.

The

. '',

administrators,

and

particularly professional personnel ) should not be required

.
·,

~~:

to

make

damages.

each
We

decision
do

not,

in

the

shadow of

of course,

an

imply that

action

for

the liberty

interests identified above are not ultimately protected by
the Constitution or that judicial review is not available
in appropriate cases.
In

this

case,

we

conclude

that

the

jury

was

~

·· -

28 •

.
'

erroreously

instructed on the assumption that the proper

standard of

liability was

that of the Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, we remand for

further proceedings consistent

with this decision.

....

-.

meb 05/01/82

Draft No. 80-1429, Youngberg v. Romeo

The
involuntarily

question
committed

mentally retarded,
Process

presented
to

a

is

whether

state

has substantive

respondent,

institution
righ~

for

the

under the Due

, a~

Clause

training

or

of

the

Amen ~_) W.

Fourteenth

"habilitation," 1

safe

-

conditions

W
of

~--

confinement 1
Respondent

~

(i;v.t )

freedom

~
under 42

~

1

administrators of the

institud

from

u.s.c.

bodily

restraints;

§1983 against three

.

be~ages

for

the alleged breach of his constitutional rights.

I

1 The American Psychiatric Associatiion explains that
"[t]he word 'habilitation,' is used to refer to programs
for the mentally retarded because mental retardation is
•.• a learning disability and training impairment rather
than an illness .... [T]he principal focus of habilitation
is upon training and development of needed skills." Brief
of American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4
n. 1.

:;;s;
A

2

0

Respondent Nicholas Romeo is profoundly retarded.
Although 33 years old,

he has the mental capacity of an

eighteen-month old child.

He cannot talk and lacks the

most basic self-care skills.
lived

with

his

parents

in

Until he was 26, respondent
Philadelphia.

But

after

the

death of his father in May 1974, his mother was unable to
control his

violence.

Within two weeks of the father's

death, respondent's mother sought his temporary admission
to a nearby Pennsylvania hospital.
Shortly

thereafter,

she

asked

the

Philadelphia

County Court of Common Pleas to admit Romeo to a state
facility on a permanent basis.

Her petition to the court

explained that she was unable to care for Romeo or control
his violence. 2

As part of the commitment process, Romeo

was examined by a physician and a psychologist.

They both

certified that respondent was severely retarded and unable
to care for himself.

7

App. 2la-22a & 28a-29a.

On June 11,

2Mrs. Romeo's petition to the Court of Common
Pleas stated: "Since my husband's death I am unable to
handle him.
He becomes violent--Kicks, punches, breaks
glass; He can't speak--wants to express himself but can't.
He is Aconstant 24 hr. care. without my husband I am unable
to care for him." App. 18a.

3.

1974,

the Court of Common Pleas committed respondent to

the Pennhurst State School and Hospital, pursuant to the
applicable

involuntary

provision

commitment

of

the

Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act, Pa.
Stat. Ann. tit. 50 §4406.
At

Pennhurst,

Romeo

was

injured

on

numerous

occasions, both by his own violence and by the reactions
of other
about

inmates

these

to

him.

injuries.

Mrs.

After

Romeo became

objecting

to

concerned

respondent's
(})v -

>

treatment several times, she filed this complaint in the
A

United States District court for
Pennsylvania
that

as his next

"[d]uring

plaintiff has
occasions."
injunctive

the

friend.

period

suffered

July,

the Eastern District of
The complaint alleged
1974

to

the

present,

injuries on at least sixty-three

The complaint originally sought damages and
relief

supervisors 3 :

it

from
alleged

Pennhurst's
that

these

director
officials

and
knew,

two
or

3 Peti t ioner Duane Youngberg was the Superintendent
of Pennhurst:
he had supervisory authority over the
entire facility.
Respondent Richard Matthews was the
Director
of
Resident
Life
at
Pennhurst.
Respondent
Marguerite Conley was Unit Director for the unit in which
respondent was incarcerated.
According to respondent,
petitioners are administrators, not medical doctors.
See
Brief of Respondent 2.
Youngberg and Matthews are no
Footnote continued on next . page.

}

J9 7fJ.,

4•

.

should have known, that Romeo was suffering injuries and
failed

to

institute

appropriate

preventive

procedures,

thus violating his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.
Thereafter,

in

late 1976,

from his ward to the hospital for
arm.
was

Romeo was

transfered

treatment of a broken

While in the infirmary, and by order of a doctor, he
physically restrained during portions of each day. 4

These

restraints

defendant

here,

hospital,

some

were
to

of

ordered

protect

whom were

treated intravenously.

by

Dr.

Gabroy,

Romeo

and

others

in

traction or

not
in

were

7 Record 40, 49, 76-78.

a
the

being

Although

respondent normally would have returned to his ward when
his arm healed, the parties to this litigation agreed that
he should remain in the hospital due to the pending law
suit.

5 Record 248,

December

1977,

a

6 R. 57-58 & 137.

second

amended

Nevertheless, in

complaint

was

filed

alleging that the defendants were restraining respondent

longer at Pennhurst.
4Although the Court of Appeals described these
restraints as "shackles," "soft" restraints, for the arms
only, were generally used. 7 Record 53-55.

5.

for

prolonged

amended

periods

complaint

compensate Romeo
him

with

also
for

appropriate

Pennhurst.

on

a

routine

added

a

basis.

claim

the defendants'
treatment

All claims for

The

for

damages

failure

throughout

second
to

to provide

his

stay

at

injunctive relief were dropped

prior to trial because respondent is a member of the class
seeking such relief in another action. 5
An eight-day jury trial was held in April 1978.
Petitioners

introduced

evidence

that

respondent

participated in several programs teaching basic self-care
skills. 6 A comprehensive behavior-modification program was
designed

by

staff

members

to

reduce

Romeo's

aggressive

behavior, 7 but that program was never implemented because

5 Pennhur st State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
451 u.s. 1 (1981) (remanded for further proceedings).
6 Prior

11

to his transfer to Pennhurst's hospital
ward, Romeo participated in programs dealing with feeding,
showering, drying, dressing, self control, and toilet
training, as well as a program providing interaction with
staff members.
Defendants' exhibit 10; 3 Record 69-70, 5
Record 44-56, 242-250, 6 Record 162-166; 7 Record 41-48.
Tk£. _.P'rogram~ continued while respondent was in the
hospital, 5 ~ecord 227, 248, 256; 6 Record 50, 162-166,
Record
32,34,
41-48,
and
t.aris
pi!'OCJ::!:ammiA9)/ reduced
respondent's aggressive behavior to some extent, 7 Record
45.
7
2 Record 7, 5 Record 88-90; 6 Record 88, 200-203;
Defendants' Exhibit 1, at 9. The program called for short
periods of separation from other residents and for use of
"muffs" on plaintiff's hands for short periods of time,
i.e. , 5 minutes, to prevent him from harming himself or
Footnote continued on next page.

6.

of

his

objections. 8

mother's

Respondent

introduced

evidence of his injuries and of conditions in his unit. 9
At the close of the trial, the court instructed
the jury that "if any or all of the defendants were aware
of

and

failed

repeated

to

take

attacks

upon

all

reasonable

Nicholas

steps

Romeo,"

such

deprived him of his constitutional rights.
for Cert.

llOa.

to prevent
failure

App to Pet.

The jury also was instructed that if the

defendants shackled Romeo or denied him treatment "as a
punishment

for

filing

this

lawsuit,"

his

constitutional

rights were violated under the Eighth Amendment.
73a-75a.
found

the

Finally,

the

defendants

jury was

Id., at

instructed that if they

"deliberately

indifferent

to

the

medical and psychological needs of Nicholas Romeo," they
might

find

that Romeo's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment

others.
8 1 Record 53; 4 Record 25; 6 Record 204.
9 The District Judge refused to allow testimony by
two
of
Romeo's
witnesses--trained
professionals-indicating that Romeo would have benefitted from more or
different training programs.
The trial judge explained
that evidence of the advantages of alternative forms of
treatment might be relevant to a malpractice suit, but was
not relevant to a constitutional claim under §1983. App.
to Pet. for Cert. lOla.

7.

rights were violated.

Id., at llla.

The jury returned a

verdict for the defendants, on which judgment was entered.
The

Court

sitting en bane,
644 F.

2d

Amendment,

147

of

Appeals

for

the

Third

reversed and remanded for
(1980).

The court held

prohibiting

cruel

and

a new trial.

that

unusual

Circuit,

the

Eighth

punishment

of

those convicted of crimes, was not an appropriate source
for determining the rights of the involuntarily committed.
Rather, the Fourteenth Amendment and the liberty interest
protected by that amendment was the proper constitutional
basis

for

Amendment,

these
the

rights.
court

In

applying

found

the

the

that

Fourteenth

involuntarily

committed retain liberty interests in freedom of movement
and

in

personal

security.

These

were

"fundamental
~

liberties"

that could

be limited only by an overriding,

non-punitive state interest.
further

found

that

\~

the

644 F.

2d, at 157-159.

involuntarily

committed

have

It
a

7
liberty interest in training--a right to treatment--under
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The en bane court did not, however, agree on the
relevant

standard

to

be

used

in

determining

whether

7

8.

Romeo's

rights

restraint

had

violated. 10

been

Because

physical

"raises a presumption of a punitive sanction,"

the majority of the Court of Appeals concluded that it can
be justified only by "compelling necessity."
160.
the

Id., at 159-

A somewhat different standard was appropriate
failure

to

provide

for

a

patient's

safety.

for
The

majority considered that such a failure must be justified
by a

showing

Finally,

of

"substantial

the majority held

administered,

those

treatment

not

is

necessity."

Id.,

at

164.

that when treatment has been

responsible

"acceptable

are
in

liable

the

medical or other scientific knowledge."

light

only
of

if

the

present

Id., at 166-167 &

173.1 1

10 The existence of a qualified immunity defense was
not at issue on appeal.
The defendants had received
instructions on this defense,
App. 76a, and it was not
challenged by respondent.
644 F. 2d, at 173 n.l.
After
citing Pierson v. ~, 386 u.s. 547 (1967) and Scheuer v.
Rhodes, 416 u.s. 232 (1974), the majority of the Court of
Appeals noted that such instructions should be given again
on the remand. 644 F. 2d, at 171-172.
11 Actually, the court divided the right-to-treatment
claim into three categories and adopted three standards,
but only the standard described in text is at issue before
this Court.
The Court of Appeals also stated that if a
jury finds that no treatment has been administered, it may
hold the institution's administrators liable unless they
can provide a compelling explanation for the lack of
treatment, 644 F. 2d at 165, 173, but respondent does not
discuss this precise standard in his brief and it does not
appear to be relevant to the facts of this case.
In
addition,
the
court
considered
"least
restrictive
Footnote continued on next page.

9.

Chief
considered

Judge

Seitz,

writing

for

the

minority,

the standards articulated by the majority as

indistinguishable
malpractice

from

claims.

those
In

Constitution "only requires

applicable

~

-1

Judge

to

Seitz's

medical

view,

that the courts make certain

that professional judgment in fact was exercised."
2d,
was

at 178.

the

644 F.

He concluded that the appropriate standard

whether

the

defendants'

conduct

was

"such

a

substantial departure from accepted professional judgment,
practice or standards
plaintiff as
base their

in the care and treatment of this

to demonstrate

that the defendants did not

conduct on a professional judgment."

644 F.

2d, at 17 8 . 12

analysis" appropriate to justify severe intrusions on
individual dignity, such as permanent physical alteration
or surgical intervention, id. , at 16 5-16 6, & 17 3, but
respondent concedes that this-issue is not present in this
case.
12 Judges Aldisert
joined Chief
Judge
Seitz's opinion, but wrote se arately to emphasize the
nature of the difference between the majority opinion and
that of the Chief Judge.
On a conceptual level, Judge
Aldisert criticized the majority for
abandoning the
common-law method of deciding the case at bar rather than
articulating broad principles unconnected with the facts
of the case and of uncertain meaning. 644 F. 2d, at 182183.
And, on a pragmatic level, Judge Aldisert warned
that
neither
juries
nor
those
administering
state
institutions would receive guidance from the "amorphous
constitutional law tenets" articulated by the majority.
!d., at 184. See id., at 183-185
Judge Garth also joined c_pief Judge Seitz Is opinion,
Footnote continued on next page.

10.

We granted the petition for certiorari because of
the

importance

administration
retarded.

451

of
of

the

state

u.s.

question

presented

institutions

982 (1981).

for

the

to

the

mentally

We now reverse.

II

We consider here for the first time the substantive
rights of the involuntarily committed under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. 13

In this case, respondent

has been committed under the laws of Pennsylvania, and he
does not challenge the commitment. Rather, he argues that
he has a constitutionally protected liberty

k

~f:ty,

freedom

r~ institution~

of

and

movement,

that

and

petitioners

training
infringed

~ u/1.
rights

by

failing

to

provide

interest

adeqtla~~

within
on

in
the

these

~

,.,;

conditions

f

separately to criticize the majority for
issues not raised by the facts of this case.
at 186.
13 In pertinent part, that Amendment provides that a
state cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law .•.. " u.s. Const.,
Amend. XIV, §1.
Respondent no longer relies on the Eighth Amendment as
a direct source of constitutional rights, Brief of
Respondent 13 n.12.

11.

confinement.
The mere fact that Romeo has been committed under

pro~

procedures does not deprive him of all substantive

liberty
e.g.,

interest

Vitek

v.

under

the

Jones,

Fourteenth

445

u.s.

Amendment.

480,

491-494

See,
(1980).

Indeed, the state concedes that respondent has a right to

~~

adequate food, shelte ~ ~and medical care. 14 We must decide
whether liberty interests also exist in safety, freedom of
movement or

training ~

and, if so, under what circumstances

ri'
these interests are infringed in violation of due process.

A

Respondent's
interests

recognized

first
by

two

prior

claims

decisions

involve
of

this

liberty
Court,

interests that involuntary commitment proceedings do not

~~
extinguish--indeed,
contrary. 15

petitioners

do

not

argue

1\

to

The first is a claim to safe conditions.

the
In

14 Brief of Petitioners 8, 11, 12 & n. 10; Brief of
Respondent 15-16.
See also Amici Curiae Brief of
Connecticut and Twenty Other States 8 ~
15
. ' - /)....... !-L-~
See Brief of Petitioner 27-31.

~~~

~~;;;-,_;:~
~~

~~

12.

the past, this Court has noted that the right to personal
');!

security

constitutes

protected

a,..

substantively

Ingraham v. Wright,

430

"historic
by

the

Due

u,s,

651,

673

liberty

interest"

Process
(1977).

Clause.
And that

right is not extinguished by lawful confinement, even for
penal

purposes. 16

(1978).

If

convicted

it

See

Hutto

v.

Finney,

437

u.s.

678

is cruel and unusual punishment to hold

criminals

in

unsafe

conditions,

it

must

be

unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed-who may not be punished at all--in unsafe conditions.
Next,

respondent claims a right to freedom from

~_iL~~
;

J_.e...t_;

?&-$'-.#~

~ng . I\ In other contexts, the existence of such an
interest is clear
Indeed,

in the prior decisions of this Court.

"[1] iberty from bodily restraint always has been

recognized as the core of the liberty protected by the Due

16 It is true that in cases dealing with prisoners,
analysis begins with the Eighth Amendment's proscription
of cruel and unusual punishment, and that amendment has no
direct bearing on non-penal institutions. See Ingraham v.
Wright,
430 u,s,
651, ___ (1977).
But the Eighth
Amendment has been applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendmenmt. If prisoners
in state institutions have a federal right to some degree
of safety, it is because their safety implicates a liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause.
See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332
u.s. 46 (1947): Palko v. Connecticut, 302 u.s. 319 (1937).

13.

Process

Clause

Greenholtz v.
(1979}

from

arbitrary

Nebraska Penal

(Powell, J.,

governmental

action."

u.s.

1, 18-19

Inmates,

concurring}.

442

This interest survives

criminal conviction and incarceration.

Similarly, it must

also survive involuntary commitment proceedings.

B

Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling: a
training ~

constitutional right to "habilitation," i.e.,

~ eaue~tion
Pennhurst.

to

improve

his

ability

to

function

within

Respondent concedes that no amount of training

will make possible his release.

Moreover, respondent does

not argue that if he were still at horne, he would have a
right to training at the expense of the state.
Oral

Arg.

33.

constitutionally

And,

since

protected

we

1 iber ty

See Tr.

Cha~ found
interests

in

freedom

f+,~

from

restraints and safety,

sorneF

_j

nt o ?r-Jlabi litati on..~

may be neccesary to avoid unconstitutional infringement of
those rights regardless of whether respondent also enjoys
a constitutional right to training per se.

We therefore

14.

~one

decide only the narrow question of whether
been

-

l

t_:nvolu~ar ilj committed~ has

ot h er

..

than

erau~·Hlg

~d
relate

a

~~

right

to safety or

who has

to.!\ training-the ability to

I{

function free of restraints--when such training

mig~
'"{

"

~*

independently within

himA function more

the

institution,

but cannot make possible his release.
Respondent

argues

that,

once a

person has

been

confined, he has "no one but the state to turn to for help
in

gaining

whatever

additional
ski:).. ls

Respondent

23.

skills

and

or,

abilities"

Respondent

at

least,

he

has.

concludes

that

preserving
Brief
the

of

state

therefore has a constitutional duty to provide reasonable
both to preserve existing skills and develop
new ones.

In making

this

argument,

respondent compares

mental retardation to an infectious disease, for which the
state has quarantined the individual, and cannot then deny
appropriate

treatment.

however,

a

disease.

certain

level

of

Mental

Rather,

it

intellectual

retardation
is

a

is

not,

description of

ability, 17

and

a

the

17 see
A.
Baumeister,
American
Residential
Institutions,
at
21-22,
as
printed
in
Residential
Footnote continued on next page.

15.

"habilitation" respondent seeks, such as training to teach

k~~~
him for the first time basic self ear€ skills~ correlates
J
more

closely

to

education

And we have never

.
.
19
Const1tUt1on.
As

a

constitutional

found

a

than

to medical

treatment. 18

right to education under

general
duty

abortions);

(medical

services,
doing so.

the

w

to

matter,
provide

states

are

services

for

under

treatment).

Maher
When

v.

Roe,

states

432
do

u.s.
choose

they G r ;} gene.::ily1 gi ve: - J wide
See Richardson v. Belcher,

no

~~

See, e.g., Harris v. McCrae, 448 u.s. 297 (1980)
funded

(publicly

464

(1977)

to provide

latitude

in

404 u.s. 78, 83-84

Facilities for the Mentally Retarded (Baumeister, ed.
1970); H. Best, Public Provision for the Mentally Retarded
in the United States, at 1 (1965).
See also Brief
American Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, at 4 n.
1 (quoted in n. 1, supra)

I"

I;

18.There may be cases in which it is difficult to
distinguish between claims to medical treatment and claims
to training in the development of skills.
This is not,
however, such a case.
Indeed, Romeo does not raise any
issues related to medical care--for example, he does not
complain that he received inadequate medical treatment in
the infirmary ward. And his claims to training are either
related to safety and freedom from restraints or purely
educational, i.e., training to make him less violent
(related to safety and freedom from restraints) and
training in self-care skills (educational).
19 see San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 u.s. 1 (1973).
Respondent does not argue that he is
denied training or habilitation available to others in
Pennsylvania institutions.

16.

(1971);

Dandrige v.

Specifically,

Williams,

states need

not

"choose

between attacking

every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at
all."

Id.,

at

486-487.

Here,

the

state has

committed

~

\ !!emeone who concedely cannot survive on the outside,

t~ s~aJ;;s

willing to provide

food, shelter,

a.,_~~ -1-o~~~

clothing and medical careA
is whether

<Qa•o~ble

~

~. /

it ~

must:

~

The narrow question presented

afford

him training to

"'*' ·j»<tiJ

develop~

~s, "~~~ ';;~~a~;:;t~

~-

~
~

We
cognizable
instance.

hesitate
under
As

to

the

find

a

Fourteenth

new

liberty

Amendment

we noted in determining

inter~~

in .~~

that there

~

~

general right to education in San Antonio School District
v. Rodriguez, 411

u.s.

1 (1973):

"It is not the province of this Court to create
substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws ••••
Rather, the answer lies in assessing whether
there is a right to education explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution."
Id., at 33-34.

A similar

~~
reluetance

is

seen

in

"liberties" under the due process.

u.s.

693

cases

considering

new

In Paul v. Davis, 424

(1976), we noted that the liberties protected by

17.

the

Fourteenth

state
the

Amendment

either

in

law--for puposes of procedural due process--or

in

guarantees

of

the

have

Bill

of

their

origins

-

~

rights,

wl:Hch have

..-

"incorporated" to apply to the states.

been

Id., at 710-711.

In addition, as noted earlier, some liberty interests are
implicit
word

in our

itself,

state.

But

categories.

process. 2 ~
regarded
"liberty."

as

historic notion of

i.e.,

freedom

a...

~ A..

right

to

Respondent
Nor

does

within

is
he

the

the meaning of

that

from bodily restraint by the
training
not

fits

seeking

claim
meaning

a

none

these

procedural

right
of

of

the

due

historically
concept

of

And respondent points to no right to training

either implicit or explicit in the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights.

~

J

~Respondent does argue that the Pennsylvania
commitment statute provides a state-law basis for a
federal substantive, not procedural, right.
He maintains
that he was commmitted for care and treatment under state
law, and he therefore has a state substantive right
entitled to substantive, not just procedural, protection
under the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution.
But this argument is made for
the first time in
respondent's brief to this Court.
It was not advanced in
the courts below, and was not argued to the Court of
Appeals as a ground for reversing the trial court. Given
the uncertainty of Pennsylvannia law and the lack of any
guidance on this issue from the lower federal courts, we
decline to consider it now. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
u.s. 321, 3273 n. 1 (1977); Duigman v. United States, 274
U.S. 196, 200 (1927); Jordan Mining Co. v. Societe des
Mines, 164 U.S. 261, 264-265 (1921).

18.

The right respondent claims is a substantive due
process right.
individual

Only when an action of a state against an

is

sharply at odds with our common sense of

"liberty and justice," will the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth

Amendment

bar

u.s.

319,

Connecticut,

302

whether

provide

to

habilitative
decision

action.

Palko

(1937) • Zl

individuals

~/

regarding

the

such

In

as

the allocation of

deciding

Romeo

the state must make

v.

with

a difficult

its resources.

We

cannot say that due process requires that such individuals
must be given training in the development of skills that
cannot

lead

scarce

resources
22

Romeo,

to

(JJ-1.,..

freedom.
on

The decision whether

programs

to

attempt

to

to ~

A~ ~
~-.J.:tate .

~ ~~~~~

o;J. \f.e~ --.a~ "" •11PE>Ci<IL -•am to ed~e~f-

~
)
2

ZLSee also Adamson v. California, 332 u.s. 46,
(1947)
(Frankfurter,
J.,
concurring)
(In
order
to
determine whether the defendant was accorded due process
under the Fourteenth Amendment, it is necessary "to
ascertain whether [the proceedings] offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice
of English-speaking peoples."); Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. , at, at
(Under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the standard is whether a state has
"subjected [an individual] to a harship so acute and
shocking that our polity will not endure it.").

~rofessionals in the habilitation of the mentally
retarded
disagree
strongly on
the
question whether
effective training of all severely or profoundly retarded
individuals is even possible.
See, e.g., Favell, Risley,
Wolfe, Riddle, & Rasmussen, The Limits of Habilitation, 1
Footnote continued on next page.

19.

r

is

ftner-city -c hildren,

a

difficult one

federal governments must face.

that

state and

The Constitution does not

~CA.-~~

answer!.J~;;:,.~:.~

dictate an

~ 4> de~<.-AZ.~ .. .
We

theref6re

conclude

~

that

involuntarily-

/

committed mentally retarded do not have a constitutionally

a~~-~/
~ ~

protected liberty interest in training

~~
~J+
per se., a'"it~e; ~ ~ they
interests

in

r=.,t_-:

'•'~

do have constitutionally protected

~~~
freedom

~

from bodily restraints

.

~

~

~

and those interests ma-y require some amount of training.
~

We

turn next

to consider the whether Pennsylvania

~

have violated these two rights. •

III

A

We

have

established

that

Romeo

retains

_

-~

)

liberty

Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities,
37 (1981); Bailey, Wanted: A Rational Search for the
Limiting Conditions of Habilitation in the Retarded, 1
Analysis and Intervention in Developmental Disabilities,
37 (1981); Kauffman & Krause, The Cult of Educability:
Searching for the Substance of Things Hoped for; The
Evidence of Things Not Seen, 1 Analysis and Intervention
in Developmental Disabilities, 37 (1981).

~-~~s 2o.

~~~~·

&--z.- a..-~(\~~

a-u- '·~· : Jj'~ .. W-(

~~ .
interests in safety and freedom from bodily restraint that
survive

his

are

not

absolute, indeed to some extent they are in conflict.

In

~~
~g an

Yet

these

interests

. t't
1ns
1 u t'10n sue h as p enn h urs t ,

J\

occasions

commitment.

in

which

it

~:OW

is

~b

th ere ~il:L±e
the

for

state

to

~~

restrain the movement of patients--for example, to protect

_/~~~~~

~d.A--

others from violenc ~ or: as part of a training program.

t\

~

/1

can

not

protect

its

inmates

~~~
of violence, if it is to permit them t

~

The question then
is

not

simply

infringed

but

whether
whether

a

liberty

interest

has

the~±~/:::::t:-=7.~~

violate due process.

.........

determining

In

been

a

whether

substantive

right

protected by the Due Process Clause has been violated, it
is necessary to balance "the liberty of the individual"
and "the demands of an organized society."
367

In

u.s.

497,

seeking

weighed the
state's

' :__;

522,

this

542

balance

(1961)

in

(Harlan,

other

Poe v. Ullman,
dissenting).

J.,

cases,

the Court has

individual's interest in liberty against the

asserted

reasons

for

restraining

~ ~$ ~~~..k

individual

-'U.C!

~

~~~~~
~~~ ~I"'V\.. ~ ) ~ ·

21.

liberty.
for

In Bell v. Wolfish,

example,

detainees'

we

considered

confinement

441 u.s.
a

520,

challenge

conditions.

We

539
to

(1979),

pre-trial

agreed

that

the

detainees, not yet convicted of the crime charged, could
not

be

liberty

punished.
that

But

were

we

upheld

reasonably

those

restrictions

related

to

government objectives and not tantamount to
And

we

have

procedural

for

a

due-process

proceedings.
example,

taken

similar

approach

challenges

to

on

legitimate

punishment.~
in

civil

deciding
commitment

In Parham v. J.R., 442 u.s. 584 (1979), for

we considered a challenge to state procedures

commitment

of

a

minor

with

parental

consent.

In

determining that procedural due process did not mandate an
adversarisal hearing, we
the

individual

state,

against

including

the

~~ the
the

fiscal

liberty interest of

legitimate
and

interests

administrative

additional procedures would entai1. 24

of

the

burdens

/

Id., at 599-600.

/
~

----~---------

23see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 u.s. 713, 738
(1972)
(holding that an incompetent pre-trial detainee
cannot, after a competency hearing, be held indefinitely
without either criminal process or civil commitment; due
process requires, at a minimum, some rational relation
between the nature and duration of commitment and its
purpose) •
Footnote(s) 24 will appear on following pages.

'·

considering whether

respondent's
~eedom

ti rst
to

substantive

of movement are

State

J

School

fi ~ the

balance

)e v. Ullman, 367 u.s.
497,

522,

542

(1961)

(Harlan, J.,

dissenting)
.nterests

/

~

and

erate,

~

against

the

the

restraints

including

institution

the

such as

~ 4 see also Addington v. Texas, 441 u.s. 418 (1979).
In that case, we held that the state must prove the need
for commitment by "clear and convincing evidence."
We
reached this decision by weighing the individual's liberty
interest against the state's legitimate interests in
confinement.
25
see Parham v. J.R., 442 u.s. 584, 608 n. 16 (1979)
(In limiting judicial review of medical decisions made by
professionals: "[I) t is incumbent on courts to design
procedures that protect the rights of individuals without
unduly burdening the legitimate efforts of the states to
deal with difficult social problems."). See also Rhodes
v. Chapman, 452 u.s. 337, __ (1981) ("[C]ourts cannot
assume that state legislatures and prison officials are
insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to
the perplexing sociological problems of how best to
achieve the goals of the penal function in the crimina!
justice system ••.• ")~
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 u.s. 520, 539 (1979) (In context of
conditions
of
confinement
of
pre-trial
detainees:
"[C)ourts must be mindful that these inquiries spring from
constitutional requirements and that judicial answers to
them must reflect that fact rather than a court's idea of
how best to operate a detention facility.")~ Wolf v.
McDonnell, 418 u.s. 539, 556
(1974)
(In considering
Footnote continued on next page.

~:

~

23.

4

..

1" •

B

We

Seitz,.\

think

the standard articulated by Chief Judge

r~

~~~.

9-t-

proper ,f;alance between the legitimate

interests of the state and the rights of the involuntarily
committed to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom
from

unreasonable

"the

Constitution

restraints.
only

He

requires

would
that

have
the

held

that

courts

make

certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised.
It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been

1-'\
made." 26 644 F.2d, at 178.

procedural due process claim in context of prison:
"[T]here
must
be
mutual
accommodation
between
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of
the Constitution of general application."); Procunier v.
Martinez,
416
u.s. 396, 404-405,406 (1974) (" [T]he
problems
of
prisons
in
America
are
complex
and
intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily
susceptible
to
resolution
by degree.
Most
require
expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of
resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province
of
the
legislative
and
executive
branches
of
the
government.").
See
also
Townsend
& Mattson,
The
Interaction of Law and Special Education, 1 Analysis and
intervention
in Developmental disabilities 75
(1981)
(judicial resolution of rights of the handicapped can have
adverse as well as positive effects on social change).

1

26 our only disagreement with Chief Judge Seitz'
holding is with regard to the existence of a right to
treatment per se. He finds that such a right does exist,
whereas we find no such right cognizable as a liberty
interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
See 644
F. 2d, at

l/r:::l""fFt' ~ ~ ~ ~

24.

~~~

.;)

~~~~~

t-,v>

~~~t?~

q1~....t:-----This

st~eh.e- !'<~~ ~

standard

J

..

is higi er

than the

~~

s;, ~
~

deliberate indifferenc ~ applied in the context of penal ~)o
~
institutions.

Persons

who

have

involuntarily ~

been

~

~ ...<A..tD..t'.t-.

committed are entitled to more considerate treatment and
conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions

~

of confinement are designed to punish.
than

the

standard

of

"compelling"

~y~

necessity

or

J t

is lower

"substantial"

Appeals.

We think

1\

piaees-teo

that such a standar

must

administer ~

We hold that when the rights of the involuntarily
committed

mentally

legitimate

retarded

interests

administrative

and

of

fiscal

against
the

state,

constraints,

the

including
due

process

requires that (i) the state subject these individuals only
to reasonable physical constraints:
reasonable

safety

conditions,

and

(ii)
(iii)

it provide them
it

afford

them

such training as is reasonably necessary to achieve these

'let
ends. 27

We

recognize

that this holding may impose some

Footnote(s) 27 will appear on following pages.

25.

additional

burdens

on

states.

In

determining

what

is

"reasonable," however, we emphasize that courts must show
deference

to

professional. 28

the

judgment

exercised

by

a

qualified

1~ )

By so limiting judicial review of challenges to
conditions
federal

in

state

institutions,

judiciary with

th~

by

internal operations of

0
institutions will

interference

v

be minimized.

'"") I

.

Moreover,

ihe
these

ther~
1\

reason to think judges or juries are better qualified than
the appropriate professional in making such decisions. 29

'V

~ 7 we

v

1M-

~ ~·~ ~

J.t.;..J- ~

have expresse£ the con 'tutional right enjoyed
~
by respondent somewhat.:Jdifferen~ t!:kaA EH-d Chief Judge
Seitz.
Rath r
them stating
that
the
involuntarily
committed
the right to have certain decisions made / /1 ~
by professionals, see 644 F. 2d, at __ , we ha 17 Q haJ:e~ hat ~
they are entitled to conditions of reasonable safety and
reasonable freedom from bodily restraints, but we go on to
h~ld that once such a /dec is ion is made by a professional
in the exercise of his judgment, courts will defer to it.
There i&, th~--ne -ett"bstant...i..y.e--...QiHQre1"i~Q bebreen th~

~.

-1 tl)..e., d.£;

~r:....vzuv-~.~ ~

~l>f,A:Bour ~ itl~~~ht~ -t, crp,

... ~ can be characterized as procedural.
We hold that the
~
involuntary committed are entitled to an informal, nonadversarial "hearing" by a professional exercising his
professional
judgment--a "procedure" not unlike that
upheld in Parham v. J .R. 1 442 u.s.
584
(1979), a
procedural due process case discussed in text at __ ,
supra.

~ 2-9It may not be immediately apparent that decisions
regarding safety conditions, the use of restraints, and
related
training
programs
involve
the
exercise
of
professional judgment by the institution's staff.
But,
for
example,
professional
judgment
is exercised
in
determining whether
a certain training
program can
reasonably
be
expected
to
facilitate
a
patient's
interation with staff and other patients without violence.
Footnote continued on next page.

S~

26.

See Parham v .
Wolfish,

441

J • R.

u.s.

,

4 4 2 U• S .
520,

544

58 4 ,

607

(1979)

( 19 7 9 ) ;

(Courts

Bell v.

should

not

"second-guess administrators on matters on which they are
better
made

informed.") •
by

a

liability may

For

these reasons, the decision, if

professional, 30
be

is

presumptively

imposed only when

valid;

the decision by the

professional is such a substantial departure from accepted
professional

judgment,

practice

or

standards

as

to

demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not
base the decision on such a

judgment.

In an act ion for

damages against a professional in his individual capacity,
however,
unable

the

professional will not be 1 iable

to exercise his professional

if he was

judgment because of

Similarly,
professional
judgment
is
exercised
in
determining whether
a patient, whose violent tendancies
have not been entirely curbed, should be allowed to
interact with others or whether the risks of injury to
self and others justify isolation or even the use · of
restraints.

~By 'professional' decision-maker, we mean a person
competent, whether by education, training or experience,
to make the particular decision at issue.
Long term
treatment decisions normally should be made by persons
with degrees in medicine or nursing, or with appropriate
training in areas such as psychology, physical therapy, or
the care and training of the retarded. Of course, day-today decisions regarding care--including decisions that
must be made without delay--necessarily will be made in
many instances by employees without formal training ~ _
who are subject to the supervision of qualified persons ~ ~

27.

budgetary

constraints;

in

such

a

situation,

good-faith

immunity would bar liability.
IV
In deciding this case, we have weighed those postcommitment interests cognizable as liberty interests under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against
legitimate state interests and the constraints under which

/A),(_~~
most state institutions necessarily operate.
concedes

a

duty

to

provide

provide reasonable safety for

the

shelter,

all patients and personnel

institution and may not restrain patients in

absence

however,

food,

'llhe state

~~~
The state also has a~dut ~ to ~------

clothing and medical care.

within the

adequate

/l

of

that

habilitat ~-;/:

a

legitimate

there

is

no

state

interest.

constitutional

traini ';J- per se.

We

hold,

right

to

~

Yet we )t'Ould not be

understood to hold that the state is under no obligation

~~..
to provide l'mbilitation.
~

~·
~
(l Romeo
with } treatment

fli

~,A,~

The state is ho1l-Ad to provide
~

f..t:btthe

appropriate

professional

~

considers reasonable to ensure his safety

~

to facilitate

1\.

his ability to function free from bodily restraints.
may

well

be

unreasonable

not

to

provide

training

It
when

28.

training

could

significantly

reduce

the

need

for

restraints or the likelihood of violence.
~

Respondent

enjoys

constitutionally

protected

..-"\

interests in conditions of reasonable safety,

reasonably

non-restrictive confinement conditions, and such training
as may

be

required

by

these

interests.

In determining

whether these rights have been violated, decisions made by
the

appropriate

presumption
necessary

professional

of
to

are

Such

correctness.

enable

institutions

unfortunately,

overcrowded and

to

A single

function.

entitled
a

of

to

a

strong

presumption
this

is

type--often,

understaffed--to continue

professional

~to
may make
/\

decisions

with respect to a number of patients with widely varying
needs and problems
administrators,

in the course of a

normal day.

The

and particularly professional personnel,

should not be required to make each decision in the shadow
of an action
the

for

damages.

liberty

e do not,

interests

of course,

identified

above

imply

are

ultimately protected by the Constitution or that judicia
es.
In

this

case,

we

conclude

that

the

jury

was

29.

erroreously instructed on the assumption that the proper
standard of liability was

that of the Eighth Amendment.

Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings consistent
with this decision.

lfp/ss 05/23/82

Rider A, p. 18

(Romeo)

ROME018 SALLY-POW

s

These are the essentialAof the care that the state must
provide.

'·

·.

'

.

lfp/ss 05/23/82

Rider...~ ,

p. 18 (Romeo)

ROME018B SALLY-POW
These conditions of confinement comport fully with
the purpose of respondent's commitment.
Indiana, 406 U.S.715, 738 (1972).

Cf. Jackson v.

Seen. 27, ante, in

determining whether the state has met its obligations in
these respects,

t

'i.,

I

,,.

..

..

.

'
''
f

'·

-~
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Rider A, p. 14 (Romeo)

ROME014 SALLY-POW

v~
~------- This case differs in critical respects from

Jackson, a procedural due process case
involuntary commitment.

involving ~A~~~

Here, petitioner was committed by

a court on petition of his mother who averred that in view
of Romeo's condition she could neither care for him nor
control his violence.

Ante, at 2.

Thus, the purpose of

petitioner's commitment basically was to provide
reasonable care and safety, conditions not available to
him outside of an instituion.

lfp/ss 05/25/82

Rider A, p. 8 (Romeo)

ROMEOS SALLY-POW
B

Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling.
In his words, he asserts a "constitutional right to
minimally adequate habilitation".

Brief, 8, 23, 45.

This

is a substantive due process claim that is said to be
grounded in the liberty component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The term

"habilitation", used in psychiatry is not defined
1
/

precisely or consistently in the opinions below or in the
briefs of the parties or the amici.

As noted previously,

at 4 n. 1, supra, the term refers to "training and
development of needed skills".

Respondent emphasizes that

the right he asserts is for "minimal" training, and he
would leave the type and extent of training to be
determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of present
medical or other scientific knowledge".
In addressing the asserted
we start from established principles.

h

right~

training,

As a general

matter, a State is under no constitutional duty to provide

2.

substantive services for those within its border.
Harris v. McRae, 448

u.s. 297, 318 (1980) (publicly funded

abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
treatment).

See,

u.s. 464, 469 (1977) (medical

When a person is institutionalized - and

wholly dependent on the State - it is conceded by
petitioner that certain duties to provide services do
exist, although even then a State necessarily has
considerable discretion in determining the nature and
scope of its responsibilities.
404

u.s.

See Richardson v. Belcher,

78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397

471, 478 (1970).

u.s.

Nor must a State "choose between

attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all."

Id., at 486-487.

Respondent, in light of the severe character of
his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will
make possible his release.
\

Nor does respondent argue that

if he were still at home, the State would have an
obligation to provide training at its expense.
Arg. 33.

See Tr.

It became necessary for the County Court of

Common Pleas to commit Romeo, at his mother's request,
because of his violence that resulted in injuries to

3.

himself, threatened injuries to others and damaged
property.

See 2 and n. 2, supra.

It is clear from the

record that respondent's primary needs are bodily safety
and a minimum of physical restraint.

~

As we hav ~ ecognized

there is a constitutionally protected liberty

interest in safety and freedom from restraint, these
established constitutional rights require at least
minimally adequate training to assure that they are
safeguarded.

Ante, at ___

We think it unnecessary in this case to decide
specifically what additional training, unrelated to safety
and physical restraint, may be required in this or
similiar cases involving claims of institutionalized
profoundly retarded persons.

Chief Judge Seitz, in

language apparently adopted by respondent, would hold:
"I believe that the plaintiff has a
constitutional right to minimally adequate care
and treatment. The existence of a
constitutional right to care and treatment is no
longer a novel legal proposition." Pet. 54a.

But Chief Judge Seitz did not undertake to identify
specifically or otherwise define - beyond the right to
reasonable safety and freedom from physical restraint the "minimally adequatf are and treatment" that may

4.

appropriately be required for thisfr espondent.

Rather, he

would leave this to "professional judgment", observing
that "the Constitution only requires that the courts make
certain that professional judgment is in fact exercised".*
Pet. 58 a, 59 a.
We agree with these views, and conclude that
respondent's liberty interests ) in the circumstances of his
case) require the State to provide such minimally adequate
training as a professional judgment deems appropriate to
~~~
~~iaG thg safety and freedom from undue restraint that

were the purpose of his commitment. In view of
respondent's condition and the state of the record.
need go no further

~

~Chief

We

Judge Seitz's formulation.

* It is clear that Chief Judge Seitz used the term
"treatment" as synonyous with training or habilitation.

5.

II

A

The liberty interests in safety and freedom from
bodily restraint are not absolute and to some extent they
may be in conflict.

lfp/ss 05/27/82

Rider A, p. 8 (Romeo)

RR MARYB-POW
B

Respondent's remaining claim is more troubling.
In

his

words,

he

asserts

a

"constitutional

minimally adequate habilitation."
is

a

substantive due

grounded
Clause

in

the

of

process

liberty

the

"habilitation",

Brief, 8, 23, 45.

claim

component

Fourteenth
used

in

right

that
of

is

said

This
to be

Process

th;;,fue

term

AmendmentV The

psychiatry ) is

to

not

defined

precisely or consistently in the opinions below or in
briefs of the parties or the

~ 25t
to

v

amici. ~~~~~~~~~~~~

As noted previously, at n. 1, supra, the term refers
"training

and

development

Respondent emphasizes

that

the

of

right

needed
he

skills."

asserts

is

for

"minimal" training, see Brief of Respondent at 34, and he
would

leave

the

type

and

extent

of

training

to

be

determined on a case-by-case basis "in light of present
medical or other scientific knowledge," id., at 45.
In addressing the asserted right to training, we
start from established principles.

As a general matter, a

2.

State

is

under

substantive

no

constitutional

services for

Harris v. McRae, 448

u.s.

those within

When

wholly

dependent

on

the

provide
See,

(publicly funded

u.s.

464, 469 (1977) (medical

is

institutionalized--and

person

a

to

its border.

297, 318 (1980)

abortions); Maher v. Roe, 432
treatment) •

duty

State--it

apetitioner
exist,

that

~A dut r

although

considerable

even

discretion

then
in

a

471,

u.s.

State

necessarily

determining

scope of its responsibilities.
404

to

the

nature

(1970).

Nor

must

and

See Richardson v. Belcher,

78, 83-84 (1971); Dandridge v. Williams, 397

478

has

a

State

"choose

u.s.

between

attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the
problem at all."

Id., at 486-487.

Respondent, in light of the severe character of
his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will
make possible his release.

Nor does he argue that if he

were still at home, the State would have an obligation to
provide training at its expense.
The

record

reveals

bodily safety and a

that

See Tr. of Oral Arg. 33.

respondent's

minimum of

primary needs

physical

restraint,

are
and

3.

respondent clearly
needs. (new

claims ,(~ related

'2; \

if tl-t-

tnote)

ant

1\

to these

we have recognized that there is

a constitutionally protected liberty

interest

in safety

and freedom from restraint, ante at ___ ;~ training may
be necessary to avoid unconsititutional

;;;-- a

ee~>e H~lltiO'II<I't" d~ h ~

infringement of

On the basis

te tr au >R'! per se •

of the record before us,

it is quite uncertain whether

respondent seeks any "habilitation" or training unrelated
to

safety and

freedom

from

bodily restraints.

In his

brief to this Court, he indicates that even the self-care
programs Romeo seeks are needed to reduce his agressive
See Reply Brief of Respondent at 21-22,

behavior.

50.

And in his offer of proof to the trial court, respondent
repeatedly
experts

indicated

would

including

show

that,
that

self-care

~~-~
allowed to

additional

programs,

Romeo's agressive behavior •

.b

if

were

testify,

training
needed

his

programs,
to

reduce

Petition for Certiorari 98a-

2--Z.

104a. \)/If,

as

seems

the

case,

respondent

seeks

only

training related to safety and freedom from restraints,
this case does not present the difficult question whether

{\U~

cA\~

~I

v

4.

a

mentally retarded person

involuntarily committed to a

~~ight

state institution has

to training

~-~-u;u,~~~

per se, even whenA trai l ing ~ A RsbJlea d to freedom.

-~

Chief~
Jud~
ge Seitz, in l:nguage apparently adopted

by respondent,

·~~c4 ~

:

"I
believe
that
the
plaintiff
has
a
constitutional right to minimally adequate care
and
treatment.
The
existence
of
a
constitutional right to care and treatment is no
longer a novel legal proposition."
644 F.2d,
(Pet. 54a).

Chief Judge Seitz did not identify or otherwise define-beyond

the

physical

right

to

reasonable

restraint--the

safety and

"minimally

freedom

adequate

care

from
and

and on the basis of the record developed to date, we agree
with

his

interests

view

and

require

the

/>'-"~
adequate Atraining to
restraint.

conclude
State

that
to

respondent's

provide ~

liberty

minimally

~
p rov i &~

safety and freedom from undue

In view of the kinds of treatment sought by

respondent and the evidence

i~f e cord,

~~~~

we need go no

?/fft

~~~~~~~~Q-~~~~~~ffitilation.

lfp/ss 05/28/82

Rider X (Romeo)

ROMEOX SALLY-POW
Note to Mary:

Our problem is to afford some general

guidance, while deciding this case narrowly on its facts.
A possibility that we might consider is indicated below.

First, add a footnote - keyed to the last
sentence on page 4 of the long rider A:

~
~

It is not feasible, as is evident from the

variety of language and formulations in the
opinions below and the various briefs here, to
define or identify the type of training that may
be required in every case.

A court properly may

start with the generalization that there is a
right to minimally adequate training.

The basic

requirement of adequacy, in terms more familiar
to courts, may be stated as that training which
is reasonable in light of identifiable liberty
interests and the circumstances of the case.
federal court, of course, must identify a
constitutional predicate for the imposition of
any affirmative duty on a state."

A

5.

(

1/~

v

Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as
synonyous with training or habilitation.
See 644 F. 2d,
at ___ (petn 65a-67a, end of Seitz's opinion).

III
A

The liberty
restraint are
e in conflict.

lfp/ss 06/01/82

Rider A, p.

(Romeo}

ROMEOB SALLY-POW
Add as a footnote:

Because the facts in cases of confinement of
mentally retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to
focus on the facts and circumstances of the case before a
court.

Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the

court below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment
of incremental decision-making in favor of promulgation of
broad standards • . . . [that] lack[] utility for the
groups most affected by this decision".

)
644 F.2d, at 18 ~ -

Judge Garth agreed that reaching
issues not presented by the case requires a court to
articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of

seitZ

t"
"tt:eatrnen
the tet:rn
see 6 44 F.
used
. tion·
-· h::\bill ta _..... ; nion) •

5.

Chief Judge Seitz used the term "treatment" as
synonyous with training or habilitation.
See 644 F. 2d,
at ___ (petn 65a-67a, end of Seitz's opinion).

III
A

The liberty
restraint are
e in conflict.

lfp/ss 06/01/82

Rider A, p.

(Romeo)

ROMEOB SALLY-POW
Add as a footnote:

Because the facts in cases of confinement of
mentally retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to
focus on the facts and circumstances of the case before a
court.

Judge Aldisert, in his dissenting opinion in the

court below, was critical of the "majority's abandonment
of incremental decision-making in favor of promulgation of
broad standards • • . • [that] lack[] utility for the

3

groups most affected by this decision".

644 F.2d, at 18 ~-

Judge Garth agreed that reaching
issues not presented by the case requires a court to
articulate principles and rules of law in "the absence of

2.

\'

an appropriate record • • •

C!l:fta

'tfi thoat belief:tt: of

186.

....

,,

-z-3

V

-tfin the trial court, respondent asserted that "state
officials at a state mental hospital have a duty to provide
residents ... with such treatment as will afford them a
reasonable opportunity to acquire and maintain those life skills
necessary to cope as effectively as their capacities permit."
App. to Pet~ for Cert. 94-95. But this claim to a sweeping ~
se right w£(dropped thereafter.
In his brief to this Court,
respondent does not repeat it and, at oral argument, respondent's
counsel explicitly disav~wed any claim that respondent is
constitutionally e 1t' d to such treatment as would enable him
"to achieve his maximum otential." Tr. of Oral Arg. 46-48.

~/82

0$1429g8

Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally retarded

~~IJ-k

patients vary widely, sweeping generalizations as to training should
(\.

be avoided.

As Judge Aldisert said in this case:

"In the common law tradition, courts resolve disputes
by examining the rules laid down by prior decisions.
These are rules of law in the narrow sense, 'precepts
attaching a definite detailed legal consequence to a
definite, detailed state of facts,' or "fairly concrete
guides for decision geared to narrow categories of
behavior and prescribing narrow patterns of conduct •.•••
"The majority's abandonment of incremental
decisionmaking in favor of promulgation of broad standards
is not only methodologically offensive, but lacks utility
for the groups most affected by this decision." 644 F.
2d, at 182-184 (footnote omitted).
Judge Garth agreed:
"The problem with including this discussion and this
[jury] charge [deciding questions not presented by the
facts of this case] is apparent. It is crystal clear that
the Plainttiff here had neither alleged nor suffered from
non-reversible surgery. Nor did he allege or suffer from
being medicated with a powerful anti-psycotic drug. Thus,
the entire discussion in the majority opinion which refers
to those two conditions is gratuitous and constitutes no
more than dictum." Id., at 186.
Judge Garth went on to note that reaching issues not presented by
the case required the court to articulate principles and rules of
law in "the absence of an appropriate record ••. and without the
benefit of analysis, argument or briefing" of such issues.

Ibid.

0$1429g8
Because the facts in cases of confinement of mentally
retarded patients vary widely, it is essential to focus on the facts
and circumstances of the case before a court. Judge Aldisert, in
his dissenting opinion in the court below, was critical of the
"majority's abandonment of incremental decisionmaking in favor of
promulgation of broad standards . . • • [that] lack[] utility for
the groups most affected by this decision".
644 F.2d, at 183-184.
Judge Garth agreed that reaching issues not presented by the case
requires a court to articulate principles and rules of law in "the
absence of an appropriate record • • . and without the benefit of
analysis, argument or briefing" on such issues.
Id., at 186.
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~ ~All

members of the Court of Appeals agreed that respondent's

expert testimony should have been admitted.

This issue was not

included in the questions presented for certioari, and we have no
reason to disagree with the view that the evidence was admissible.
It appears relevant to whether petitioners• decisions were a
substantial departure from accepted professional practice.

